IN RE ASHLEY NICOLE HARRIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHLEY NICOLE HARRIS, Minor.
JULIE ANN KUBACKI and KENNETH JOHN
KUBACKI,
UNPUBLISHED
March 29, 2007
Petitioners-Appellees,
No. 273430
Huron Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-001510-AY
v
RONALD WAYNE HARRIS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Neff and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child under the stepparent adoption statute, MCL 710.51(6). We reverse and remand.
Respondent does not contend on appeal that the statutory ground for termination of his
parental rights was not established, but rather that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to provide him with court appointed counsel. The trial court possessed the discretion to appoint
counsel for an indigent respondent facing involuntary termination of parental rights under MCL
710.51(6). In re Sanchez, 422 Mich 758, 770-771; 375 NW2d 353 (1985). Its refusal to do so is
reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.
An indigent parent has no right to court appointed counsel in proceedings under the
Adoption Code, MCL 710.21 et seq., but the Michigan Supreme Court held in In re Sanchez that
termination of parental rights under § 51(6) of the Adoption Code is involuntary and based on
fault, as is termination of parental rights on the basis of neglect under the Juvenile Code, and that
the probate court is authorized to appoint counsel for a nonconsenting
noncustodial parent in proceedings brought pursuant to § 51(6) of the Adoption
Code. In exercising such discretion, the trial court will be guided by the principle
of assuring the nonconsenting parent the ability to present a case properly,
measured in the particular case by factors such as the relative strength of the
adversaries and the presence or absence of legal, factual, procedural, or
evidentiary complexity.”
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The evidence showed that respondent had been incarcerated since August 2004 and
expected to remain so until August 2009, during which time he earned approximately $5 per
week in prison. The trial court did not inquire regarding his indigency or existence of assets but
should have, given the circumstances. Nor did the trial court make statements on the record
indicating that it had assured respondent’s ability to properly present his case by considering the
relative complexities of the case and the fact that petitioners were represented by counsel.
Rather, the trial court’s statements in response to respondent’s requests for court appointed
counsel indicated that the trial court either did not recognize that it had discretion to appoint
counsel for respondent or that it disregarded its option to appoint counsel.
We cannot conclude that respondent’s ability to present his case was not impaired by the
absence of counsel, given the contested factual issues; the confusion over witnesses who were
present at the initial proceeding, but were excluded from the courtroom and did not testify;
respondent’s inability to effectively question or cross-examine witnesses at the subsequent
proceeding, as evidenced by his ineffective attempts at questioning Kubacki and his sister; and
the court’s own confusion concerning the evidence of respondent’s finances. In re Sanchez,
supra; In re Fernandez, 155 Mich App 108, 115; 399 NW2d 459 (1986). Further, respondent
could participate in the proceedings only via telephone from prison and lacked subpoena power
to ensure the presence of witnesses or secure alleged favorable documentary evidence, such as
telephone records. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we conclude that the court abused
its discretion in denying respondent’s request for appointed counsel without considering the
relevant Sanchez factors.
Reversed and remanded for determination of respondent’s indigency, appointment of
counsel, and further proceedings under MCL 710.51(6). We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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