THRIVENT FINANCIAL FOR LUTHERANS V NATALIE KOLASKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THRIVENT FINANCIAL FOR LUTHERANS,
UNPUBLISHED
March 27, 2007
Plaintiff,
v
NATALIE KOLASKI, Conservator of the Estate
of JESSICA CARPENTER; and WILLIAM
CARPENTER, Personal Representative of the
Estate of JOHN CARPENTER,
No. 269481
Genesee County Circuit Court
LC No. 05-082241-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOSEPH
CARPENTER
and
CYNTHIA
CARPENTER, Conservators of the Estate of
JACOB CARPENTER,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: White, P.J., and Zahra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this interpleader action, appellants appeal by right from an order denying their motion
for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of appellee Natalie Kolaski,
as conservator of the estate of Jessica Carpenter. We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I Basic Facts and Procedure
In 1985, John W. Carpenter purchased a $50,000 life insurance policy from plaintiff. The
policy named his parents as beneficiaries. John then fathered Jacob R. Carpenter. John did not
marry Jacob’s mother but provided child support. John later married appellee Natalie Kolaski.
In 1995, John named his spouse as the first beneficiary of the policy and Jacob as the contingent
beneficiary. In 1996, John and Natalie became the parents of a daughter, Jessica.
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John and Natalie divorced in 1998. The judgment provided that the parties were to have
joint legal custody of Jessica and that John was to have physical custody, with Natalie providing
monetary support if employed.
Significantly for the issues here, the judgment also provided:
CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [insured] shall have the
physical care, custody and control of the minor child . . . .
***
LIFE INSURANCE
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each of the parties hereto
shall name the minor child as the irrevocable beneficiary of any life insurance in
force and effect upon their lives, and they shall maintain such insurance in full
force and effect until the obligation to support said minor child, as provided
herein has terminated.
***
INSURANCE/RETIREMENT/PENSION
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that neither party hereto shall
hereafter have any further interest as beneficiary or otherwise in and to any life
insurance policies, endowments, annuity contracts, retirement and/or pension
benefits standing in the name of or insuring the life of either party.
John died in 2005 without changing the policy beneficiaries to conform to the judgment
of divorce. Upon John’s death, appellee Natalie Kolaski sought the insurance proceeds as the
conservator of Jessica’s estate. Appellants, Jacob’s guardians and conservators, also claimed the
policy proceeds for Jacob’s estate.
Plaintiff filed this interpleader action asking the court to determine the appropriate
distribution of the proceeds. In granting summary disposition in favor of appellees and awarding
the insurance proceeds to Jessica, the trial court concluded that decedent owed a statutory duty to
support Jessica notwithstanding his failure to comply with the terms of the divorce judgment,
citing MCL 722.3.
II Analysis
We review a decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
There exists no question that the terms of the judgment of divorce entered between
Natalie Kolaski and the decedent operate to waive any claim Natalie personally has as the named
first beneficiary under the policy. Prudential Insurance Co v Irvine, 338 Mich 18; 61 NW2d 14
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(1953). The question presented in this case is whether, in the face of a waiver of the named
beneficiary by operation of a judgment of divorce, the proceeds under the policy should be paid
to the contingent beneficiary as named under the insurance policy or the intended first
beneficiary as designated in the judgment of divorce.
Preliminarily, we reject the conclusion reached by the trial court that the proceeds should
be awarded to appellees because the insured was under a statutory duty to support Jessica,
independent of the terms of the judgment of divorce. The trial court failed to identify a specific
statute. To the extent there is such a statutory duty, that duty would not be unique to Jessica, and
would apply equally to Jacob, as the insured was Jacob’s legally recognized father.
We nonetheless affirm the judgment of the trial court. The terms in the judgment of
divorce pertaining to the life insurance proceeds at issue here are substantially similar to those at
issue in In re Monreal Estate, 422 Mich 704; 375 NW2d 329 (1985). There, the insured was
ordered by judgment of divorce to name his minor children as beneficiaries under his life
insurance policy. While the insured initially complied with the judgment of divorce, the insured
later changed the policy to reflect his second wife as the beneficiary.1 At the time of the
insured’s death, one of his children remained under the age of majority. The Supreme Court
concluded that the life insurance benefits were intended by the judgment of divorce to act as a
means of child support for the children in the event decedent died before the youngest child
reached the age of 18. The Supreme Court ostensibly rewrote the terms of the insurance contract
to honor the dictates of the judgment of divorce. A portion of the insurance proceeds sufficient
to fund the balance of the child support obligations due until the youngest child reached the age
of 18 was paid to the estate of the minor child. The balance of the insurance proceeds was paid
pursuant to the dictates of the policy.2
The terms of the judgment of divorce in this case refer to the decedent’s obligation to
support Jessica “as provided herein.” Appellants argue that the judgment of divorce does not
expressly require the insured to provide “support” for Jessica; rather, the judgment provides that
the insured’s ex-wife shall provide support when she is able to find “gainful employment.” As
such, appellants contend, the insured’s obligations to Jessica ended when he died. We find this
argument unpersuasive.
We agree the judgment did not expressly require decedent to pay a periodic and specific
dollar-amount of “support” for Jessica when he was alive. However, the court awarded him sole
physical custody of the child. A court may award custody only after it has determined that doing
1
The insured divorced his second wife and, as part of the judgment of divorce in that case, the
second wife waived her interest in the life insurance proceeds. The fact that the second wife
waived her interest in the insurance proceeds is not relevant to our analysis here, as the Supreme
Court had to determine whether the first judgment of divorce essentially reformed the insurance
policy, thereby precluding the insured from avoiding his obligation under the first judgment of
divorce.
2
It appears that in light of the waiver of the named beneficiary, the insured’s second wife, the
policy required the proceeds to be paid to the insured’s estate.
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so is in the child’s best interests. See Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 192; 680 NW2d 835
(2004). It is axiomatic, then, that a court would not award physical custody to a parent and still
find it necessary to state separately a level of “support” for the child – such support is inherent in
the custody award. Moreover, the judgment of divorce expressly provides that, to “effectively
rear” Jessica, each parent “shall have an active role in providing a sound moral, social, economic
and education [sic] environment for the minor child.” [Emphasis added.] A sound economic
environment for Jessica includes the monetary support from the custodial parent needed to
provide an appropriate custodial environment.
Michigan courts have historically modified insurance contracts to comport with
judgments of divorce. See White v Michigan Life Ins Co, 43 Mich App 653; 204 NW2d 772
(1972). Moreover, by statute the lower court had the power to place a child support order within
a judgment of divorce as well as enforce it.3 MCL 552.16 reads:
(1) Upon annulling a marriage or entering a judgment of divorce or separate
maintenance, the court may enter the orders it considers just and proper
concerning the care, custody, and, as prescribed in section 5 of the support and
parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605, support of a minor
child of the parties. . . .4
(2) An order concerning the support of a child of the parties is governed by and is
enforceable as provided in the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982
PA 295, MCL 552.601 to 552.650. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, MCL 552.625 expressly gives courts and payees both enumerated and unenumerated means to enforce support orders in judgments. It provides:
In addition to providing remedies or imposing penalties otherwise available under
this act or other law for the enforcement of support orders, the court, upon petition
by the office of the friend of the court or recipient of support and after notice to
the payer and an opportunity for a hearing, may require a payer to provide
sufficient bond, security, or other guarantee to secure the payment of support that
is past due, or due in the future, or both. . . . Upon default in the payment of the
amount awarded in the judgment, the court may order execution of the judgment;
. . . or take any other appropriate action to enforce the judgment. [Emphasis
added.]
In this case, the judgment of divorce ordered disbursement of proceeds from “any life
insurance in force” at the time of the judgment, which proceeds were obviously “due in the
future,” to go to Jessica. The court below in this case properly ordered execution of the
3
Whether a court could unilaterally impose such terms had been unsettled in Michigan. See
Kasper v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 412 Mich 232; 313 NW2d 904 (1981).
4
See Burba v Burba, 461 Mich. 637, 642; 610 NW2d 873 (2000), where the Court noted that the
statutory language prior to amendment gave courts “little guidance in ordering child support.”
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judgment of divorce because to make a disbursement to any person other than Jessica, who was
nine years old at the time of her father’s death, would result in a default on the support
envisioned and awarded in that judgment.5
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
5
We note that in In re Monreal Estate, supra, the Supreme Court limited its holding to require
payment only of those funds needed to pay child support until the youngest child reached the age
of 18. Thus, in some circumstances, it may be necessary for a trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of support payable from a custodial parent from the
time of that parent’s death until the children at issue reach the age of majority. Here, Jessica was
nine years old when her father died, leaving a void of more than eight years in which her father
would have been supporting her as the primary custodial parent. We take judicial notice
pursuant to MRE 201(b) that the amount of monetary support needed by a custodial parent to
provide for the support of one child for more than eight years would well exceed the value of the
insurance proceeds at issue in this case. We further note that Jacob’s conservators have not
argued that the proceeds should be apportioned; they argue only that the circuit court erred in
finding that John had a obligation to list Jessica as a beneficiary.
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