IN RE BREANNA RENEE RUCKEL MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BREANNA RENEE RUCKEL,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 22, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 272771
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-421671-NA
CAROL ANN RUCKEL,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Talbot and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm. This case is being
decided without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
I. FACTS
Respondent’s parental rights were terminated on August 11, 2006. Before that date,
respondent’s five other children were removed from her care for various reasons, including
temporary homelessness, failure to feed the children, and poor parenting skills. At the time this
petition was filed, two of respondent’s children were temporary wards of the court due to
respondent’s poor housekeeping skills and her failure to protect one of the other children from
sexual abuse. The only child concerned in this case is respondent’s youngest. The petition for
termination of the child’s parental rights, filed in October of 2004, cited the other children’s
wardship, as well as the unsanitary, cluttered conditions of respondent’s household. As of
January 2006, respondent had not shown a stable income or permanent residence. Respondent
stated that she worked on cars and that while she was working, the child could be in the garage
or in the fenced-in yard without supervision. Respondent attended parenting classes, but she
failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills during testimony regarding the concepts she
had learned in the class. Petitioner renewed the request for termination of parental rights in
March 2006, citing the above factors.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
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A. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it
finds that the termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child. Id. at 364-365. This
Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); In
re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if a
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made, giving due regard to
the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989).
B. Analysis
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination of
respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. The child was
removed from respondent’s care at birth in October 2004. The evidence showed that respondent
had neglected the child’s half siblings in Indiana from 1988 to 1994 and in Michigan since June
2003, and the trial court correctly considered the child’s proceeding a continuation of the 2003
Michigan proceeding. In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) provides that termination of parental rights is appropriate when the
parent “fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.” Respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for the
child by not providing an environmentally fit home for the child after her birth, despite receiving
services for over one year for a prior child protection proceeding. Respondent complied with
many elements of her parent-agency agreement, despite several changes in caseworkers, but a
review of the entire record shows that she continues to lack insight into her failure to safeguard
her children and fails to provide an environmentally fit home. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Further, because this Court has already established that there is at least one legitimate
statutory ground for termination of parental rights, we need not examine whether the trial court
erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) or (j). In re
Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
III. BEST INTERESTS OF CHILD
A. Standard of Review
Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence,
the trial court must terminate parental rights unless termination clearly is not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 353. The trial court’s decision on the best
interests question is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
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B. Analysis
The evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly
contrary to the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 356-357. The
child was bonded to respondent in that she recognized her, but they did not share a child-parent
bond from the child’s perspective. Respondent never demonstrated that she had appropriate
parenting abilities and that she could provide a safe environment for the child even after
participation in many months of governmental programs. Therefore, we conclude that the
evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly contrary to the
child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Bill Schuette
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