MEREDITH TAYLOR-MAGEE V ALLSTATE INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MEREDITH TAYLOR-MAGEE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 22, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266361
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 04-079779-NF
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant,
and
BERNSTEIN & BERNSTEIN,
Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals by leave granted an order denying its motion to withdraw as counsel
for plaintiff in this case. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument under
MCR 7.214(E).
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to
withdraw as plaintiff’s counsel. We disagree.
An attorney who has entered an appearance may withdraw from an action only on order
of the court. MCR 2.117(C)(2); Coble v Green, 271 Mich App 382, 386; 722 NW2d 898 (2006).
Accordingly, a judge presiding over a case has authority to control whether a law firm may
withdraw from representing a client. Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell, 254 Mich App 300, 345;
657 NW2d 759 (2002). We review a decision regarding a motion to withdraw as counsel for an
abuse of discretion. In re Withdrawal of Attorney, 234 Mich App 421, 431; 594 NW2d 514
(1999). Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it selects a reasonable and
principled outcome. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
Although the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct do not expressly apply to a motion
to withdraw, it is logical “to consider the question of withdrawal within the framework of our
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code of professional conduct.” In re Withdrawal of Attorney, supra at 432. In arguing that it
should have been allowed to withdraw in this case, appellant relies on the following language in
MRPC 1.16(b):
[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
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(5) the representation . . . has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the
client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
While apparently not contending that it could withdraw without material adverse effect on
plaintiff, appellant contends that it was nevertheless entitled to withdraw because she has made
appellant’s continued representation of her unreasonably difficult, and/or that the circumstances
provided other good cause for withdrawal.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion
to withdraw as counsel. The trial court reasonably considered that plaintiff’s grievance and
allegations appeared to have been directed at only one attorney in appellant law firm, and that it
would seem difficult for plaintiff to obtain another attorney to represent her in light of the
progression of this case. Further, the trial court’s suggestion that appellant assign a different
attorney to represent plaintiff was a reasonable way for appellant to reduce any continued
difficulty in representing plaintiff. We recognize that continued representation of plaintiff may
entail some difficulty for appellant. However, regardless of whether we would have reached the
same result as did the trial court, the trial court did not reach an unreasonable or unprincipled
outcome in deciding to deny the motion to withdraw. The trial court advanced reasonable
concerns that support a conclusion that it would not be unreasonably difficult for appellant to
continue to represent plaintiff and that good cause for withdrawal did not otherwise exist.
In this regard, the use of the phrase “unreasonably difficult” in MRPC 1.16(b)(5)
suggests that some level of difficulty in representing a client is not a sufficient reason to
withdraw. Further, contrary to the possible implication of appellant’s argument, it was not
inappropriate for the trial court to consider the difficulty that plaintiff might face in finding
replacement counsel in determining whether continued representation of her would be
unreasonably difficult for appellant. Rather, it is reasonable to expect a law firm to tolerate a
higher degree of difficulty in representing a client where it would seem difficult for the client to
obtain replacement counsel than if replacement counsel would seem easily obtained, so that this
is one factor appropriately considered in determining whether continued representation would be
unreasonably difficult.
We also note that, contrary to the suggestion of appellant’s statement of the question
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presented, we find nothing to reasonably indicate that the trial court’s denial of its motion to
withdraw was based on concern with “its own trial docket.”
We affirm.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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