PEOPLE OF MI V TAUREEN HARRIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 22, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266275
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 05-051650-FH
TAUREEN HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Murray and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions after a jury trial for resisting and
obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), possession of a firearm as a felon, MCL 750.224f,
and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1).
Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to 15 months to 4
years’ imprisonment for his resisting and obstructing a police officer conviction, to 18 months to
10 years’ imprisonment for his felon in possession conviction, and to 24 months’ imprisonment
for each of his felony-firearm convictions. We affirm.
These convictions stem from an encounter between defendant and Muskegon Heights
police officers on July 22, 2004. Sergeant Gary Cheatum spotted defendant on his bicycle at
approximately 4:00 a.m. He approached defendant and asked to speak with him about an alleged
shooting on July 18, 2004. Witnesses to that shooting named defendant as one of the
participants. Defendant declined to speak to the Sergeant and rode off on his bicycle. Sergeant
Cheatum gave chase, first on foot with his canine partner, and then by car.
Officer John Waldo responded to Sergeant Cheatum’s call for assistance in setting up a
perimeter. He saw defendant climb over a fence and noticed that he had a gun in his right hand.
Officer Waldo ordered defendant to stop several times. After defendant disobeyed these orders,
the officer chased him to an abandoned house. Defendant surrendered to police after Sergeant
Cheatum threatened to release his dog. Officer Waldo found a silver revolver under a heating
grate several feet from where defendant was captured. The officer testified that this gun
appeared to be the same gun he had seen defendant holding earlier.
Defendant claims that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of other-acts evidence
under MRE 404(b). We disagree. This Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence absent an abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785
-1-
(1998). To the extent that the admission of evidence involves preliminary questions of law, such
questions are reviewed de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
No reversal is required for a preserved error in the admission of evidence unless it affirmatively
appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v
Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). The defendant bears the burden of
establishing that, more probably than not, a miscarriage of justice occurred. Id.
Here, Paul Shappee, a resident of defendant’s neighborhood, testified that he observed
defendant use a gun, specifically a revolver, in a shoot-out with several other men on July 18,
2004. This incident occurred four days before defendant’s arrest on these charges. At
defendant’s request the trial court gave the following limiting instruction; “You may only think
about whether this evidence tends to show circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s possession
3 ½ or 4 days before this happened.”
Our Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant’s possession of a weapon of the
kind used in a charged offense is relevant and admissible “under MRE 401, without reference to
MRE 404(b).” People v Hall, 433 Mich 573, 580; 447 NW2d 580 (1989). Further, the fact that
the evidence of a defendant’s gun possession may also reveal a separate act, wrong, or crime
does not bring the evidence within MRE 404(b). Id. Subsequently, this Court has explained
that, because evidence that a defendant possessed a gun days before a crime does not “operate
through an intermediate inference,” “[a]nalysis under MRE 404(b) is inapposite.” People v
Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 468; 683 NW2d 192 (2004).
Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Shappee’s
testimony. The evidence was relevant to the issue of whether the revolver found with defendant
in the abandoned house had been in his possession. Shappee’s testimony tended to prove that
defendant was in possession of a revolver four days prior and, therefore, made it more probable
that the revolver in the house was the same gun. MRE 401. In addition, the evidence was highly
probative because it complemented Officer Waldo’s testimony that he saw defendant with a
silver revolver as he ran toward the abandoned home. Because defendant’s possession of the
revolver found in the abandoned house was a critical issue, we find that the probative value of
Shappee’s testimony was substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice to defendant.
MRE 403; Hall, supra at 584; Houston, supra at 468.
Defendant’s next argument is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant’s claim that he was denied the right
to a speedy trial raises constitutional questions that this Court reviews de novo. People v
McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 643; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). To the extent that defendant’s
claim requires a review of the trial court’s factual determinations, those findings are reviewed for
clear error. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).
Defendant asserts that his convictions must be vacated because the delay between his
arrest and the commencement of his trial, during which he was held on a parole detainer, denied
him his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.1 In assessing whether defendant’s
1
See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1.
-2-
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, the following factors are to be balanced: (1) the
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4)
prejudice to defendant. Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101
(1972); People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 319-320; 299 NW2d 346 (1980). With regard to
the element of prejudice to defendant, there are two types of prejudice, prejudice to the person
and prejudice to the defense. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112; 503 NW2d 701
(1993).
Here, the 14-month delay in awaiting trial was entirely attributable to the prosecution or
to congestion in the court system. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 460; 564 NW2d 158
(1997); People v Ross, 145 Mich App 483, 491; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). Nonetheless, because
the delay was under 18 months, defendant carries the burden of establishing prejudice. See
People v Janice Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
We find no violation of defendant’s constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial
because defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by the time he served on a parole
detainer while awaiting trial. Our Supreme Court recently found that a defendant who served 19
months on a parole hold awaiting trial was not prejudiced under Barker because the defendant
did not demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced. Williams, supra at 264. Here, defendant’s
claim that he was prejudiced relies solely on the fact that he was not given any sentence credit
for the time he served on a parole detainer while awaiting trial. He does not claim that his
defense was prejudiced as a result of the delay.
Defendant cannot establish prejudice to his person because, by statute, a parolee who is
sentenced for a crime committed while on parole must serve the remainder of the term imposed
for the previous offense before he serves the term imposed for the subsequent offense. MCL
768.7a(2); People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705; 686 NW2d 821 (2004). MCL 791.238
precludes a parolee from receiving credit toward his sentence for the new offense for time served
while being held on a parole detainer. People v Watts, 186 Mich App 686, 689-690; 464 NW2d
715 (1991); People v Brown, 186 Mich App 350, 359; 463 NW2d 491 (1990). Therefore,
because defendant was on parole at the time he committed these offenses, the trial court could
not give defendant credit for the 451 days he spent in jail on the detainer prior to his sentencing
on these convictions. Furthermore, this Court has recognized that the period of time that a
defendant serves on a parole detainer is not, as defendant characterizes it, “dead time” because
the time is ultimately credited, pursuant to MCL 791.238(2), against the sentence for the paroled
offense. People v Stewart, 203 Mich App 432, 434; 513 NW2d 147 (1994). Accordingly, we
find that there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial
because defendant has not established that the personal deprivation he suffered while awaiting
trial amounted to prejudice. Cain, supra at 112.
Defendant also takes the position that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash
all charges because the evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his right against
unlawful searches and seizures. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to quash
charges. People v Wilson, 257 Mich App 337, 341; 668 NW2d 371 (2003) vacated in part on
other grounds People v Wilson, 469 Mich 1018; 677 NW2d 29 (2004). Likewise, whether an
alleged violation of the federal constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
-3-
seizures requires exclusion of the evidence is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Id. at 351.
Defendant argues that, because he was within his rights to refuse to talk to Sergeant
Cheatum, neither Cheatum nor the other pursuing officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity to justify the chase that followed. He contends that the officers had
insufficient information to satisfy a reasonable person that defendant had committed or was
about to commit a crime when Sergeant Cheatum decided to pursue him. Therefore, he asserts
that all evidence obtained through the unjustified pursuit must be suppressed as the fruit of an
illegal seizure.
As this Court recently summarized:
The federal and Michigan constitutions protect persons from unreasonable
searches and seizures. People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 97; 549 NW2d 849
(1996); US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Generally, a search without a
warrant or a seizure without a warrant is unreasonable per se, ‘subject to several
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ Id. at 98; People v
Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 232; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). Evidence seized
pursuant to an unconstitutional search must be excluded from trial unless an
exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable. People v Stevens (After Remand),
460 Mich 626, 634, 636; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). [Wilson, supra at 351.]
Therefore, this Court must determine when defendant was “seized” by Fourth
Amendment standards and whether, at that point, the officers had a lawful basis to seize him
without a warrant. Michigan follows the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in
California v Hodari D, 499 US 621, 625-626; 111 S Ct 1547; 113 L Ed 2d 690 (1991), that a
suspect is not “seized” because he observes officers chasing him. The Hodari Court concluded
that a suspect in a police chase is not seized until the moment he is physically apprehended. Id.
at 626. Following Hodari, this Court found that where evidence is obtained during a pursuit
before the defendant is actually seized, the evidence may not be suppressed as the fruit of an
illegal detention. People v Lewis, 199 Mich App 556, 560; 502 NW2d 363 (1993).
Applying that principle to this case, we find that whether Sergeant Cheatum had
reasonable suspicion to initiate the police chase is irrelevant because a chase does not constitute
a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the trial court properly found that
Officer Waldo’s observation that defendant possessed a gun as he ran was not the fruit of an
illegal pursuit.
The remaining question is whether Officer Waldo had probable cause to arrest defendant
at the time he apprehended him.
This Court repeatedly has explained that ‘probable cause’ to justify an arrest
means facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient
to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense. [People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 58; 378 NW2d 451
-4-
(1985), quoting Michigan v DeFillippo, 443 US 31, 37; 99 S Ct 2627; 61 L Ed 2d
343 (1979).]
According to his preliminary examination testimony, Officer Waldo was aware that
defendant was in flight from Sergeant Cheatum. Flight from police, by itself, does not create
reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant. However, flight is a factor to be considered under the
totality of the circumstances test for reasonable suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest.
People v Parr, 197 Mich App 41, 43; 494 NW2d 768 (1992); People v Armendarez, 188 Mich
App 61, 68; 468 NW2d 893 (1991). The other factors contributing to probable cause to arrest
defendant were that defendant was holding a revolver as he ran from Sergeant Cheatum, he
disobeyed Officer Waldo’s repeated commands to stop, and he refused to surrender to police
until threatened with a police dog. We find that defendant’s conduct created probable cause to
arrest because Officer Waldo reasonably believed, at a minimum, that defendant committed a
felony by disobeying his lawful order.
Finally, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question, this Court views the evidence de novo in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
conclude that the elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997). This Court does not interfere with the
jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). A trier of fact may make reasonable
inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence in the record. People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App
376, 379-380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
We find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to show that defendant
obstructed Officer Waldo, who defendant had reason to know was performing his duties, and that
defendant possessed a firearm at the time of this offense.
To prove a charge of resisting and obstructing a police officer, the prosecutor must show
that an individual assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a
police officer that the individual knew or had reason to know was performing his or her duties.
MCL 750.81d(1). Obstruct includes the “use or threatened use of physical interference or force
or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.” MCL 750.81d(7)(a).
Defendant argues that his conviction is invalid because the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to demonstrate that he knowingly ran from Officer Waldo. He suggests that the early
morning conditions made it impossible for him to observe that Officer Waldo was a uniformed
officer. This Court has held that the “has reason to know” language of MCL 750.81d “requires
the fact-finder to engage in an analysis to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the
case indicate that when resisting, defendant had ‘reasonable cause to believe’ the person he was
[resisting or obstructing] was performing his or her duties.” People v Nichols, 262 Mich App
408, 414; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). The jury must objectively determine whether the prosecution
met its burden of proof. Id. A defendant knows or has reason to know that he is resisting and
obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties when he ignores or resists the
persistent commands of an police officer in a full uniform. Id. at 413.
-5-
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude that defendant committed the offense of resisting
and obstructing a police officer. Officer Waldo was in full uniform and was training a flashlight
and his service weapon on defendant when he gave his first order for defendant to stop.
Defendant initially ran toward Officer Waldo but then turned at a 90-degree angle and
accelerated away from the officer after the command to stop was given. Officer Waldo testified
that he gave at least two additional orders to stop but defendant only ran faster. Sergeant
Cheatum testified that he heard at least one of Officer Waldo’s commands from his position.
Furthermore, defendant’s earlier encounters with Sergeant Cheatum raise a reasonable inference
that defendant knew Officer Waldo was one of the police officers pursuing him. Vaughn, supra
at 379-380. Finally, the evidence that defendant continued to ignore commands from the police
inside the abandoned house casts doubt on his argument that he ignored Officer Waldo’s stop
command because he reasonably thought the officer was “a stranger in the dark.”
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, the parties submitted a stipulation that defendant had
been convicted of a felony and had no right to be in possession of a firearm. Therefore, the only
disputed element under MCL 750.224(f) was whether defendant possessed a firearm. Viewed in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, the testimony of Officer Waldo was itself sufficient
to establish that defendant was in possession of a firearm. He testified that he was a certified
firearms instructor and that he was able to see the silver revolver in defendant’s hand “as clear as
day.” The jury chose to credit Officer Waldo’s testimony and this Court does not interfere with
the jury’s role of determining the credibility of witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514. Furthermore,
Officer Waldo’s testimony was consistent with circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed
a firearm during the incident. Officer Waldo testified that the silver revolver recovered next to
defendant’s hiding place in the abandoned house was the same gun he observed him with earlier.
From this, a rational trier of fact could infer that defendant had actual possession of a firearm.
Thus, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant’s felon in possession of
a firearm conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.