CHAD STEPHENSON V MICHELLE STEPHENSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHAD MICHAEL STEPHENSON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272937
Jackson Circuit Court, Family
Division
LC No. 00-000371-DM
MICHELLE LEE STEPHENSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order awarding primary physical custody of
the parties’ minor children to defendant and ordering plaintiff to pay child support pursuant to
the Michigan Child Support Formula. We affirm.
Plaintiff Chad Stephenson and defendant Michelle Stephenson married in 1997. They
divorced in November 2000. The trial court awarded joint legal custody of the parties’ two
minor children to plaintiff and defendant and awarded primary physical custody of the children
to defendant. The trial court ordered plaintiff to pay child support and childcare expenses. On
December 11, 2001, the trial court entered a stipulated order, which provided, in part, that the
parties “shall have joint legal and joint physical custody of the minor children.” The order
further provided that “the parties wish to deviate from the guidelines and agree that the
Plaintiff’s child support obligation be reserved, $0.00 per week, based on the new joint custody
agreement.”
On May 12, 2006, defendant moved to modify the custody order, seeking primary
physical custody of the children. She alleged that she signed the stipulated order because
plaintiff told her he would not visit the children unless she agreed to give him joint physical
custody and eliminate his child support obligation. She also alleged that, after the entry of the
stipulated order, plaintiff failed to exercise his parenting time and that he placed the children at
risk because he consumed alcohol in the children’s presence and continued to operate a motor
vehicle after his driver’s license was revoked.
After a hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court determined that there was proper
cause to modify the child custody order. The court reasoned:
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I can’t understand why there’s not a significant amount of parenting time
complaints that have been filed and documented. I can’t understand why a father
wouldn’t have a week of scheduled vacation with the children. And even if the
children didn’t have – had an activity that was scheduled, why he’s not there, why
he’s not in Court, why he’s not reinforcing it. And I think that the reason for that
is he simply doesn’t want to pay guideline child support. I think he negotiated a
joint custody relationship with the mother. She wasn’t represented. It’d be one
thing if the parties truly had joint physical custody, but the parties don’t have joint
physical custody. It’s not what they’ve been exercising consistently. And, as I
indicated before, that is the good cause for changing the custodial relationship.
The trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with both parents and,
after examining the best interests of the child factors set forth in MCL 722.23, the trial court
concluded “by way of clear and convincing evidence that they clearly favor the mother.” Thus,
the court awarded primary physical custody of the children to defendant. The trial court ruled
that plaintiff was entitled to reasonable rights of parenting time and ordered him to pay child
support according to the statutory child support guidelines.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in finding that the parties did not have
joint custody of the children. We disagree.
“To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication,
all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge
made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of
discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28; Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich
871, 876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). Under the great weight of the evidence standard, “this
Court will sustain the trial court’s factual findings unless ‘the evidence clearly preponderates in
the opposite direction.’” Shulick v Richards, ____ Mich App ____; ____ NW2d ____ (2006),
quoting LaFleche v Ybarra, 242 Mich App 692, 695; 619 NW2d 738 (2000). A trial court
commits clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. Id.
Joint physical custody is an arrangement in which a child “reside[s] alternately for
specific periods with each of the parents.” MCL 722.26a(7)(a). In this case, the stipulated order
provided, in part, that the parties had joint physical custody of the children and that “the plaintiff
and the defendant shall have parenting time with the minor children on alternate weeks.” An
order that provides for alternating weeks of parenting time indicates that the parties have a joint
physical custody arrangement. See Shulick, supra; Gehrke v Gehrke, 266 Mich App 391, 392;
702 NW2d 613 (2005); Winn v Winn, 234 Mich App 255, 260; 593 NW2d 662 (1999). Thus,
pursuant to the terms of the order, the parties had joint physical custody of the children as a
matter of law. An order entered by a court of proper jurisdiction must be obeyed even if it is
clearly incorrect. Schoensee v Bennett, 228 Mich App 305, 317; 577 NW2d 915 (1998).
Nevertheless, the trial court found that the parties did not exercise their alternating weeks
of parenting time consistently and that plaintiff had “significantly” less than 128 overnights with
the children. Therefore, the parties did not “truly” have joint physical custody of the children.
The evidence in this case supported the trial court’s finding that the actual amount of parenting
time exercised by the parties was inconsistent with the joint custody arrangement contemplated
by the parties when they signed the stipulated order. Defendant testified that, from December
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11, 2001, to January 2005, plaintiff had the children for approximately 50 overnights per year.
In 2005, he had the children for 99 overnights. From January 1, 2006, to July 26, 2006, he had
the children for 14½ overnights. In support of her testimony, she submitted a copy of her
journal, in which she documented plaintiff’s parenting time. Defendant admitted that she denied
parenting time to plaintiff when he arrived to pick up the children and was intoxicated, or when
he exhibited “dangerous behavior” in the children’s presence. However, she also testified that
plaintiff offered her several reasons why he could not exercise his parenting time, including that
he could not provide transportation for the children, that it was “not a good night,” and that he
did not have a babysitter for the children. Plaintiff testified that, contrary to defendant’s
testimony, he had the children for approximately 150 overnights in 2004 and 2005 and that
defendant denied him parenting time “plenty” of times. However, “[t]his Court gives special
deference to a trial court’s findings when they are based on the credibility of the witnesses.”
Dragoo v Dragoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). See also MCR 2.613(C).
The trial court’s finding, that the parties did not “truly” have joint physical custody of the
children, was not against the great weight of the evidence. The evidence did not clearly
preponderate in the opposite direction; therefore, we must sustain the trial court’s finding.
Shulick, supra.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in determining that proper cause existed to
modify the custody order. We disagree.
A child custody order may only be modified upon a showing of proper cause or change of
circumstances that establishes that the modification is in the child’s best interests. MCL
722.27(1)(c); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 5; 634 NW2d 363 (2001). The moving party
“has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that either proper cause or a
change of circumstances exists before the trial court can consider whether an established
custodial environment exists (thus establishing the burden of proof) and conduct a review of the
best interest factors.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003)
(emphasis in original).
[T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a
movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an
appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate
ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest
factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s
well-being. [Id. at 512.]
“[I]n order to establish a ‘change of circumstances,’ a movant must prove that, since the entry of
the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have
a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.” Id. at 513 (emphasis in
original).
In this case, the trial court was concerned about plaintiff’s failure to enforce the stipulated
order and his failure to exercise his parenting time with the children. “[P]arenting time is not
merely a right of the parent, but also a right of a child and thus an obligation of the parent.”
Delamielleure v Belote, 267 Mich App 337, 340; 704 NW2d 746 (2005). However, the record
indicates that the trial court did not modify the custody order to sanction plaintiff for failing to
enforce the order. Cf. Kaiser v Kaiser, 352 Mich 601; 90 NW2d 861 (1958). The trial court was
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also concerned about plaintiff’s seeming manipulation of the child support guidelines. The trial
court found that plaintiff negotiated a joint custody arrangement with defendant because “he
simply doesn’t want to pay guideline child support.” The court noted that it had “an obligation
to make sure there’s statutory child support set and paid.” Regardless of the agreement of the
parties, the trial court was responsible for determining and protecting the children’s inherent
rights with respect to custody, support, and parenting time. Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186,
192-194; 680 NW2d 835 (2004).
In Macomb Co Dep’t of Social Services v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645
NW2d 710 (2002), this Court opined that:
Biological parents have an inherent obligation to support their children.
Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). A biological
parent must support a minor child unless a court of competent jurisdiction
modifies or terminates the obligation or the child is emancipated. MCL 722.3.
The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of a child. Evink, supra
at 176. The parents of a child are not permitted to bargain away a child’s right to
receive adequate support. Id.
A trial court has discretion to modify a child support order “as the circumstances of the parents
and the benefit of the children require.” MCL 552.17(1). However, when modifying a child
support award, the trial court has a statutory duty to follow the criteria set forth in the Michigan
Child Support Formula Manual (“MCSFM”). Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637,
643-645, 647; 610 NW2d 873 (2000).
The shared economic responsibility formula (“SERF”) provision found in the MCSFM
provides:
When children share substantial amounts of time with both parents, child
support should consider the costs and savings associated with parenting/custodial
time. When a parent cares for a child overnight, that parent will cover many of
the child’s unduplicated costs. Conversely, the other parent will not be expending
food or utility costs for the child. This calculation presumes that as parents spend
more time with their children they directly contribute toward a greater share of all
expenses. [2004 MCSF 3.05.]
For purposes of the SERF, “substantial amounts of time” is specifically defined in the MCSFM
as 128 overnights. 2004 MCSF 3.05A; Gehrke, supra at 396. However, a noncustodial parent
need not exercise his rights of visitation for all of those days before the SERF becomes
applicable. Eddie v Eddie, 201 Mich App 509, 514; 506 NW2d 591 (1993). “[T]he support
must be based upon the number of days that the noncustodial parent is entitled to visitation under
the order, not the actual visitation that will be exercised in the future.” Id. at 514 n 1.
Pursuant to the terms of the stipulated order, plaintiff was entitled to a reduction in his
child support obligation under the SERF, regardless of the number of overnights or the amount
of parenting time that he actually exercised. Id. The trial court found, however, that plaintiff
exercised “substantially” less than 128 overnights per year. Consequently, plaintiff was not
entitled to calculate his child support obligation using the SERF. However, because the SERF
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applied regardless of the amount of parenting time that plaintiff exercised, the trial court could
not modify the child support order without modifying the custody order. Thus, based on the
facts of this case, plaintiff’s seeming manipulation of the child support guidelines constituted
“the existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court.” Vodvarka,
supra at 512.
Further, plaintiff’s nonpayment of child support was “relevant to at least one of the
twelve statutory best interest factors . . . .” Id. Payment of child support is relevant to the
parties’ ability to continue the education of the children, MCL 722.23(a), and the capacity and
disposition of the parties to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other
material needs, MCL 722.23(c). Plaintiff’s failure to enforce the parenting time schedule, and
his manipulation of the child support guidelines, were also relevant under MCL 722.23(l), which
authorizes a trial court to consider “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.”
Finally, plaintiff’s failure to enforce his parenting time, coupled with his nonpayment of
child support, was “of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child[ren]’s well
being.” Vodvarka, supra at 512. A parent’s inability to adequately provide a child with food,
clothing, medical care, and other material needs certainly has a significant effect on the child’s
wellbeing. The evidence in this case established that defendant was recently unemployed at the
time of the hearing on her motion to modify the custody order. Plaintiff was employed full-time
and had the ability to pay child support. Because defendant did not have a source of income, but
was primarily responsible for caring for the parties’ two minor children, plaintiff’s payment of
child support would have had a significant impact on the children’s wellbeing. Plaintiff testified
that the main factor contributing to his failure to exercise his parenting time was not his lack of
desire or attempts to exercise his parenting time, but defendant’s refusal to allow parenting time.
The trial court found, however, that plaintiff negotiated the joint custody arrangement because he
did not want to pay the statutory child support and that he failed to enforce the parenting time
provisions in the custody order. “On review, considerable deference is given to the superior
vantage point of the trial judge respecting issues of credibility . . . under the statutory factors.”
Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 305; 477 NW2d 496 (1991). Thus, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in determining that proper cause existed to modify the custody order.
Because defendant established proper cause to modify the custody order, the trial court
was authorized to consider whether an established custodial environment existed and to conduct
a review of the best interest factors. Vodvarka, supra at 509. A custodial environment “is one of
significant duration ‘in which the relationship between the custodian and the child is marked by
qualities of security, stability and permanence.’” Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 197; 614
NW2d 696 (2000) (citation omitted). Where supported by the facts, a trial court may find that an
established custodial environment exists in more than one home. Jack v Jack, 239 Mich App
668, 671; 610 NW2d 231 (2000). Here, the trial court found that an established custodial
environment existed with both parents. Plaintiff did not challenge this finding on appeal.
Because an established custodial environment existed with both parties, the trial court
could modify the existing custody order under MCL 722.27(1) only upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that the change was in the children’s best interests. MacIntyre v MacIntyre,
267 Mich App 449, 451; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). After examining the factors set forth in MCL
722.23, the trial court concluded that a change in custody was in the children’s best interests. On
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appeal, plaintiff did not challenge the trial court’s findings on any of the factors. Further, he did
not challenge the trial court’s determination that the change of custody was in the children’s best
interests. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody of the
children to defendant, where the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to do
so. Id. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order awarding primary physical custody to defendant
and ordering plaintiff to pay child support. MCL 722.28.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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