KENNETH D SMALLEGAN V RONALD J KOOISTRA
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH D. SMALLEGAN, Individually and as
Trustee of the FLORENCE J. SMALLEGAN
CHARITABLE REMAINDER UNITRUST
UNDER AGREEMENT DATED OCTOBER 31,
1998, and Personal Representative of the Estate of
FLORENCE J. SMALLEGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272838
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 04-049107-CZ
RONALD J. KOOISTRA and KOOISTRA &
DANTUMA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P. J., and Murray and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’ summary
disposition on all counts pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
This case arose when the decedent, Florence Smallegan, approached defendant, Ronald
Kooistra, in need of an estate plan. Mr. Kooistra referred her to individuals at American Express
Financial Advisors, who prepared an in-depth estate plan for her. Plaintiff, Florence’s son and
only heir, participated in most of the estate planning discussions along with Mr. Kooistra.
Central to the estate plan designed by American Express was a Charitable Remainder Unitrust
(CRUT), which would remove $900,000 worth of appreciated stock from Florence’s estate and
place it in plaintiff’s limited control as the CRUT’s trustee. The American Express
representatives advised that the estate’s assets could be replaced with proceeds from a life
insurance policy funded by the CRUT’s distributed earnings. Pursuant to this plan, defendants
drew up the CRUT documents. Even after the aged decedent was denied life insurance
coverage, the American Express representatives assured her that they could find a life insurance
policy to replace the value of the stock, so she executed the CRUT and transferred the stock to
the trust.
After another set of denied applications, the decedent gave up trying to enter a life
insurance contract. Although the trust paid a percentage of its value to Florence every year, all
its remaining assets would be distributed directly to a designated charitable organization when
-1-
Florence died. Plaintiff was left to expend his own assets to salvage what was left of his awaited
inheritance. Decedent eventually died without the anticipated life insurance in place. Plaintiff
filed this suit against defendants to recover the value of the nonexistent insurance proceeds, and
defendants essentially demurred, claiming that the trust worked as designed and did not contain
any errors for which they could be held liable. The trial court applied the “four corners” rule
adopted in Mieras v DeBona, 452 Mich 278; 550 NW2d 202 (1996), and granted defendants’
motion for summary disposition on all remaining matters under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
On appeal, plaintiff first claims that the ambiguities in the CRUT and the legal
presumptions derived from defendants’ loss of Florence’s file provide sufficient evidence of
malpractice within the estate planning documents. We disagree. We review de novo a trial
court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). Whether phrased as an evidentiary limitation or put in terms of a
beneficiary’s standing, the “four-corners” rule precludes a beneficiary from introducing extrinsic
evidence to undermine the viability or intent of a clear and unambiguous testamentary document.
Mieras, supra at 303. Because the law must presume that the stated intentions contained in
testamentary documents accurately reflect a decedent’s intent, a beneficiary’s suit against a
drafting attorney for malpractice is similarly dependent upon evidence gleaned from the drafted
instruments themselves. Id. If the instruments do not contain internal inconsistencies,
ambiguities, or other evidence of the drafting attorney’s poor craftsmanship, then a would-be
beneficiary may not establish the attorney’s malpractice with outside evidence of the decedent’s
“true” intent. Id. Once reserved for wills, this evidentiary limitation now extends to other
alternative testamentary instruments such as trusts. Bullis v Downes, 240 Mich App 462, 467470; 612 NW2d 435 (2000). In short, if a testamentary document clearly performs a function as
designed, a would-be beneficiary has no grounds to challenge whether its function was actually
intended by the decedent. Mieras, supra at 304-305.
Here, the CRUT itself clearly reflects Florence’s intent to distribute $900,000 in stock out
of her estate in 1998, and nothing presented in the trial court indicates that it had any contrary
effect. It does not contain confusing or ambiguous language and does not mention any intent to
preserve the assets that are clearly and unambiguously being committed to charity. Nevertheless,
plaintiff argues that the CRUT contained an insurance clause, which raises an ambiguity
regarding whether the CRUT actually intended to replace its assets with insurance proceeds.
However, the clause that plaintiff points to only relates to insurance policies owned by the CRUT
and does not indicate that the CRUT was designed for or conditioned upon insurance obtained to
benefit plaintiff. In fact, the CRUT’s provisions adamantly prohibit plaintiff from using any
CRUT assets for his own benefit, and plaintiff concedes that Florence only intended to pay for
the life insurance policy out of the CRUT’s periodic payments to her. Therefore, the CRUT’s
insurance clause does not create an ambiguity.
Next, plaintiff points to Florence’s application for life insurance and asserts that the
application constitutes a testamentary document that should be read together with the CRUT to
reveal its true, but failed, intent. However, we agree with the trial court that a rejected insurance
application does not qualify as a testamentary document under the “four corners” rule. A mere
application for insurance does not distribute any of the estate’s assets and does nothing to
increase a beneficiary’s capital. Once the application was rejected, it lost all its potential force
and value, and Florence could not have reasonably intended it to affect the distribution of her
-2-
estate after her demise. See Bullis, supra at 468. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that
the rejected life insurance application did not qualify as a testamentary document.
Plaintiff next argues that the legal presumptions generated by defendants’ spoliation of
evidence should have precluded summary disposition. We review for abuse of discretion a trial
court’s decision regarding the proper sanction for spoliation of evidence. Brenner v Kolk, 226
Mich App 149, 160; 573 NW2d 65 (1997). It is undisputed that defendants lost Florence’s file,
including her will, so the puzzle of Florence’s documented testamentary intent was missing at
least one major piece. However, plaintiff does not raise any issue relating to the malpractice of
losing the file, forcing plaintiff to probate the estate. Instead, plaintiff argues that defendants’
loss of Florence’s file raises the legal presumption that it contained evidence that was
unfavorable to defendants’ handling of the CRUT. Again, plaintiff has not argued that the
missing will itself contained tax-saving measures or other means of providing him with a greater
portion of his mother’s estate, but merely argues that the trial court should have presumed that
the will created an ambiguity that would open the door for parol evidence of defendants’
malpractice regarding the CRUT.
Plaintiff has never even speculated about what the will could have possibly contained to
support his claims. Although a judge may allow a jury to draw unfavorable inferences about an
absent article of evidence, it may also decide that the nature of the missing evidence does not
warrant the bald assumption that it would support a highly unlikely claim of what the deceased
might have done. See Id. at 160-161. This holds true especially when the actions of the
deceased do not reveal any inclination to undo what the testamentary document accomplished.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was unwilling to assume
that the missing will would have discussed the decedent’s intent to acquire life insurance. A will
by its nature only has effect after the opportunity for meaningful discussion about obtaining life
insurance has been rendered academic. Even if this type of statement existed, it would not be of
a testamentary nature (how the decedent wants the estate distributed), but of a colloquial nature,
describing unfulfilled intentions or regrets. See Bullis, supra. Moreover, the point of funding a
transfer of assets with life insurance is to take assets out of the estate and convert them into
assets for beneficiaries. The point of a will is to distribute the assets that remain in the estate
postmortem. Under the circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that defendants’ failure
to preserve the will did not warrant the court’s indulgence in an unreasonable presumption that
Florence’s missing will contained a declaration of her true intentions regarding the life insurance
and the CRUT. Brenner, supra. Because plaintiff fails to point to anything that might conflict
with the CRUT’s clear and unambiguous intent, the trial court correctly limited its analysis to the
CRUT’s four corners. Mieras, supra at 303. Therefore, plaintiff’s cause of action must derive
from something other than his mother’s decision to establish the CRUT. Id.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if the CRUT itself is an unassailable legal
instrument that faithfully carried out its expressed intent, defendants still committed malpractice
by advising his deceased mother to place her assets into the irrevocable trust without first
acquiring the anticipated life insurance. The problem with this argument is that, without undoing
the CRUT, the theory of malpractice would have only created a cause of action in Florence.
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how defendants breached any duty to him as personal representative
of her estate, trustee of the CRUT, or individually as a potential beneficiary of Florence’s
residuary estate as it existed at the time of her death.
-3-
Although plaintiff claimed that Florence was emotionally hurt by her imprudent failure to
obtain life insurance before transferring the stock into the trust, she nevertheless chose to
establish the trust, and we are not free to look outside the CRUT’s four corners for reasons to
second-guess that decision. Id. The CRUT effectively moved assets from Florence to her
desired charitable beneficiary, simultaneously decreasing her estate and its tax burden and
preserving the maximum amount of gross benefit for the charity. See id. at 304-305. Therefore,
her estate did not “lose” the amount of money that went into the CRUT, and her estate has no
claim for reimbursement. See id. at 290 (Levin, J.). Because the estate did not lose anything,
plaintiff may not bring suit to recapture the assets transferred on its behalf.1 See id. Likewise,
plaintiff was clearly not the intended beneficiary of the CRUT, because by its terms it plainly
and unambiguously prohibits him from using any of its assets for his own personal gain. If
plaintiff had his druthers, the CRUT would have gone totally unfunded, so plaintiff has no claim
against defendants in his capacity as the CRUT’s trustee.
Finally, plaintiff does not have a personal claim against defendants because they never
owed him an individual duty to deter Florence from transferring her assets into the trust.
Essentially, plaintiff claims that, in hindsight, defendants owed him a duty to warn Florence not
to transfer the stock into the trust without first obtaining effective “replacement” insurance. The
problem with this argument is that plaintiff has failed in his challenge to the CRUT itself, so we
must presume that Florence fully intended to transfer her stock into the trust, even when that
meant that plaintiff might never recover the value of those assets. The damage claimed on
appeal is the loss of the value to the estate of the stock transferred to the CRUT, which was
presumptively an intended consequence of Florence’s actions. Defendants did not do anything to
make Florence less insurable and did not interfere with her attempts to obtain life insurance, so
they are not liable for her inability to acquire life insurance coverage. Because plaintiff cannot
hold defendants liable for Florence’s decision to transfer her assets into the CRUT, and fails to
establish any cognizable claim against them for Florence’s failure to obtain insurance coverage,
he fails to point to anything that can substantiate his claim for malpractice regarding the CRUT.
Furthermore, the trust was executed October 31, 1998. Florence did not die until August
10, 2002. During that time, Florence understood that obtaining the desired insurance was
problematic because she was declined coverage three days before executing the trust agreement.
Yet she took no action during the last four years of her life to disavow the trust, rescind its
establishment, or seek recourse against those who recommended it. Under the circumstances, the
trial court correctly determined that summary disposition was appropriate.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Alton T. Davis
1
The trial court’s opinion on this matter was cryptic, but we agree with its clear and final grant
of summary disposition on this and every other one of plaintiff’s claims.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.