MICHIGAN COLUMBUS FED CREDIT UNION V MADISON NAT'L LIFE INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN COLUMBUS FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272725
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-525495-CK
MADISON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the summary dismissal of its breach of contract claim. We
affirm but remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This case involves a group credit life insurance policy that was issued on the life of
Thomas Busdeker in conjunction with his purchase of a mobile home through a loan Busdeker
obtained from plaintiff. Under the terms of the life insurance policy, if Busdeker died prior to
the balance on the mobile home loan being paid, plaintiff was to be paid the balance of the loan
as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy. In fact, Busdeker did die on November 30, 2004,
before the mobile home loan was paid off, but defendant refused to pay plaintiff’s claim for the
balance of the loan consistent with the terms of the life insurance policy that defendant issued.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this breach of contract action. Defendant responded to
plaintiff’s complaint, averring that the terms and conditions of the life insurance policy were not
met. Specifically, defendant claimed that the insurance policy terminated when Busdeker, before
his death, became three months delinquent in his repayment of the mobile home loan. Further,
defendant claimed, because Busdeker refinanced the mobile home loan, the policy terminated at
the time of the refinance, as provided by the terms of the life insurance policy.
Subsequently, defendant moved to summarily dismiss the case pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Defendant indicated that in January of 1998, plaintiff financed a loan to Busdeker
with terms that included 84 payments of $479.61 on the 20th of each month, and one balloon
payment, on February 20, 2005, of $30,350.08. Defendant claimed that Busdeker was late on a
majority of the loan payments, including (1) in 2000, he made nine late payments, and only 11
out of 12 payments were paid; (2) in 2001, all of his payments were late, and only 11 out of 12
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payments were paid; (3) in 2002, he made three late payments, and only 11 out of 12 payments
were paid; (4) in 2003, he made five late payments, and only 11 out of 12 payments were paid;
and (5) in 2004, he made seven late payments, and only 11.8 payments out of 12 were paid.
Further, defendant argued, in April of 2002, plaintiff lowered the loan payments to $425
a month and changed the due date to the 30th of each month via an “Extension Agreement,”
which changed the terms of the initial loan and purportedly forgave the late fees and interest that
had accrued to that date. Thus, when Busdeker died, he owed $38,852.33 in principal on the
loan, instead of only three more payments and the amount of the balloon payment. And,
defendant claimed, Busdeker was more than three months late in making his February 2004
payment because it was paid on June 14, 2004, thus, the policy was terminated on June 30, 2004.
Accordingly, because the life insurance policy provided that it terminated either upon
refinancing the loan or when the debtor was three months delinquent in loan payments,
defendant argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact that it did not breach its
contract by failing to pay plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion for summary dismissal, arguing first that
defendant never notified Busdeker or his wife that the life insurance policy was terminated but,
in fact, continued to accept premium payments for the coverage even during this litigation.
Second, plaintiff argued that the loan was not refinanced or renewed, but merely extended for
three months at the end. Third, plaintiff argued that the mobile home loan was not in arrearage
but, even if it was, there was no material breach of contract. Further, plaintiff claimed that the
life insurance policy was ambiguous because the “When Insurance Stops” provision was
contradicted by the “Termination” provision of the policy in that the latter required that a 30 day
written notice be given before the policy was cancelled and no such notice was given in this case.
Therefore, plaintiff argued, there were substantial genuine issues of material fact that prevented
the granting of defendant’s motion for summary dismissal.
Defendant responded to plaintiff’s arguments, claiming that (1) the plain meaning of the
word “renew” is “to grant or obtain extension of” according to Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s
Law Dictionary; (2) the contested policy provisions were not ambiguous or contradictory in that
the “Termination” provision applied only when either defendant or plaintiff decided to cancel the
policy, and the “When Insurance Stops” provision applied when the individual debtor fails to
perform the necessary acts; (3) this was not a breach of contract case rather it is a case in which
defendant determined that coverage did not exist under the circumstances; (4) defendant did not
cancel the coverage and defendant never collected payments from Busdeker, plaintiff collected
the payments from all of its debtors and forwarded one monthly check for the lot of them; and
(5) defendant was not notified by plaintiff that Busdeker was in arrearage and plaintiff is the only
entity that would know such information.
Following oral arguments, defendant’s motion for summary dismissal was granted. The
trial court noted that at issue was a group credit life insurance policy issued to plaintiff and
plaintiff was provided the policy; whether plaintiff gave copies of the policy to its debtors was
plaintiff’s decision, not defendant’s burden. Further, plaintiff’s counsel admitted that Busdeker’s
loan “was about three months and I think five or six days in arrears for a short period of time,”
but argued that it did not constitute a material breach of the insurance contract. The trial court
rejected that argument, noting that according to the terms of the policy, “It can’t be a nonmaterial breach. It’s the difference between whether there is coverage or there is not coverage.
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That can’t be a non-material breach.” Thereafter, the trial court granted the motion for dismissal.
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal followed.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for
summary disposition because numerous issues of fact existed, including whether Busdeker was
three months or more in arrears in violation of the insurance policy terms. After review de novo
to determine whether plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact, we disagree. See
MCR 2.116(C)(10); Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003).
Plaintiff’s counsel admitted during oral arguments on the motion for summary disposition
that the loan was more than three months in arrears, as quoted above. Specifically, with regard
to the loan, the colloquy included:
Mr. Padgett: . . . It was about three months and I think five or six days in
arrears for a short period of time. We haven’t denied that. The testimony of the
president [of the credit union] establishes that. But our argument is –
The Court:
You mean – you denied what?
Mr. Padgett: No, I said, Judge, we’re not denying that.
The Court:
That he was –
Mr. Padgett: He was in arrears –
However, on appeal, plaintiff is attempting to argue the loan was not in arrears 3 months,
but was only in arrears 2.8 months. But, it is well-established that a party cannot take a position
in the trial court and then take a contrary position on appeal. See Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant
Properties, Inc, 259 Mich App 241, 252; 673 NW2d 805 (2003). Therefore, plaintiff’s argument
that the loan payments were not 3 months delinquent is rejected. And, the policy clearly
provides that “Insurance stops . . . (6) on the last day of the month in which the Debtor is 3
months delinquent in any payment on his loan.” Insurance policy language must be interpreted
as written and according to its plain meaning. American Bumper & Mfg Co v Nat Union Fire Ins
Co, 261 Mich App 367, 375; 683 NW2d 161 (2004). Therefore, the trial court properly
determined that this policy term was triggered by Busdeker’s delinquency.
Plaintiff also argues, however, that defendant should be estopped from defending the
claim on the ground that the delinquency terminated the coverage because defendant did not
provide notice of the terms of the policy to Busdeker. We disagree. As the trial court noted, the
insurance policy was a group credit life insurance policy. Apparently, plaintiff recommended
that its debtors secure the coverage, which names plaintiff the beneficiary. See MCL 500.4416.
Plaintiff is the group policyholder. See MCL 500.4418. The group life insurance policy refers
to plaintiff as the “creditor” and provides as follows: “The Creditor shall deliver to each insured
Debtor an Individual Certificate furnished by the Company describing the coverage to which the
insured Debtor is entitled under this policy.” Therefore, as the policyholder and according to the
clear terms of the policy, it was plaintiff’s responsibility to provide Busdeker with notice of the
life insurance policy terms. Thus, this argument is without merit.
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And, we reject plaintiff’s argument that defendant should be estopped from defending the
claim because it continued to accept premiums for coverage. In fact, plaintiff continued to
accept premiums from Busdeker for the life insurance policy. The group policy provides that
“Premiums under this policy . . . shall be paid to the Company [defendant] by the Creditor
[plaintiff] at the same time the Creditor shall furnish the Company with reports and information
required pursuant hereto.” And, the policy required that plaintiff maintain a record regarding the
debtor insured, including the amounts of their indebtedness, cancellations, changes, and
additions. In light of plaintiff’s collection of both the loan payments and the insurance premium
payments, plaintiff knew or should have known that Busdeker may not have been eligible for
coverage and, as policyholder, should have advised Busdeker of the same. Nevertheless,
defendant may not retain the unearned premiums; therefore, we remand this matter to the trial
court for determination of the amount of reimbursement, including interest, to which Busdeker’s
widow may be entitled. See MCR 7.216(A)(7).
We decline to address plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should not have summarily
dismissed this matter on the ground that Busdeker’s loan was renewed because the trial court
made no findings on the issue and did not dismiss this matter on that ground.
Affirmed but remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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