IN RE TALIA HOGAN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TIAJ'JA CONNER, TIAJ'WAN
CONNER, TISAIAH CONNER, TASTARRA
CONNER, TRE'YON CONNER, TAVIONNA
CONNER, and TALIA HOGAN, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270139
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-117434-NA
DONNA EVANS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
THADDEUS CONNER and RICHARD L.
HOGAN,
Respondents.
In the Matter of TALIA HOGAN, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 270154
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-117434-NA
RICHARD L. HOGAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DONNA EVANS,
Respondent.
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Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent Donna Evans appeals by right from the trial
court’s orders terminating her parental rights to all of the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and respondent Richard Hogan appeals by right the termination
his parental rights to Talia Hogan under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
A neglect petition was filed on December 4, 2003 to take temporary custody of the minor
children on grounds of substance abuse, neglect, and improper supervision. Talia was removed
from respondent Hogan's home. The mother and children had previously lived with maternal
grandmother Louella Evans and other adults. After removal, the children were placed with
Louella Evans. Respondent mother admitted some allegations in the petition, and an order of
disposition was entered on January 6, 2004. The case was then referred to drug court. However,
respondents failed to appear at drug court hearings and did not comply with that court’s
requirements. The case then returned to the family division of the circuit court. Respondents’
case service plan (CSP) and parent agency agreement (PAA) required drug assessment, treatment
and screens, psychological evaluation and counseling, parenting classes, and visitation with the
children. Consistent with DHS policy, supervised visitation was permitted after three clean drug
screens.
Respondents both claim that the trial court clearly erred in finding clear and convincing
evidence to terminate their parental rights. We disagree. Respondents complied minimally with
the court-ordered requirements. Both had psychological evaluations but failed to attend or
dropped out of individual counseling. Both completed parenting classes, and respondent Evans
did attend a 28-day inpatient drug program. But respondents missed many drug screens and had
some screens positive for cocaine. Respondent Hogan was in jail for part of the time for
violating probation on a conviction for maintaining a drug house or vehicle. Respondent Evans
was also jailed before completing a substance abuse treatment assessment in January 2006.
Neither respondent visited the children regularly, had adequate housing, or provided verification
of employment to the caseworker. Failure to comply with a PAA is evidence of continuing
neglect. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 360-361 n 16; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Here, respondents'
participation in services was sporadic. There is some merit to respondent Hogan’s claim that his
visitations should have commenced because he complied with the court's requirements of three
negative screens, and later one negative screen. Still, part of the problem was that Hogan then
stopped providing screens and/or became unavailable. Had he truly wished to continue
establishing a relationship with Talia, he would have regularly turned in negative screens and
complied with other reasonable requirements of his CSP. We find sufficient evidence supported
the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent Hogan’s rights to Talia under subsections (g)
and (j) and respondent Evans’ rights to the minor children under subsections (c)(i), (g), and (j).
MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
We further reject respondent Hogan’s claims that hearsay evidence was improperly
admitted against him, and that the DHS failing to provide drug screen reports and the
psychologist’s report impeded his ability to prepare a defense. Contrary to Hogan’s argument,
the petition contained numerous references to him. Moreover, once the court took jurisdiction
over the children, the court was empowered to enter orders affecting both respondents. In re CR,
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250 Mich App 185, 205; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). Additionally, much of the evidence against
both respondents was based on firsthand knowledge or was otherwise legally admissible. For
instance, in July 2003, respondents left a small child alone in the car while they went in the state
office building in Flint to speak with their caseworker. The windows in the car were up and the
doors locked. When a Children's Protective Services worker spoke to respondent Hogan about
this, he replied angrily that he did not have to answer questions and drove off. He had slurred
speech and his breath smelled of alcohol. As for the drug screen reports and psychological
reports, these were repeatedly referred to at hearings, yet apparently no specific request to bring
or furnish the reports was received.
Respondent Hogan further claims that he was prejudiced by the trial court's handling of
the paternity issue. Respondent Hogan apparently was given an acknowledgement of parentage
form, completed it, and had it notarized in court. He said he then filed it at the place where he
had obtained it. He argues that he complied with MCL 722.1003(2) and should have been
considered a “father” under MCR 3.903(A)(4). However, the caseworker testified that she could
find no record of filing of an acknowledgment of parentage for Talia. Filing with the state
registrar is required by MCL 722.1005(1). Here, Hogan suffered no real prejudice because he
was given the opportunity to comply with services and was a provided a psychological
evaluation, parenting classes, and drug screens. He also would have been permitted visitation if
he had complied with drug screens. We find no reversible error.
Finally, we find that termination of respondents’ parental rights was not clearly contrary
to the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(J); Trejo, supra. The children
were in relative or foster care for over two years, and all but Talia were victims or perpetrators of
sexual abuse. Respondents were provided many chances to comply with services and rectify the
problems that brought the children into care. Respondents complied only minimally and never
reached the point where the children would not be at risk in their care. The children need a
permanent, safe, stable home, which neither respondent can provide. We find no clear error in
the trial court's best interests ruling.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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