CHRIS DICKINSON V ROY WALKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
CHRIS DICKINSON and SHARON
DICKINSON,
Plaintiffs/Counter DefendantsAppellants,
v
ROY WALKER, SHIRLEY WALKER, LELAND
EASTER, PAT EASTER, GLADYS A. ROLL,
ARNOLD E. ROLL, E. W. WINFIELD, JOANN
WINFIELD, MIKE WEAKS, DEB WEAKS,
WILLIAM BARTON, BERNADETTE BARTON,
JOSEPH O. BRADISH, DEBORAH A.
BRADISH, SUSAN L. ROBERTS, COLLEEN
LAY, DONALD LAY, JACK HOLT, CYNTHIA
HOLT, NANCY L. REYNOLDS, DAVID A.
REYNOLDS, STEVE WEISS, LYNNE M.
WEISS, ROBERT BEDARD, DEBRA BEDARD,
FRANK DICKERSON, TINA M. PROND,
CHARLES R. RICHARD, DIANE JO RICHARD,
and KENNETH CUNNINGHAM,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs/
Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
ESTATE OF ELIZABETH E. LORBER, ROY E.
ELDEN, NELLA MAE BROOKS, and BETTY
JANE KLAG,
Third Party Defendants.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
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No. 266645
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-001061-CH
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a bench trial judgment restricting the use of the
lakefront abutting their land and granting a prescriptive easement to defendants in this riparian
rights and quite title action.1 We affirm.
This action arises out of a dispute between plaintiffs and defendants regarding the
reasonable use of the water abutting their lakefront properties. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that
defendants did not acquire a prescriptive easement to use the waterfront area at issue because
their use of this area was not continuous. Notwithstanding, plaintiffs agreed with the trial court
that the only issue before the trial court was the parties’ reasonable use of the property at issue.
Thus, plaintiffs have arguably waived this issue for appellate review. See Chapdelaine v
Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 172; 635 NW2d 339 (2001) (“A party cannot stipulate to a matter
and then argue on appeal that the resultant action was error.”) Regardless, plaintiffs have failed
to show plain error in this case. See MRE 103(d); Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333,
336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000).
“An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specified purpose.” Schadewald
v Brule, 225 Mich App 26, 35; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). “An easement by prescription results
from use of another’s property that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of
fifteen years.” Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc v Prose, 242 Mich App 676, 679; 619
NW2d 725 (2000), citing MCL 600.5801.
In Dyer v Thurston, 32 Mich App 341, 342-344; 188 NW2d 633 (1971), this Court found
that the defendants’ use of a pathway across the plaintiffs’ land to a lake satisfied the continuous
use requirement because “continuous use does not mean constant use.” In arriving at this
conclusion, this Court elaborated that “[a] pathway easement to a summer cottage is considered
to be continuous if it is used merely seasonally . . . [because] this use would be in keeping with
the nature and character of the right claimed.” Id. at 344. Thus, the defendants’ seasonal use of
the pathway was likewise continuous.
Here, both parties stipulated that Lots 1 and 2 were “primarily used during the summer
season.” Specifically, defendants stipulated that they would “seasonally” build docks on their lot
extending from their shoreline into Devil’s Lake and had moored watercraft to these docks for
over 15 years before the filing of this suit. Similarly, plaintiffs admitted building docks from
their shoreline into Devil’s Lake and mooring watercraft to them during the summers of 2002 to
2004 and stipulated that they would mostly use Lot 2 on weekends in the summer. Further,
defendants would store pieces of their dock during the “off-season” on Lot 1.
From these facts, it appears that the practice of building docks and mooring watercraft to
them was a seasonal activity. In addition, in light of the fact that others owning lots around
Devil’s Lake had built a total of 720 docks in the lake and moored watercraft to those docks as of
1
Although “[s]trictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian, while
land which includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral,” the terms may be used interchangeably.
Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 288 n 2; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). Given that the land at issue
was referred to below as riparian, we will use this term for the sake of consistency.
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the time of trial, it appears that defendants’ mooring their boats in the disputed area in the lake
was consistent with “the nature and character of the property involved.” Id. Therefore,
defendants’ practice of mooring boats in front of plaintiffs’ lot was sufficiently continuous to
establish their prescriptive easement.
Plaintiffs claim that defendants’ seasonal use was not continuous because the area at
issue could be used for other beneficial purposes at different times of the year. In support of this
argument, plaintiffs cite Rose v Green, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued May 18, 1999 (Docket No. 206524), in which this Court noted that property must lend
itself to seasonal use to be continuous.2 However, in making this statement, Rose was merely
rearticulating this Court’s holding in Dyer. Rose, supra, slip op at 3-4. Indeed, the central
holding of Rose was that the defendants’ use of the property at issue did not create a prescriptive
easement because their use was not adverse. Id. at 4. Therefore, plaintiffs’ reliance on Rose is
misplaced, and their argument fails.
Plaintiffs next argue that there were no “indicia of ownership” putting them on notice of
defendants’ “trespass” before they purchased Lot 2. However, plaintiffs cite to a portion of the
record that does not clearly support their contention. Specifically, as the following exchange
shows, plaintiff Chris Dickinson’s testimony regarding the state of the dock extending from Lot
1 and the watercraft moored to that dock at the time plaintiffs purchased Lot 2 is unclear:
Q.
When you first looked at this house what was the status of the docks both
the dock here and dock next door?
A.
The previous owner had a dock extended out from the dock parallel [sic].
And the pontoon went in and out in a line with the boats. And those boats there, I
don’t recall them being there. But it was September so I think a lot of them were
already out.
While we acknowledge that this testimony was given at trial on the location at issue, and
therefore, may have originally seemed less vague, plaintiffs’ bare citation to this portion of the
record, without more, hardly establishes plain error in this case regarding notice. See Kern,
supra at 336. Indeed, it is ambiguous to what docks and boats plaintiff Chris Dickinson is
referring in this statement.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ claim still fails. “[A]ctual notice may be determined by the
character of the use. Such use and occupancy, however, must be so open, notorious, and hostile
as to leave no doubt in the mind of the owner of the land that his rights are invaded.” Menter v
First Baptist Church of Eaton Rapids, 159 Mich 21, 25; 123 NW 585 (1909). Here, it was
undisputed that defendants and their predecessors had seasonally built a dock from Lot 1 into
Devil’s Lake and moored watercraft to that dock since 1948. Moreover, defendant Roy Walker
noted that defendants’ usage of their dock has been consistent since 1976 and plaintiffs’
predecessor had never complained of this use. Given that plaintiffs purchased Lot 2 in 2001, it is
2
Unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. MCR
7.215(C)(1).
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clear that defendants had already openly, notoriously, and adversely used the area in dispute for
more than 15 years before plaintiffs’ purchase of Lot 2. Therefore, this claim is without merit.
Plaintiffs also assert that the court’s ruling effectively gave defendants exclusive use over
the area at issue and, therefore, was akin to a finding of adverse possession. This argument is
without merit. Adverse possession requires the same elements as a prescriptive easement with
the additional element of exclusivity. Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc, supra at 679680. Here, although the temporary order and the judgment restricted the placement of plaintiffs’
dock, neither the temporary order nor the judgment precluded plaintiffs from using the area at
issue. Indeed, the court’s temporary order permitted plaintiffs to use the area at issue to place a
volleyball net and to moor their watercraft in the area “as close as reasonably practicable to their
dock,” and the judgment did not even address the placement of the volleyball net. Plaintiff Chris
Dickinson even noted that the only usage he did not have concerned the placement of his dock.
Thus, any of the court’s restrictions on plaintiffs did not grant exclusive use of the area at issue
to defendants, “but merely grant[ed] [defendants] qualified possession only to the extent
necessary for enjoyment of the rights conferred by the easement.” Schadewald, supra at 35.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court’s determination regarding the reasonable use of
the area at issue was erroneous because it was based on the faulty premise that defendants had
acquired a prescriptive easement and deprived plaintiffs of the use of 70 percent of their
shoreline. We disagree. We review a trial court’s factual findings in a bench trial for clear error
but review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. MCR 2.613(C); Walters v Snyder, 239
Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000).
As previously noted, the trial court’s ruling that defendants had acquired a prescriptive
easement was not erroneous. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment regarding where defendants
could moor their watercraft was reasonably based on this easement given that an easement may
confer the exclusive right of a riparian landowner to permanently anchor watercraft off of his
shore. Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 288; 380 NW2d 463 (1985); Little v Kin, 249 Mich App
502, 511; 644 NW2d 375 (2002).3 Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, plaintiffs were
not enjoined from using 70 percent of their shoreline. Rather, the trial court’s restrictions on
plaintiffs pertained only to the location of plaintiffs’ dock (as plaintiff Chris Dickinson
admitted), the mooring of watercraft to their dock, and the requirement not to interfere with
defendants’ ingress and egress to and from defendants’ dock. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim fails.
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erroneously found that their use of a volleyball net
was not a riparian right. However, regardless of whether the use of a volleyball net in the water
constitutes a riparian right, the trial court did not address plaintiffs’ volleyball net in its
judgment. Therefore, given that “courts speak through their judgments and decrees, not their
oral statements or written opinions,” Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632
(1977), plaintiffs’ argument fails.
3
It should be noted that, to the extent defendants’ usage of the area at issue did not conform to
the scope of the easement, the trial court restricted defendants’ usage (specifically, the trial court
limited the number and size of watercraft defendants could moor on the eastern side of their
dock, specified the angle at which defendants could park these watercraft, and prohibited
defendants from swimming in front of plaintiffs’ land).
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We note that although not incorporated into its judgment, the trial court’s bare statement
that use of the volleyball net in the water was not a riparian right was incorrect. See Kurrle v
Walker, 56 Mich App 406, 410; 224 NW2d 99 (1974) (among the rights of littoral landowners is
the right to engage in aquatic sports). Nevertheless, given the parties’ stipulation that the
placement of the volleyball net interfered with some of defendants’ ability to navigate their
boats, the trial court’s statement was proper in the context of reasonable use.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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