LILLIAN BULLARD V INKSTER HOUSING & REDEVELOPMENT COMMN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LILLIAN BULLARD,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
INKSTER HOUSING & REDEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION, TONY LOVE, MELODY
COFFEE, LEONTINE MONTGOMERY, FLOYD
SIMMONS, and ERNESTINE CARTER,
No. 265095
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-341181-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right, challenging the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant Inkster Housing & Redevelopment Commission (“IHRC”), and
individual defendants Tony Love, Melody Coffee, Leontine Montgomery, Floyd Simmons, and
Ernestine Carter, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(10), with
respect to plaintiff’s claims for noneconomic damages. We affirm.
Plaintiff brought this action against the IHRC and several employees of the IHRC after
she was physically and sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant inside her apartment at the
Twin Towers, a public housing complex operated by the IHRC and subsidized by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Plaintiff sought recovery of
noneconomic damages for breach of her residential lease agreement, gross negligence, and
violation of the Michigan Consumers Protection Act (“MCPA”), MCL 445.901 et seq. The trial
court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed each of these claims.1
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Maiden
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Guerra v Garratt, 222 Mich App 285,
1
The trial court allowed a breach of contract claim for economic damages to proceed, but, on the
day of trial, plaintiff conceded that she had incurred no economic damages and the case was
dismissed.
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288; 564 NW2d 121 (1997). The trial court granted defendants summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of fact).
When reviewing a dismissal on the basis that a claim is barred because of governmental
immunity, MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, unless
contradicted by documentary evidence, and construe them in favor of the nonmoving party.
Maiden, supra at 119; Guerra, supra at 289. If no facts are in dispute, or if reasonable minds
could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, then the question whether the claim is
barred is an issue of law. Maiden, supra at 122; Guerra, supra at 289.
When reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
the court must examine the documentary evidence and, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Quinto
v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). The party opposing the
motion may not rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings, but rather has
the burden of establishing—through affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary
evidence—that a genuine issue of disputed material fact exists. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that she was not entitled to
recover noneconomic damages for her breach of contract claim, and that there is a question of
fact whether her noneconomic damages were caused by the IHRC’s breach of the lease
agreement.
A party alleging breach of contract may recover “‘those damages that arise naturally from
the breach, or which can reasonably be said to have been in contemplation of the parties at the
time the contract was made.’” Lawrence v Will Darrah & Assoc, Inc, 445 Mich 1, 13; 516
NW2d 43 (1994), quoting Kewin v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 419; 295
NW2d 50 (1980) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). This is an objective test. Lawrence,
supra at 13. Thus, damages are recoverable if there is evidence for a reasonable person to
conclude that the parties knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff’s damages would result
from a breach of the contract. Id. at 13, 15-16; see also Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256
Mich App 505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003) (party may recover damages that are the direct,
natural, and proximate result of the breach).
As plaintiff observes, “it is generally held that damages for emotional distress cannot be
recovered for the breach of a commercial contract” because such damages are not reasonably
foreseeable at the time the contract is made. Lane v KinderCare Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich
App 689, 693-694; 588 NW2d 715 (1998); see also Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513,
530; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). “However, [in Stewart v Rudner, 349 Mich 459, 469; 84 NW2d
816 (1957),] our Supreme Court . . . recognized that damages for emotional distress may be
recovered for the breach of a contract in cases that do not involve commercial or pecuniary
contracts, but involve contracts of a personal nature.” Lane, supra at 693. The Stewart Court
stated:
When we have a contract concerned not with trade and commerce but with
life and death, not with profit but with elements of personality, not with pecuniary
aggrandizement but with matters of mental concern and solicitude, then a breach
of duty with respect to such contracts will inevitably and necessarily result in
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mental anguish, pain and suffering. In such cases the parties may reasonably be
said to have contracted with reference to the payment of damages therefor in
event of breach. Far from being outside the contemplation of the parties they are
an integral and inseparable part of it. [Stewart, supra at 471.]
“In such case the party sought to be charged is presumed to have contracted with reference to the
payment of damages of that character in the event such damages should accrue on account of his
breach of the contract.” Id. at 472. “Examples of personal contracts include a contract to
perform a cesarean section, a contract for the care and burial of a dead body, a contract to care
for the plaintiff’s elderly mother and to notify the plaintiff in the event of the mother’s illness,
and a promise to marry.” Lane, supra at 693-694 (citations omitted). A contract to care for
one’s child is also a personal contract. Id. at 694.
In the present case, plaintiff fails to cite any legal authority to support her argument that a
residential lease agreement is a personal contract that may give rise to noneconomic damages in
the event of a breach. We further conclude that this case is controlled by McDowell v Detroit,
264 Mich App 337; 690 NW2d 513 (2004), lv gtd 474 Mich 999 (2006). In McDowell, a
fiduciary sued the city of Detroit and the housing commission after a fire in a public housing
project killed six children and injured an adult and another child. The plaintiff alleged that the
fire was caused by a faulty electrical system, about which the lessee had repeatedly complained,
and asserted a claim for breach of contract premised on the lease agreement. Id. at 341-342, 355.
The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition, finding that, under Mobil
Oil Corp v Thorn, 401 Mich 306; 258 NW2d 30 (1977), the plaintiff could “maintain a tort
action predicated upon a breach of contract to keep the premises in reasonable repair.”
McDowell, supra at 354-355 (emphasis added).
On appeal, this Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the [plaintiff’s] claims are in fact merely
recapitulations of the tort claims. . . . Mobil Oil stands for the proposition that
lessees can recover in tort for personal injuries in actions sounding in contract. In
applying Mobil Oil to this case, we are again left with the conclusion that
although plaintiff’s cause of action “sounds in contract” the issues are plainly tort
issues. Accordingly, the trial court should have . . . tested whether the claims
were barred by governmental immunity.” [Id. at 355-356 (emphasis in original).]
In this case, although plaintiff’s cause of action “sounds in contract,” substantively her
claims are tort issues. Therefore, because the IHRC is a governmental entity, it is immune from
tort liability if engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL
691.1407(1).
In McDowell, the Court held that the defendants, in operating a public housing project,
were engaged in the discharge of a governmental function. McDowell, supra at 356; MCL
125.602. The Court also observed that, under the governmental immunity act, there are only five
exceptions to the rule that government agencies are immune from tort liability (highway, motor
vehicle, public building, proprietary function, and government hospital), none of which applied
to the operation of a public housing project. The Court concluded that without an applicable
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exception to governmental immunity, the plaintiff’s claims failed and summary disposition
should have been granted to the defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7). McDowell, supra at 356.
The same result applies here. In operating the Twin Towers apartments, the IHRC was
engaged in the discharge of a governmental function. Further, although plaintiff’s claim sounds
in contract, we agree that the noneconomic damages she seeks are plainly tort damages.
Therefore, the IHRC is immune from liability and the trial court properly granted summary
disposition with respect to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for noneconomic damages.
In light of our resolution of this issue, it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of
any “preexisting duty doctrine” defense or plaintiff’s argument that she was an intended thirdparty beneficiary to a contract between the IHRC and HUD. See McDowell, supra at 356.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in determining that there was no genuine
issue of material fact whether the individual defendants were grossly negligent and whether their
alleged negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries.
MCL 691.1407(2) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and
employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a
governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or
statutorily created task force of a governmental agency is immune from tort
liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer,
employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or caused by
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the
following are met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably
believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.
[Emphasis added.]
Because the question of proximate cause is dispositive, we need only address that issue.
In Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 445-446; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), our Supreme
Court held that the phrase “the proximate cause” means that the employee’s gross negligence
must be “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause,” not merely a proximate cause.
In the present case, it is clear that “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of
plaintiff’s injuries was the intruder who broke into her apartment and assaulted her. Because the
individual defendants’ alleged gross negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
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injuries, the trial court properly granted their motion for summary disposition. Therefore, the
issue of gross negligence need not be reached.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims under the MCPA
because defendants are not immune from liability for violations of the act.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated MCL 445.903(1)(g), (s), and (bb), which
prohibits “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of
trade or commerce” in the following respects:
(g) Advertising or representing goods or services with intent not to
dispose of those goods or services as advertised or represented.
***
(s) Failing to reveal a material fact, the omission of which tends to
mislead or deceive the consumer, and which fact could not reasonably be known
by the consumer.
***
(bb) Making a representation of fact or statement of fact material to the
transaction such that a person reasonably believes the represented or suggested
state of affairs to be other than it actually is.
However, MCL 445.904(1)(a) provides that the MCPA does not apply to
[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a
regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the
United States.
Contrary to what plaintiff argues, an allegation that defendants engaged in conduct that
could be considered illegal is insufficient to avoid application of this exemption. In Smith v
Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 465; 597 NW2d 28 (1999), our Supreme Court held that, in
adopting this exemption, the Legislature “intended to include conduct the legality of which is in
dispute.” In determining whether the exemption applies, “the relevant inquiry is not whether the
specific misconduct alleged by the plaintiff is ‘specifically authorized[,]’ . . . [but] whether the
general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific
misconduct alleged is prohibited.” Id.
MCL 125.653 authorizes a city to create a housing commission, such as defendant IHRC.
Such a commission is specifically authorized to “operate any housing project,” MCL 125.657(b),
and the commission “shall have complete control of the entire housing project or projects
including the construction, maintenance and operation as fully and completely as if said
commission represented private owners.” MCL 125.662. “[E]ach commission shall manage and
operate, or cause to be managed and operated, its housing projects in an efficient manner so as to
enable it to fix the rentals for dwelling accommodations at the lowest possible rates consistent
with its providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations, and that no commission
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shall construct or operate any project for profit.” MCL 125.677(1). The commission “may rent
or lease to a tenant dwelling accommodations consisting of the number of rooms, but no greater
number, which it deems necessary to provide safe and sanitary accommodations to the proposed
occupants thereof, without overcrowding.” MCL 125.694(c). The commission is also
empowered to adopt use and occupancy rules, among others. MCL 125.694b.
Because it is clear that the general transaction involved here, the operation of a public
housing project, was authorized under laws administered by defendant housing commission
under statutory authority, the MCPA does not apply. Therefore, the trial court properly
dismissed plaintiff’s MCPA claims.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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