PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID ALAN RUIZ
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 262699
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC No. 04-009184-FC
DAVID ALAN RUIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted on three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I),
MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (personal injury), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(f) (personal injury), following a jury trial. Defendant was sentenced
to concurrent prison terms of 13 to 20 years for each CSC I conviction and 5 to 15 years for the
CSC II convictions. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial in that regard. We disagree.
Whether sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction is reviewed de novo. People v Lueth,
253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a
new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d
174 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that falls
outside the principled range of outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 246, 269; 666 NW2d
231 (2003).
In a criminal case, due process requires that a prosecutor introduce evidence sufficient to
justify a trier of fact in concluding that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723-724; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). In reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005). MCL
750.520h specifically permits CSC convictions on the basis of uncorroborated testimony by the
victim.
-1-
The essential elements of CSC I as charged in this case are as follows: the defendant “(1)
causes personal injury to the victim, (2) engages in sexual penetration with the victim, and (3)
uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual penetration.” MCL 750.520b(1)(f); People v
Nickens, 470 Mich 622, 629; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). MCL 750.520a(1) defines “personal
injury” as “bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or
loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ.” For personal injury purposes, evidence
that a victim suffered bruises and tenderness as a result is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
People v Gwinn, 111 Mich App 223, 239; 314 NW2d 562 (1981). Additionally, some of the
factors to consider for finding “mental anguish” include testimony that the victim was upset or
crying during or after the assault, the victim’s need for psychiatric or psychological care or
treatment, the victim’s inability to conduct a normal life, such as absence from the workplace,
and evidence that the psychological or emotional effects of the assault were long-lasting. People
v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 270; 380 NW2d 11 (1985). “Sexual penetration” is statutorily defined
in part as “sexual intercourse . . . or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body.” MCL
750.520a(o). Evidence concerning sexual penetration is sufficient “where the circumstances of
the assault and the graphic description of physical sensations strongly point to the achievement
of penetration.” People v Hollis, 96 Mich App 333, 337; 292 NW2d 538 (1980).
The elements of CSC II as charged in this case are that: the defendant (1) caused
personal injury to the victim, (2) engaged in sexual contact with the victim, and (3) used force or
coercion to accomplish the sexual contact. MCL 750.520c(1)(f).
“Sexual contact” includes the intentional touching of the victim’s or
actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional
touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal
or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner for:
(i) Revenge.
(ii) To inflict humiliation.
(iii) Out of anger. [MCL 750.520a(n).]
Here, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s three CSC I convictions, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial in that regard. Specifically, the
complainant testified that defendant grabbed her arm, forced her to the ground, and penetrated
her vagina at least three times. The complainant stated that she felt pain in the back of her legs
as if defendant was pinning her down, and the examining doctor stated that the complainant had
bruising behind her knees. Moreover, the complainant testified that she experienced severe
psychological trauma at the time of the assault and for a period of time after the assault, which
required hospitalization. Because issues of credibility are properly left for the jury, People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999), the testimony was sufficient to support
those convictions. We disagree that the complainant’s testimony was sufficiently impeached to
render her incredible. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). And
concerning the complainant’s testimony that she was penetrated three separate times, there is no
-2-
evidence to suggest that the complainant did not mean what she said, and all reasonable
inferences that arise from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the
crime. People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004).
Additionally, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s two CSC II
convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial in that regard.
Along with the above testimony, the complainant stated that defendant moved his hand up her
shirt and under her bra and that she felt him touch her vagina. Therefore, because issues of
credibility are properly left for the jury, Avant, supra at 506, there was sufficient evidence to
support those convictions as well.
Defendant next argues that the convictions were against the great weight of the evidence,
and he has properly preserved this issue by raising it in a motion for a new trial. People v
Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). “The test to determine whether a
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is whether the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.”
Id. at 218-219. We conclude that the convictions were not against the great weight of the
evidence based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial.
Defendant argues that his two CSC I convictions and his two CSC II convictions violate
the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions, US Const, Am V
and Const 1963, art 1, § 15. We disagree.
“The prohibition against double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) it
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.” People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).
When the double jeopardy issue is based on a claim of multiple punishments, legislative intent is
determinative. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 485; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). Additionally,
the Blockburger1 test, which was developed for double jeopardy purposes when a single act falls
within the scope of two statutes, does not apply when multiple punishment under a single statute
is in issue. Id. at 483, 486.
Our Supreme Court has held that a single act of penetration accompanied by multiple
aggravating circumstances cannot result in multiple convictions and sentences under MCL
750.520b. People v Johnson, 406 Mich 320, 331; 279 NW2d 534 (1979). While citing the
above language in Johnson, this Court has concluded that a defendant was wrongfully convicted
and sentenced on multiple counts of CSC where there was evidence “of only a single continuing
transaction.” People v Armstrong, 100 Mich App 423, 428; 298 NW2d 752 (1980), citing
Johnson, supra at 331. Without reciting the relevant facts in detail, the Court in Armstrong
reasoned that “[t]he events in question were confined to a single location and occurred within a
brief time span lasting approximately five minutes.” Id. In a case factually dissimilar to
Armstrong that involved a defendant who penetrated multiple victims, this Court reasoned that
Michigan courts have consistently held that the legislative intent concerning CSC was to punish
1
Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932).
-3-
each criminal sexual penetration separately. People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 608; 493
NW2d 471 (1992), citing Johnson, supra at 330; People v Dowdy, 148 Mich App 517, 521, 384
NW2d 820 (1986); People v Nelson, 79 Mich App 303, 261 NW2d 299 (1977), vacated in part
406 Mich 1020 (1979). In Wilson, the Court concluded that no double jeopardy violation
occurred because “convictions for two acts of penetration that occurred at the same time are not
for the ‘same offense[.]’” Id. The Court noted that to hold otherwise would allow, for example,
an individual to vaginally and anally penetrate a victim simultaneously. Id. at 608 n 2.
Defendant in this case relies on Armstrong in arguing that a double jeopardy violation
occurred because the sexual assault here occurred at a single location and within a short period of
time. However, Armstrong is distinguishable because that decision did not expressly involve
multiple penetrations and apparently involved a single penetration involving more than one
aggravating circumstance under MCL 750.520b. See Armstrong, supra at 428 (reasoning that “a
single penetration” cannot result in multiple convictions when accompanied with more than one
aggravating circumstance under MCL 750.520b). Moreover, while somewhat factually
dissimilar because the decision involved multiple victims, the Court in Wilson concluded that the
Legislature intended on punishing each separate criminal sexual penetration. Wilson, supra at
608. It therefore follows that the Legislature intended under MCL 750.520c to punish each
separate criminal sexual contact as well. The plain language of both MCL 750.520b and MCL
750.520c support these conclusions because there is no language to suggest otherwise in either
section. Therefore, because the complainant testified that defendant penetrated her vaginally
three times and touched her breast and her vagina, no double jeopardy violation occurred.
Defendant next argues that a number of alleged trial court errors denied him a fair trial
first alleging that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated, US Const, Am VI and
Const 1963, art 1, § 20. We disagree that defendant was denied a fair trial.
A question of constitutional law is reviewed de novo. People v Herron, 464 Mich 593,
599; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). “A defendant’s right of confrontation is guaranteed through three
devices: cross-examination, the oath, and demeanor.” People v Lawson, 124 Mich App 371,
374; 335 NW2d 43 (1983), citing in part California v Green, 399 US 149; 90 S Ct 1930; 26 L Ed
2d 489 (1970). A defendant’s right of confrontation is violated if an individual testifies over the
telephone because a defendant is unable to view the witness’s demeanor. Lawson, supra at 373374. However, a preserved constitutional error under the Confrontation Clause is harmless if it
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found defendant guilty absent
the error. People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347-348; 697 NW2d 144 (2005).2 Factors to
consider when determining whether an error is harmless include the importance of the witness’
testimony and the strength of the prosecution’s case. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 644645; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
2
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the Court in Shepherd plainly indicated that a preserved claim of
constitutional violation of the Confrontation Clause is not a structural error and is subject to a
harmless error analysis. Shepherd, supra at 348.
-4-
Here, concerning testimony relevant to the charges, the examining doctor testified that
the complainant appeared frightened and was crying while being examined, complained of mild
abdominal pain, and had faint bruising behind her knees. The examining nurse similarly testified
that the complainant was crying and appeared scared while being examined, had some bruising
on her knees, and complained of abdominal and vaginal pain. Therefore, because the examining
doctor’s testimony was cumulative, the violation was harmless. See, e.g., People v Solomon, 220
Mich App 527, 531; 560 NW2d 651 (1996).
Defendant next argues that the trial court denied his right to present a defense by not
adjourning the trial and requiring the prosecution to do DNA testing of the smears as purportedly
ordered previously by the trial court. We disagree that the prosecution failed to comply with the
trial court’s order for testing.
Specifically, the order for testing provides as follows:
[T]he Prosecution shall conduct scientific testing for the presence of
semen or DNA on the clothing (and now in evidence) worn by the complainant,
and also on any fluids or biological samples collected from the complainant by
medical personal [sic] at the time of the complainant’s sexual assault medical
examination.
The plain language of the order provides that the prosecution was to conduct testing for semen or
DNA on any smears taken from the complainant. A Michigan State Police Crime Lab Forensic
Scientist testified that she tested the vaginal smears for seminal fluid and found none. Therefore,
we disagree that the prosecution erred by not testing the smears for foreign DNA because the
order was not as broad as defendant suggests. Nevertheless, if the order required testing, we
disagree that defendant was prejudiced by the failure to conduct such testing.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed in depth “what might loosely be called
the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” United States v Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 US 858, 867; 102 S Ct 3440; 73 L Ed 2d 1193 (1982). The prosecution’s failure to conduct
a test, the exculpatory value of which is unknown, does not violate the Due Process Clause
unless a defendant demonstrates that prejudice resulted from the prosecution’s failure to perform
DNA tests or demonstrates that the missing tests were material to the defense.3 See Strickler v
Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282, 290-291; 119 S Ct 1936; 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999). “The evidence
is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v Bagley, 473 US
667, 682; 105 S Ct 3375; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985).
3
Part of defendant’s apparent strategy at trial was to suggest that the complainant had sexual
contact with another individual the night after the alleged sexual assault. On appeal, defendant
claims that if DNA from that individual were found on the vaginal smears, “it would directly
impeach the complainant’s testimony that such other things had not occurred and could be an
alternative source of her complaints and would generally buttress the defendant’s case.”
-5-
Here, there is not a reasonable probability that further testing would have changed the
result of the trial. Specifically, in support of the complainant’s claim, many witnesses who saw
the complainant immediately after the assault testified that she was visibly shaken and crying.
Significantly, there were no witnesses to support defendant’s claim that the complainant was not
upset immediately following the assault. Moreover, the complainant’s mother testified that the
complainant had become extremely withdrawn and suicidal after the assault occurred. As a
result, even if the complainant’s testimony was discredited by failing to disclose sexual relations
with another individual the day after the assault,4 there is no reasonable probability this would
have changed the verdict.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to
allow defense counsel to impeach the complainant by calling a witness to rebut her claim that she
had not visited the Deja Vu Men’s Club after the assault occurred. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to allow the late endorsement of a witness is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 291; 537 NW2d 813 (1995), as is a
decision to admit evidence, People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 575; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
MCL 767.40a(4) permits the prosecutor’s late endorsement of a witness at any time upon leave
of the court and for good cause shown. Generally, the late endorsement of a witness is permitted
and a continuance is granted if necessary to prevent possible prejudice to the defendant. People
v Suchy, 143 Mich App 136, 141; 371 NW2d 502 (1985). However, a party cannot introduce
evidence on rebuttal unless it relates to a substantive rather than a collateral matter. People v
Losey, 413 Mich 346, 351-353; 320 NW2d 49 (1982).
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to allow defendant’s late
endorsement of a witness to rebut the complainant’s testimony because, as concluded by the trial
court, the proposed testimony involved a collateral matter. Specifically, the proposed, extrinsic
evidence was to impeach on a matter that was not relevant to whether defendant committed the
assault but rather whether the complainant on a particular occasion many months after the assault
decided to go out rather than stay at home. While this may have been evidence that the
complainant was not as withdrawn after the assault as she suggested during trial, not allowing the
late endorsement was plainly not an abuse of discretion even if this amounted to a close
evidentiary issue. People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 632; 683 NW2d 687 (2004).
Defendant next argues that the trial court denied his right to a fair trial by failing to
prevent the prosecution from committing alleged acts of misconduct. However, as concluded
below, none of the alleged acts of misconduct prejudiced defendant. Therefore, defendant’s
argument is without merit.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because of numerous acts of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. Unpreserved5 claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
4
We do not mean to suggest that there is any particular reason to conclude that the complainant
misrepresented this matter.
5
Defendant failed to preserve this issue because the alleged prosecutorial acts of misconduct
were not objected to below and are therefore unpreserved. Geno, supra at 626. While defendant
(continued…)
-6-
reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434,
448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). A
defendant’s opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 438; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the
facts of the case. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). Generally,
appellate review of alleged improper prosecutorial remarks is precluded absent an objection
because the trial court is deprived of its opportunity to cure the error. People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). But an exception exists where a failure to consider the
error would result in a miscarriage of justice or if a curative instruction could not have eliminated
the prejudicial effect. Id.
Except for one claim of misconduct, we find that the prosecutor did not act improperly.
Defendant’s sole valid claim is that the prosecutor improperly questioned the investigating
officer who in turn testified that he did not find any individuals to corroborate defendant’s story
and that he did not believe defendant. Defendant argues that the investigating officer’s
testimony in both instances amounted to him improperly providing an opinion about defendant’s
credibility. Assuming plain error, we conclude that the error did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights.
Generally, it is improper for a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness
since credibility issues are to be determined by the trier of fact. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1,
17; 378 NW2d 432 (1985); People v Smith, 158 Mich App 220, 230; 405 NW2d 156 (1987). In
Smith, numerous errors occurred requiring reversal including when the prosecution elicited
testimony from police witnesses who testified regarding the credibility of the prosecution’s key
witness. Id. at 230-231. However, this Court noted that the evidence against the defendant was
not overwhelming and that the error, by itself, was harmless. Id. at 225.
Here, both the complainant and defendant testified, and the jury had an opportunity to
view their demeanor and assess their credibility first hand. Moreover, while defendant did not
provide any witnesses to substantiate his claim on what occurred after the assault took place, the
prosecution elicited testimony from numerous witnesses to support the complainant’s claim.
Therefore, based on the weight of the evidence against defendant, we conclude that the error was
harmless.
Defendant next claims that People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140; 715 NW2d 778 (2006), was
wrongly decided relying on several decisions from the United States Supreme Court. However,
(…continued)
did object during trial based on speculation when the prosecution asked the investigating officer
what his reasons were for not believing defendant, a party must object at trial for the same
grounds as argued on appeal to preserve an evidentiary issue. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve that particular claim
of misconduct as well. Geno, supra at 626.
-7-
defendant’s argument fails because this Court is bound by decisions from our Supreme Court,
Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), including Drohan where
our Supreme Court held that Blakely does not apply to sentences imposed in Michigan that are,
as in this case, below the statutory maximum. Drohan, supra at 160.
Defendant next argues that offense variable (OV) 4, MCL 777.34, was incorrectly scored
at ten points. We disagree that the scoring was improper. A question of statutory interpretation
is a question of law reviewed de novo. Griffith v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich
521, 525-526; 697 NW2d 895 (2005). A sentencing court has discretion in scoring offense
variables if record evidence supports a particular score. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462,
468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). “Scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support will
be upheld.” People v Elliott, 215 Mich App 259, 260; 544 NW2d 748 (1996).
Under MCL 777.34(1)(a), a defendant is scored ten points under OV 4 when “[s]erious
psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.” A sentencing court
may consider all record evidence before it, including the contents of a presentence investigation
report or testimony taken at a preliminary examination or trial. People v Ratkov (After Remand),
201 Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993).
Here, the complainant testified that after the assault, she slept on the couch so her parents
could hear if she screamed, she was scared for herself, her family, and her friends, she suffered
panic attacks, she was unable to return to work, and she underwent counseling and was
hospitalized after becoming suicidal. Plainly, the complainant’s testimony supports a finding
that she suffered a serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment under MCL
777.34(1)(a).
Defendant next argues that OV 11, MCL 777.41, was incorrectly scored at 50 points
relying on his previous argument that it was constitutionally improper to convict defendant of
three separate counts of CSC I. We disagree that the scoring was improper given our previous
conclusion that the convictions were not improper under the statute. OV 11 provides that 50
points should be scored if two or more sexual penetrations occurred. MCL 777.41(1)(a). The
statute also provides:
All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 11:
(a) Score all sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender arising out
of the sentencing offense.
(b) Multiple sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender extending
beyond the sentencing offense may be scored in offense variables 12 and 13.
(c) Do not score points for the 1 penetration that forms the basis of a firstor third-degree criminal sexual conduct offense. [MCL 777.41(2).]
Here, defendant sexually penetrated the complainant three separate times. Thus, MCL
777.41(2) provides that all penetrations arising from the entire assault are scored except for the
penetration that forms the basis for the sentencing offense. People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App
-8-
728, 743; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). Therefore, while one CSC I conviction cannot be scored,
MCL 777.41(2)(c), the remaining two were properly scored at 50 points, MCL 777.41(1)(a) and
(2)(a), because those penetrations occurred during the entire assault.
Defendant next argues that OV 13, MCL 777.43, was incorrectly scored at 25 points. We
disagree that the scoring was improper. As to OV 13, 25 points are properly scored where the
offense is part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving three or more crimes against a
person. MCL 777.43(1)(b). That statute also provides:
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 13:
(a) For determining the appropriate points under this variable, all crimes
within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense, shall be counted
regardless of whether the offense resulted in a conviction.
***
(c) Except for offenses related to membership in an organized criminal
group, do not score conduct scored in offense variable 11 or 12. [MCL
777.43(2)(a), (c).]
Initially, defendant’s reliance on his previous arguments for arguing that OV 13 was
improperly scored is without merit given our prior conclusions. Further, the two CSC II
convictions can be scored under MCL 777.43(2)(a) because that subsection plainly includes the
crime that constitutes the sentencing offense. And while the two CSC I convictions scored in
OV 11 could not be scored under OV 13, MCL 777.43(2)(c), the remaining CSC I conviction
can be scored under MCL 777.43(2)(a) because, again, that subsection plainly includes the crime
that constitutes the sentencing offense.
Defendant argues that MCL 777.41(2)(b) prohibits scoring the penetration that forms the
basis of the sentencing offense for purposes of OV 11, i.e., the CSC I conviction that was not
scored as prohibited by MCL 777.41(2)(c). However, when MCL 777.41(2)(b) and MCL
777.43(2)(a) and (c) are read in context, those subsections plainly provide that for purposes of
scoring OV 13, those penetrations not scored under OV 11 may be scored under OV 13,
including the sentencing offense that could not be scored under OV 11. MCL 777.41(2)(b) does
not prohibit any scoring of a sexual penetration under OV 13 but rather provides that multiple
penetrations may be scored under OV 13 subject to the limitations in MCL 777.43(2)(c). Thus,
defendant’s argument is without merit.
Defendant finally argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. A preserved
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves a mixed question of law and fact. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, and its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant bears a heavy
burden. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Specifically, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that, but for defense
-9-
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. at 600. In addition, there is a strong presumption that defendant’s counsel’s
performance was sound trial strategy. Id.
Here, the trial court found defense counsel acted based on reasonable professional
judgment and reasoned that the claim must fail because all of the premised claims of error were
without merit. We conclude that no clear error occurred and that defense counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective. Concerning the alleged errors that were without merit, defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise those arguments at trial. See People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 457; 678 NW2d 631 (2004) (failure to make a futile objection does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). And concerning the actual errors that did occur,
defendant has failed to establish sufficient prejudice to show that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Therefore, defendant’s claim is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.