IN RE FINCHER/RIDGE/WILLBANKS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MICHELLE LOUISE FINCHER,
JENNIFER ALEXANDRIA RIDGE, and
CHRISTINE LYNN-MARIE WILLBANKS,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 270944
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-436795-NA
v
PAMELA ALEASE WILLBANKS, a/k/a
PAMELA ALEASE FINCHER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MICHAEL RIDGE and DAVID SMITH,
Respondents.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
First, we find that the court properly established its jurisdiction. Whether a trial court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Ryan v Ryan, 260 Mich App 315, 331; 677 NW2d 899 (2004). A court’s jurisdiction in child
protective proceedings is governed by MCL 712A.2(b). The valid exercise of jurisdiction is
established by the contents of the petition after the court conducts a probable cause hearing on
the allegations. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 437-438; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). Respondentappellant admitted to some of the allegations in the petition. Based on two substantiated
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allegations, the court assumed jurisdiction and the children were made temporary wards of the
court. Upon de novo review, we find that the two substantiated allegations in the petition were
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).1
Next, we find that respondent-appellant was not denied her due process right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard. In re Nunn, 168 Mich App 203, 208-209; 423 NW2d 619
(1988). Respondent-appellant failed to raise the issue of notice in the trial court. Thus, she must
demonstrate plain error that affected her substantial rights; i.e., she must establish that a different
outcome would have resulted absent the error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597
NW2d 130 (1999); see also In re Osborne, 237 Mich App 597, 606; 603 NW2d 824 (1999).
Statements at the preliminary hearings indicated that respondent-appellant had been
informed of the hearings,2 but she nonetheless was not present at them. With regard to additional
hearings from which respondent was absent, it appears that respondent-appellant had failed to
keep the pertinent parties appraised of her current contact information. Any error was due to
respondent-appellant’s own actions. Moreover, respondent-appellant was present for both
sessions of the termination bench trial. She acknowledged timely receipt of the petition and
made no claims regarding notice. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692 NW2d 708
(2005) (“[a] litigant may not harbor error, to which he or she consented, as an appellate
parachute”). Under all the circumstances, respondent-appellant, with regard to notice, has failed
to demonstrate any plain error that affected her substantial rights.
Next, we address respondent-appellant’s claim that she was denied due process when the
court did not comply with the time-related and other requirements of MCR 3.965(D)(1) and
MCR 3.973(C). These court rules do not provide any sanctions for failure to comply with them.
“This Court will not impose sanctions that the Legislature and the Supreme Court have declined
to impose.” In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28-29; 501 NW2d 182 1993); In re Kirkwood, 187
Mich App 542, 546; 468 NW2d 280 (1991). In addition, respondent-appellant did not object
below to the court’s actions in this regard. Thus, she has forfeited this issue, People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), and we find no plain error affecting substantial
rights, Carines, supra at 763-764.
We also find no merit to respondent-appellant’s claim that she was prejudiced by delays
in implementing her treatment plan. The record is replete with instances of respondentappellant’s noncompliance and uncooperative attitude. She failed to show up for scheduled
evaluations and counseling appointments and gave false information to the workers and court,
even after the order for the treatment plan was signed. Just two weeks before the final trial date,
respondent-appellant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and the police found
1
Moreover, as stated in In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679-680; 692 NW2d 708 (2005),
“[m]atters affecting the court's exercise of its jurisdiction may be challenged only on direct
appeal of the jurisdictional decision, not by collateral attack in a subsequent appeal of an order
terminating parental rights.”
2
As noted in MCR 3.920(C)(2)(b), notice of a preliminary hearing “may be in person, in writing,
on the record, or by telephone.”
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heroin in her purse. Respondent-appellant missed numerous weekly random drug screens.
Considering the significant lack of compliance, respondent-appellant cannot be heard to
complain about any delay.
Respondent-appellant contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. However, respondentappellant abandoned this issue by failing to address the merits of this issue in her brief. Mitcham
v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959); Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251
Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Moreover, given respondent-appellant’s failure to
comply with her parent-agency agreement, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the
statutory grounds for termination were established. MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624,
633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Finally, we find that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
respondent-appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. MCL
712A.19b(5). The evidence on the whole record supported the court’s conclusion. In re Trejo,
462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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