PEOPLE OF MI V SALAH DADO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266962
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 04-015279-FH
SALAH DADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of possession with intent to deliver five
or more but less than forty-five kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(ii). He was
sentenced to probation for three years, with the first ninety days to be served in jail. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I
On January 9, 2004, the Genesee County Sheriff’s Department was conducting
surveillance of Matthew Hilton, a suspected drug dealer, when they conducted a traffic stop of
the vehicle he was in and found marijuana in the car. The officers arrested Matthew Hilton and
his cousin Wilbur Hilton, who was also in the car. Wilbur informed the police that there were
quantities of marijuana at Champion Communications, a telecommunications store co-owned by
Wilbur and defendant. The officers searched the store with Wilbur’s consent. The police found
more than five kilograms of marijuana, packaging materials, a digital scale, dryer sheets, three
Fila athletic bags, food saver bags, and Ziploc bags. Defendant’s fingerprints were found on
some of the bags. The officers later searched defendant’s home and found a Fila athletic bag
similar to the bags found in the store, but it did not contain any illegal substance.
Defendant arrived at the store while the search was in progress. The police searched him
and found $4,699 in cash. Several photographs of defendant were displayed in the store’s office.
Defendant admitted that he was aware that marijuana was present in the office.
At trial, the prosecutor sought to qualify Lieutenant Terrence Green as an expert witness
on drug trafficking, particularly drug trafficking in Genesee County. Defendant objected,
arguing that the officer-in-charge could not testify as an expert witness, that Green’s expert
testimony was irrelevant because defendant intended to stipulate that the supply of marijuana
-1-
was intended for distribution, and that Green’s testimony would not withstand a Daubert1
analysis. The trial court overruled his objections. Green testified that possession of a large
quantity (more than four ounces) of marijuana is indicative of drug trafficking. He stated that
other indicators of drug trafficking are possession of packaging material, scales, drug tabulation
sheets, food saver bags (to contain the smell), and dryer sheets (to mask the smell).
Green also testified as a fact witness regarding the surveillance of Matthew Hilton, the
arrests of Matthew and Wilbur Hilton, and the search of the store. Green gave a detailed account
of all items seized during the search of the store. When Green’s review of the tabulation was
complete, the prosecutor questioned him as follows:
Q. [I]n your opinion as an expert [in the field of drug trafficking], given the
evidence that you reviewed here in open court, what does the possession of
this marijuana indicate to you? And please explain.
A. It exhibits distribution. This marijuana is used to distribute to other sellers. I
base that on number one, the amount, speaking of over twenty-six pounds.
You have the packaging, the dryer sheets, scales, large sums of U.S. currency.
Green testified that the marijuana was packed in quantities of 1-1/2 pounds, which was “[v]ery
consistent with trafficking.”
On cross-examination, Green stated that Matthew Hilton, the original subject of the
investigation, was not charged with any offense related to the supply of cocaine found in the
Champion Communications store. Green explained, “through my investigation – my thorough
investigation I proved that Matthew Hilton had no part in this large amount of marijuana.”
When defense counsel asked Green whether Wilbur Hilton was charged in this matter, the
prosecutor objected on relevance grounds. Defense counsel responded, “Wilbur Hilton was a codefendant here and I think that it’s fair for this jury to know what happened with Wilbur
[Hilton].” The trial court sustained the objection.
II
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in permitting Green to testify as an expert
witness concerning drug trafficking. We review the trial court’s decision to admit Green’s
testimony for an abuse of discretion. People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21, 31; 645 NW2d 65
(2002).
Defendant acknowledges that the rules of evidence do not prohibit police officers from
testifying as experts, but he argues that the inherent danger of such testimony may render the
testimony unacceptably prejudicial. The substance of this argument invokes MRE 403, which
provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . .
1
Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469
(1988).
-2-
.” We are not persuaded that Green’s dual role as a fact and expert witness created any danger of
unfair prejudice. Defendant did not dispute that the drugs in question were intended for delivery;
rather, his defense was that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed the drugs.
Defendant argues that Green’s certification as an expert witness bolstered the prosecution’s case
and likely led the jurors to believe that the marijuana was in defendant’s possession. This
argument is purely speculative. There was no connection between Green’s opinion that the
drugs were intended for sale and the prosecutor’s contention that defendant possessed the drugs.
The prosecutor never suggested that Green’s expert opinion had any bearing on the question of
possession; rather, the prosecutor sought to prove possession with evidence that the marijuana
was kept in a store that defendant owned and operated. Under these circumstances, defendant
was not unfairly prejudiced by Green’s dual role. No error requiring reversal occurred.
Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to exercise its gatekeeping function as
required by MRE 702 and Daubert v Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct
2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1988). MRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and
provides:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
In Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 780; 685 NW2d 391 (2004), our Supreme
Court held that MRE 702 imposes
an obligation on the trial court to ensure that any expert testimony admitted at trial
is reliable. While the exercise of this gatekeeper role is within a court's
discretion, a trial judge may neither “abandon” this obligation nor “perform the
function inadequately.”
See also Daubert, supra at 589 (concluding from similar language in FRE 702 that “the trial
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant,
but reliable”), and Kumho Tire Co, Ltd v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 149-150; 119 S Ct 1167; 143
L Ed 2d 238 (1999) (applying reliability requirement to technical and non-scientific areas of
expertise). In United States v Lopez-Medina, 461 F3d 724, 742-743 (CA 6, 2006), the court held
that the Daubert gatekeeping requirements apply to a police officer’s expert testimony
concerning drug trafficking. The court stated that such testimony satisfied the reliability
requirement where the officer had sufficient training and experience in investigating drug-related
offenses. Id.
Here, Green’s experience in investigating drug trafficking operations in Genesee County
was sufficient to establish the reliability requirement. As an experienced police officer, he was
capable of giving reliable testimony on how to recognize evidence of drug sales. Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the expert testimony.
-3-
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the
disposition of charges against Wilbur Hilton, who had pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of
possession with intent to deliver a smaller quantity of marijuana found in the car. Defendant
argues that the evidence of third-party guilt was relevant to the question of defendant’s
innocence, because Hilton’s conviction suggested that Wilbur Hilton, not defendant, possessed
the marijuana in question. Defendant expands on this issue by claiming that Hilton’s additional
charge for possession of the marijuana found in the store – a charge that was later dismissed –
was relevant to the question of defendant’s guilt.
In People v Lytal, 415 Mich 603, 612; 329 NW2d 738 (1982), our Supreme Court stated
that “[i]t is an established rule of law that the conviction of another person involved in the
criminal enterprise is not admissible at defendant's separate trial.” As support for this principle,
the Court cited People v Crawl, 401 Mich 1, 33; 257 NW2d 86 (1977) (Levin, J.), which states
that an accomplice’s guilty plea or trial conviction “is not admissible against another person.”
(Emphasis added.) The purpose of this rule is to protect a defendant from unfair prejudice that
would inure from evidence that a codefendant has already been adjudicated guilty. Accordingly,
a defendant may introduce evidence of a codefendant’s guilty plea as exculpatory evidence.
Nonetheless, the trial court properly excluded the evidence of Wilbur Hilton’s guilty plea.
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401; see also People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 114; 631
NW2d 67 (2001). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise dictated by
law, and evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. MRE 402; Aldrich, supra at 114.
Hilton’s guilty plea did not relate to the marijuana found in the store, but rather arose from the
marijuana found in the car during the traffic stop. Because defendant was not charged with any
offense involving the marijuana found during the earlier traffic stop, Wilbur’s plea-based
conviction arising from that stop was not relevant, and introducing evidence of it may have
misled the jury. See MRE 403. Additionally, the trial court did not commit an error requiring
reversal in disallowing the evidence that Wilbur Hilton had been charged in connection with the
marijuana found at the store. Hilton was merely charged with possessing this marijuana and not
convicted of possessing it. Evidence of the charge was only marginally relevant and was likely
to have misled the jury. See MRE 403. We simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion in disallowing the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.