PEOPLE OF MI V DARRYL JOHN WHITE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266555
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-197414-FH
DARRYL JOHN WHITE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assaulting a police officer and resisting
arrest, MCL 750.81d(1), and sentenced to twelve months’ probation. He appeals as of right. We
affirm.
I. Underlying Facts
On July 9, 2004, defendant was arrested after allegedly pushing a police officer who
responded to the scene of a disturbance at a bank branch inside a Kroger grocery store. Michael
Kofsky, the regional bank manager, testified that he was in the lobby area when defendant and
another customer became verbally abusive toward each other. When Kofsky tried to calm
defendant and resolve the situation, defendant became verbally abusive toward him, telling him
to “get the f off [him].” Kofsky threatened to call the police and to close defendant’s account,
but defendant did not calm down. Two uniformed police officers arrived at the scene.1
Oakland County Sheriff’s Deputy Frank Lenz testified that when he and his partner,
Deputy Christopher Gardner, arrived at the bank, several employees pointed toward defendant
and he saw defendant flailing his arms, cursing, and acting unruly. Deputy Lenz approached
defendant from behind, while Deputy Gardner approached defendant from defendant’s right side.
Deputy Lenz told defendant in a soft voice to “calm down” and touched him on the right hip
area. Defendant turned, looked at Deputy Lenz, and pushed him in the chest area with both of
his hands. Deputy Lenz testified that the force of the push knocked him back about three or four
1
The officers were wearing deputy uniforms, which consisted of dark brown tops, light tan pants
with stripes, and badges.
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feet. Deputy Gardner ordered defendant to the ground while holding a Taser. When defendant
did not comply, Deputy Gardner Tasered him, and Deputy Lenz again ordered him to the ground.
Deputy Lenz testified that when defendant asked what he had done wrong, Lenz repeatedly
stated, “you can’t push a police [officer], you’re under arrest for disorderly person.” When
defendant still did not comply, the officers tackled defendant to the ground, and Deputy Lenz
“dry-stunned” defendant with the Taser. Defendant was eventually handcuffed, but remained
argumentative with the officers. When defendant refused to get into the patrol car, he was “drystunned” again and eventually complied.
Kofsky testified that he did not see the initial interaction between defendant and the
officers because he was in a different area. When Kofsky returned, he heard the officers asking
defendant to get down on the ground and saw that defendant was not complying. Kofsky
testified that a few days after the incident, he viewed a digital video recording of the incident
recorded by the bank video surveillance equipment. On the video, he observed one of the police
officers approach defendant from behind and get his attention. When defendant saw them, he
turned completely around and shoved one of the officers with both of his hands. Kofsky then
observed the other officer Taser defendant.
At trial, defendant testified that while waiting in line at the bank, the person behind him
“was getting real close to the back of [his] neck,” and an argument ensued. The bank manager
approached them and took the other person to another area of the bank. Defendant explained
that although he was still upset, he was quietly waiting for the manager to return when a person
approached him from behind, whispered something in his ear, and “put a taser on his back.”
Defendant denied knowing that the person was a police officer. Defendant indicated that he spun
around, knocking the Taser off his back. Defendant indicated that as Deputy Lenz reached for
him, he reacted and “pushed back” or “pushed off.” Defendant admitted that he did not comply
with the officers’ commands to get on the ground, but claimed that he was “just trying to get
some space between [him] and them and trying to figure out why they had approached [him] that
way.” After being Tasered “several times,” defendant “went down” and was placed in a patrol
car. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he “pushed” the officer, whom he could see
was in some type of uniform, and that he did not follow the commands of the officers.
Defendant asserted that he pushed the officer to defend himself.
II. Best Evidence Rule
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Kofsky’s testimony regarding
the contents of the video recording violated the “best evidence rule,” MRE 1002. Because
defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, we review this unpreserved claim for plain
error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Kofsky testified that the bank video surveillance equipment made a digital video
recording of the incident that is destroyed after sixty days. A few days after the incident, Kofsky
viewed the video recording and also saved a copy on his laptop computer. Kofsky explained that
after some time, he deleted the video recording because he had not heard anything else about the
incident and the recording was using a substantial amount of the computer’s memory.
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Deputy Lenz testified that he did not ask Kofsky about a video. Immediately after the
incident, Deputy Lenz did ask a female bank employee if there was any video of the front lobby
area of the bank, and she said there was not. He also asked the manager of the Kroger store if
there was any surveillance video for the area and, after checking, the manager stated that there
was no video.
MRE 1002 provides:
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original
writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by statute.
An exception to this rule is found in MRE 1004, which states, in relevant part:
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if—
(1) Originals Lost or Destroyed. All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith[.]
It was not plain error for Kofsky to testify about the contents of the video recording. It is
undisputed that the original video recording was destroyed, and there is no indication that the
prosecution or the police were responsible for destroying the recording. Contrary to defendant’s
suggestion, Deputy Lenz’s actions did not constitute bad faith; indeed, Deputy Lenz asked both a
bank employee and a store manager if there was any surveillance video. Defendant cites pre1990 (and therefore nonbinding under MCR 7.215[J][1]) cases indicating that negligence on the
part of the police is sufficient to establish a violation of the best evidence rule. However, even
assuming that the cases cited by defendant were binding on us, we do not agree that Deputy
Lenz’s actions here amounted to a sufficient level of negligence such that MRE 1002 was
violated. Deputy Lenz did not fail to ask about a video at all, but instead asked two people – two
people who might reasonably have known about the existence of a video – whether one existed.
We conclude that testimony regarding the contents of the video recording was admissible under
MRE 1004.
As part of this issue, defendant suggests that he is entitled to a new trial because
potentially exculpatory evidence was destroyed in bad faith. However, defendant bears the
burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith. People
v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). As indicated previously, there is no
basis for concluding that the police or the prosecution acted in bad faith. Moreover, defendant
has not demonstrated that the evidence was exculpatory. Rather, his assertion that the video
recording could have exonerated him is entirely speculative.2 Consequently, this claim is
without merit.
2
In his brief, defendant argues that the video recording “could have shown the sequence of
police ‘tasering’ of defendant, and could have made it more clear whether defendant was acting
(continued…)
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III. Inadmissible Evidence
We reject defendant’s claim that a new trial is required because the trial court did not
sufficiently address defense counsel’s objections to challenged other-acts testimony. Defendant
did not argue below that the court improperly handled the objections, and therefore we review
this issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764.
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Kofsky, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Did [defendant] calm down at this point?
A. No, he wasn’t cooperating. At this point in time, I said you know what, this
isn’t the first time that this has happened because I’ve had prior conversations
with the branch manager with regards to [defendant].
[Defense counsel]:
Well, objection to what conversations he had with the
manager. It’s hearsay and what might have happened on others (sic) dates
isn’t relevant to this jury’s determination.
[The trial court]:
Response?
[The prosecutor]:
Well, your Honor, I’ll withdraw it at his point but if there’s
a part in his testimony where it is relevant as to why he did what he did then I
would ask if we could [The trial court]:
And if proper notice has been given, perhaps. Sir, confine
yourself to answering the question as directly as you can. That answer is
struck. Next question, please.
During subsequent questioning, the following exchange occurred:
Q. What happened then?
A. I told him that if he doesn’t calm down that eventually I’m going to close
down his account because of this, because this has happened in the past with
his anger [Defense counsel]:
Well, objection to what happened in the past, your Honor.
It’s irrelevant to this, what happened on the date in question and the jury’s
determination as to this specific charge.
[The prosecutor]:
You Honor, I’ll move on.
[The trial court]:
That answer is struck again. We’re not interested in the
reasons that you’re acting sir, we’re interested in the facts that happen which
(…continued)
intentionally, or just reacting to a chain of events beyond his control.”
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means, basically, what you saw and heard on this day, not why you acted but
what you saw and heard [defendant] do.
The record does not support defendant’s claim that the jury was allowed to consider
evidence of his prior bad acts. In both instances, the trial court impliedly sustained defense
counsel’s objection. More importantly, the court struck the unresponsive answers and instructed
the witness to answer the questions directly. Defendant did not request any further action by the
trial court. The prosecutor did not pursue the matter or discuss defendant’s alleged past incidents
in closing argument. In its final instructions, the trial court reminded the jurors of their oath to
return a verdict based only on the evidence and the court’s instructions on the law, and further
instructed:
During trial, evidence was excluded or struck that was heard. Do not
consider those things in deciding the case. Make your decision only on the
evidence that was admitted and nothing else . . . . To repeat, you must decide this
case based only on the evidence that was admitted during trial.
“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most
errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Defendant is not
entitled to a new trial.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also argues that a new trial is required because defense counsel was ineffective
at trial. We disagree.
“Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise.” People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms” and that the
representation so prejudiced the defendant that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id.
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the unpreserved claim of error discussed in part II and for failing to object more specifically and
request a cautionary instruction with respect to the claim of error discussed in part III. In light of
our conclusion in part II that the evidence was admissible under MRE 1004, along with our
conclusion in part III that the court struck the challenged testimony and later instructed the jury
not to consider evidence that was excluded or struck, defendant cannot demonstrate that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s inaction, the result of the proceedings would have
been different. Id.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for cross-examining Kofsky
about the video recording of the incident because such questioning “only accentuate[d] the
evidence by clarifying and drawing more attention to it.” However, decisions about what
questions to ask are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74,
76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). In his brief, defendant acknowledges that defense counsel’s
questions were “a valiant attempt to discredit Mr. Kofsky’s stated observations,” but then
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basically asserts that “in the end” it did not work. This Court will not second-guess counsel in
matters of trial strategy. People v Stewart, 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996). The
fact that the strategy chosen did not work does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. Additionally, defendant has not identified any damaging evidence that was elicited on the
cross-examination of Kofsky that would have changed the result of the proceedings. Effinger,
supra at 69.
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for cross-examining
Deputy Lenz regarding a notation in his police report that defendant was carrying a knife in his
pocket at the time of the incident. Defense counsel asked Deputy Lenz why he had not put that
seemingly important fact in the general incident report, but included it in his Taser report.
Defendant argues that this was an ineffective method of impeaching Deputy Lenz “and only
served to unnecessarily suggest to the jury that defendant is a dangerous person.”
Defendant has not overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decision was
reasonable trial strategy, nor has he shown that the evidence affected the outcome of the
proceedings. As defendant acknowledges in his brief, defense counsel was attempting to
discredit Deputy Lenz’s credibility. Given that Deputy Lenz’s testimony was the chief evidence
against defendant, attacking his testimony was crucial. Defendant’s complaint is that counsel
was “ineffective” in doing so. Again, we will not second-guess counsel in matters of trial
strategy, and the fact that the strategy did not work does not render its use ineffective assistance.
Stewart, supra at 42. Further, given the weight of the evidence produced at trial, no reasonable
likelihood exists that defendant would not have been convicted if defense counsel had not
questioned the officer about the knife. Effinger, supra at 69. Consequently, defendant cannot
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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