PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL JAY JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266369
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-001001-FH
MICHAEL JAY JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and White and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with a dangerous weapon
(felonious assault), MCL 750.82. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense,
MCL 769.12, to four to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right, and we
affirm.
On November 28, 2004, Jose Barrera was walking when a car stopped along side him,
and defendant and two other men got out of the car. Defendant approached Barrera with an open
knife in his hand. The other two men attempted to surround Barrera, with one proceeding behind
him and the second man off to his side. Defendant faced Barrera on the sidewalk from
approximately five feet away, and stated: “You snitchin.” Instead of waiting for defendant to
reach him or the two men to grab him and hold him, Barrera “went for” defendant and the knife.
The two struggled, and both fell to the ground. While they wrestled on the ground, the other two
men punched and kicked Barrera, and eventually pulled Barrera off defendant. Defendant and
his two accomplices then jumped back into the car and it took off. Defendant was charged with
the assault.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
felonious assault. We disagree. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
reviewed de novo. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). We
determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether a rational
jury could find “that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002). However, we do not determine
what testimony to believe; rather, we resolve any conflicts in the evidence in the prosecution’s
favor, People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997), and, in matters of the
credibility of conflicting testimony, we give the jury’s verdict great deference, People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
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The elements of felonious assault are (1) the defendant committed an assault; (2) with a
gun, knife, or other dangerous weapon; (3) with the intent to injure or to place a victim within
reasonable fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. MCL 750.82; People v Avant, 235
Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999); People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 349; 492
NW2d 810 (1992). Either of the two types of assault under Michigan law may fulfill the assault
element: an attempted-battery assault, or an apprehension-type assault that arises when a
defendant performs an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving
an immediate battery. People v Starks, 473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 136 (2005). A battery is
“‘an intentional, unconsented, and harmful or offensive touching of another or of something
closely connected with the person.’” Id., quoting People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 240 n 4; 580
NW2d 433 (1998). The jury may infer the requisite intent from the conduct of the accused and
all of the surrounding circumstances. Lawton, supra at 349.
Defendant argues that felonious assault is a specific intent crime, and the prosecution did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to injure Barrera or to place him in
reasonable apprehension of receiving an imminent battery. He seemingly argues that because he
was prevented from physically touching Barrera by Barrera’s grabbing the knife, he did not
“assault” Barrera. However, the actual infliction of harm, or even the actual ability to inflict
threatened harm, is largely irrelevant, as long as the victim reasonably apprehends an imminent
battery. Reeves, supra at 244. Here, defendant approached to within five feet of Barrera with a
knife in his hand and threatened him with his statement “You snitchin.” Barrera stopped
defendant from completing a battery. Nevertheless, that does not mean that Barrera did not have
a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery.
A “fleeting” aim of the gun at a victim is enough to cause a reasonable apprehension of
an imminent battery. People v McConnell, 124 Mich App 672, 678-679; 335 NW2d 226 (1982).
Furthermore, merely displaying a weapon implies a threat of violence and causes reasonable
apprehension of an imminent battery. People v Pace, 102 Mich App 522, 534; 302 NW2d 216
(1980). We held in Pace that the fact that the defendant did not lunge at the victim or wield the
knife was irrelevant, because the mere display of a weapon without pointing it at the victim was
sufficient evidence to prove felonious assault. Id. at 533-534.
Here, Barrera testified that defendant had the knife in his hand, placed down at his side,
but slightly in front of his body. That mere display implies a threat of violence. In addition,
Barrera testified that when defendant said “You snitchin,” he knew immediately defendant was
referring to Barrera’s assistance to police, and that defendant meant to hurt him. This statement
and the presence of the other men behind him caused him to reach for the knife. Clearly,
defendant intended to intimidate Barrera. The fact that the two men attempted to surround
Barrera, so that he believed they were going to grab him and hold him, provides additional
evidence to support that Barrera reasonably feared an imminent battery, and that defendant
intended that he do so. Moreover, a witness to the assault testified that it appeared defendant and
the other two men were attacking Barrera; he did not see Barrera swing first. Viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant intended to cause an apprehension of an imminent battery.
Defendant next argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by the ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel. According to defendant, his counsel performed below the
standard for effective assistance because she was mistaken about the number of peremptory
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challenges available to defendant, and used only two of the five allowed. We conclude that
although counsel’s performance was deficient, defendant’s right to effective assistance of
counsel was not violated because defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced.
The determination whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. We review the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error, and its constitutional determinations de novo. People v LeBlanc,
465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). In People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326-327; 521
NW2d 797 (1994), our Supreme Court adopted the federal standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel established in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his
counsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness and that but
for counsel’s error the result of the proceeding would have been different; therefore, he was
denied a fair trial. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 485-486; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). Defendant
bears a “heavy burden” to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective. People v
Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001).
Generally, counsel’s failure to challenge a juror is not a basis to claim ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 95; 397 NW2d 229 (1986). That
decision is a matter of trial strategy, and we will not evaluate the decision in hindsight. People v
Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 259; 631 NW2d 1 (2001). However, in this case, counsel admitted
there was no trial strategy involved in the decision not to excuse the two jurors whom defendant
asserts should have been removed by peremptory challenge. The trial court also found, on the
record, that counsel’s performance was deficient because, “[t]hat he had five [challenges] was
readily knowable to anybody who looks at the rules governing proceedings in this Court.” The
belief that defendant had only three peremptory challenges was clearly erroneous. “Defense
counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal
law” or it may be ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Jenkins, 99 Mich App 518, 519;
297 NW2d 706 (1980), quoting Beasley v United States, 491 F2d 687, 696 (CA 6, 1974).
Defendant’s counsel did not do so. Counsel may have had a legitimate strategy to save one
peremptory challenge, as defendant argues and the trial court stated was common practice, but
there could be no legitimate strategy to not know the number of peremptory challenges available.
See, e.g., People v Carrick, 220 Mich App 17, 22; 558 NW2d 242 (1996). Thus, as the trial
court found below, we hold counsel’s performance was deficient and the first prong of Strickland
is met.
Defendant bears the burden to prove that, but for the error, there is a reasonable
probability the outcome would be different, not that the error had “some conceivable effect on
the outcome” of the trial. Strickland, supra at 693-694. A reasonable probability is “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. We conclude that
defendant has not met that burden. He argues only that if he had used all of the challenges
available, the composition of the jury would have been different, and because the evidence
against defendant was so weak, “it is entirely possible that a different jury may have harbored a
reasonable doubt regarding Mr. Jackson’s guilt” or “could quite possibly have made a different
assessment of the strength of the evidence.” Defendant offers only speculation that the outcome
would have been different—could quite possibly is not reasonable probability.
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Moreover, the underlying purpose of peremptory challenges is to protect the defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair and an impartial jury. Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42, 57; 112 S
Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992); People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 528; 586 NW2d 766
(1998), overruled in part by People v Bell, 473 Mich 275; 702 NW2d 128 (2005). Peremptory
challenges do not entitle defendant to a jury of only those jurors he wishes. “‘An impartial jury
is all that a party is entitled to, and when he has obtained that he has no valid ground for
complaint.’” People v Badour, 167 Mich App 186, 190; 421 NW2d 624 (1988) rev’d on other
grounds sub nom People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 456 NW2d 319 (1990). Here, defendant fails
to argue that the jury was not impartial. Therefore, the failure to exercise additional peremptory
challenges did not violate his right to a fair and impartial jury. Nor has defendant shown that
because of counsel’s mistake, his trial was unreliable or fundamentally unfair. There was
sufficient evidence to support his conviction of felonious assault; the verdict was not unreliable.
Therefore, reversal is not required.
Defendant also argues that harmless error analysis is inappropriate in this case because
the denial of peremptory challenges is a structural error and reversal of the conviction is
automatic. United States v McFerron, 163 F3d 952, 955-956 (CA 6, 1998). However, our
Supreme Court stated that because peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed,
but only a product of state law, MCL 768.12, and court rule, MCR 6.412(E), constitutional
analysis does not apply. Bell, supra at 295. Thus, the denial is not structural error, and reversal
is unwarranted. Even if we were to challenge our Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell as dicta, it
would not change the outcome of this case, because the trial court did not deny defendant’s
exercise of the peremptory challenges; rather, counsel’s mistake did.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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