CARRIE LYMAN V TOUNDAS MOTOR SPORTS GROUP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CARRIE LYMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 8, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 271428
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 05-068194-NZ
v
TOUNDAS MOTOR SPORTS GROUP, INC.,
d/b/a TMG SPORTS MARKETING, RANDY
HEAGY, PETER TOUNDAS and BOB
LAWSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. and civil assault
and battery case, plaintiff appeals by right from the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part and reverse in part. This
appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff filed the instant suit in August 2005 alleging three counts: (1) violation of
ELCRA—sex/pregnancy discrimination; (2) violation of ELCRA—sexual discrimination and
harassment; and (3) assault and battery. Plaintiff worked for defendant Toundas Motor Sports
Group, Inc. (TMG) from 1999 to 2003. In June 2003, plaintiff announced she was pregnant.
After her baby was born on July 28, 2003, plaintiff took 13 weeks of maternity leave.
When plaintiff returned to work, she felt “uncomfortable,” “awful” and “discriminated
against.” About three weeks after returning to work, plaintiff brought her sick daughter to work
with her. She requested that she be allowed to leave and work and make phone calls from home.
Plaintiff was fired that morning. In her complaint, plaintiff also alleged that the individually
named defendants each touched her inappropriately during the course of her employment.
After taking plaintiff’s deposition, defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that plaintiff’s deposition testimony did not support
her allegations of a discriminatory failure to promote, sexual harassment, or assault and battery.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion.
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This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary
disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Maiden, supra at 120. When the proffered evidence fails to
establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Id.; MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4).
Plaintiff first argues the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition of her sex/pregnancy discrimination claim. We disagree. Defendants argue that this
Court should only consider this claim as it relates to plaintiff’s “failure to promote” argument.
Defendants assert that plaintiff pleaded no facts related to her discrimination claim as it related to
her termination. A complaint must include “specific allegations necessary to reasonably inform
the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called on to defend.” MCR
2.111(B)(1). Here, all of the facts pleaded under the heading “violation of ELCRA
sex/pregnancy discrimination” heading relate to a “failure to promote” argument. Plaintiff now
argues that her termination was discriminatory because she was terminated for attendance issues
when other employees with similar issues were not terminated and that her job duties were taken
from her when she returned from maternity leave. Plaintiff never pleaded these allegations and
never amended her complaint to reflect them; thus, defendants were not reasonably informed of
these claims. Therefore, we will consider plaintiff’s sex/pregnancy discrimination claim only as
it relates to her “failure to promote” argument.
MCL 37.2202(1)(a) provides, in part, that an employer shall not “[f]ail or refuse to hire or
recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment,
compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of … sex.…” The term
“sex” is defined in the ELCRA as including pregnancy. MCL 37.2201(d); Sniecinski v Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). Unless a plaintiff
presents direct evidence of employment discrimination, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case from which discrimination may be inferred. DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After
Remand), 463 Mich 534, 537-540; 620 NW2d 836 (2001).
In cases involving direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove unlawful
discrimination in the same manner as a plaintiff would prove any other civil case. Hazle v Ford
Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). In cases involving indirect or
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must proceed by using the burden-shifting approach set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). This
approach allows “a plaintiff to present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from
which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination.”
DeBrow, supra at 538. To establish a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff
must present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) her failure to obtain the
position occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Hazle, supra at 463; see also McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802.
Here, plaintiff’s deposition does not support her claim of sex discrimination based on a
failure to promote. Plaintiff offered no testimony that she applied for a promotion during or after
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her pregnancy. She offered no testimony that she was qualified for a promotion or that
defendants were attempting to fill such a position. The only adverse employment decision to
which plaintiff testified was her firing. Furthermore, plaintiff did not plead a claim based on her
firing. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not support a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under a “failure to promote” theory. Thus, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion
for summary disposition.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on the assault
and battery claims against defendants. We hold that the trial court properly granted summary
disposition as to defendants Toundas and Heagy, but that it erred as to defendant Lawson.
“An assault is defined as any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another
person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances
which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent
present ability to accomplish the contact.” Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119; 472
NW2d 16 (1991). A battery is defined as “the willful and harmful or offensive touching of
another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact.” Id.
Plaintiff stated that the touchings made her feel uncomfortable and were unwelcome.
Thus, she has established that the touchings were harmful or offensive to her. But there is
nothing in the present record that would allow this Court to determine defendants’ intent as they
have not submitted any affidavits or depositions and plaintiff did not offer any insight into their
intent in her deposition.
Nonetheless, defendants are correct in their assertion that the majority of these claims
could have been properly dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because plaintiff acknowledged
they occurred before the two-year period of limitations applicable to assault and battery under
MCL 600.5805(2). “This Court will uphold a trial court’s ruling on appeal when the right result
issued, albeit for the wrong reason.” Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v Nestlé Waters
North America, Inc, 269 Mich App 25, 82; 709 NW2d 174 (2005).
Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 3, 2005. Plaintiff went on maternity leave on July
27, 2003; thus, any alleged assault or battery must have occurred during the few weeks she
worked after she returned from maternity leave in October and November 2003. She alleged that
Toundas put his hand on her shoulder in a manner that made her feel uncomfortable at a holiday
party in 2002 and that Heagy patted her on the bottom during a time when she was working on
“the Pontiac program.”1 Neither of these incidents occurred within the two-year period of
limitations.
Plaintiff also alleged that Lawson gave her shoulder rubs that made her feel
uncomfortable. She did not specify when these shoulder rubs occurred, so summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is inappropriate as to plaintiff’s claim of assault and battery against
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Plaintiff testified that she was working on this project before her maternity leave and after she
returned to work from maternity leave she only worked on the “Corvette Heritage Tour.”
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Lawson. But, any claims of assault and battery based upon shoulder rubs that occurred before
plaintiff’s maternity leave are barred by the two-year period of limitations. Defendants argue
that Lawson’s shoulder rubs could not be considered assaults because a federal court applying
Michigan law recently held that shoulder rubbing did not constitute assault and battery. See
Russell v Bronson Heating & Cooling, 345 F Supp 2d 761 (ED Mich, 2004). The Russell court
actually determined that based on the facts of that case, the plaintiff’s male supervisor did not
commit an assault under Michigan law when he rubbed the female employees’ shoulders without
permission because the supervisor snuck up behind her, and the plaintiff did not experience a
reasonable fear or apprehension. Id. at 796. In addition, the court found no evidence the
defendant intended his touch be harmful or offensive. Id. at 796-797. Here, there is no evidence
to conclude as a matter of law that Lawson did not commit an assault or battery.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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