PEOPLE OF MI V EDWARD LEE ROWLAND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 1, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266081
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-004588-01
EDWARD LEE ROWLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to rob while armed,
MCL 750.89, and third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 257.602a(3).1 He was
sentenced as a habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 15 to
40 years for the assault conviction, and 3 to 10 years for the fleeing and eluding conviction. He
appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
I. Underlying Facts
On April 23, 2005, 18-year-old Jeff Crespi and his girlfriend, Casse Sandusky, were
sitting in Crespi’s car in front of Sandusky’s house when a car traveling in the opposite direction
“slammed on the brakes,” backed up, and parked near Crespi’s car. Both Crespi and Sandusky
testified that defendant approached Crespi’s car. When Crespi rolled down his window,
defendant said, “Give me your ******* money,” and hit Crespi in the head with a metal lug
wrench. Sandusky ran to call the police, leaving the passenger door open. Crespi crawled out of
the passenger door as defendant attempted to hit him again. Defendant then chased Crespi
around the car with the lug wrench. Crespi screamed out as he ran toward Sandusky’s front
door, and defendant returned to his car and sped away.
A police officer observed defendant’s car pass him at a high rate of speed in an area
where the speed limit was 35 miles an hour. Police officers, traveling at speeds up to 125 miles
1
Defendant was also convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, but that conviction was
vacated on double jeopardy grounds.
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an hour, were unable to catch the car over a four-mile chase. Officers subsequently saw that the
car had crashed and was unoccupied. Shortly thereafter, a canine unit located defendant hiding
in a dumpster. Officers determined that defendant matched a recent description for an attempted
robbery suspect. In a statement made to the police, defendant denied robbing anyone, and stated
that he fled from the police because he “had warrants.” The police recovered a black metal lug
wrench from the front seat of defendant’s car. The parties stipulated that a cell phone found in
Crespi’s car belonged to the owner of the car defendant was driving. The person had loaned
defendant both her car and cell phone.
At trial, defendant denied demanding money from Crespi, but admitted fleeing the police
and hiding in a dumpster. Defendant claimed that he could not get by Crespi’s car, and Crespi
made a derogatory comment when he asked him to move. Defendant, who was intoxicated, got
out of his car and brandished a lug wrench to intimidate Crespi, but Crespi protruded his head
and defendant hit him. Defendant admitted that he did not mention the incident with Crespi
when talking to the police about his whereabouts that evening.
II. Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor
to impeach his credibility with evidence of a 2003 conviction for second-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(3), under MRE 609(a)(2). We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to allow impeachment by evidence of a prior
conviction for an abuse of discretion. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 6; 532 NW2d 885
(1995).
A prior conviction may be used to impeach a witness’s credibility if the conviction
satisfies the criteria set forth in MRE 609. People v Cross, 202 Mich App 138, 146; 508 NW2d
144 (1993), lv den 445 Mich 912 (1994). Evidence of a prior conviction for an offense involving
theft may be admitted for impeachment purposes under the balancing test in MRE 609. In
determining the probative value of evidence of a prior conviction, the trial court must “consider
only the age of the conviction and the degree to which of conviction of the crime is indicative of
veracity.” MRE 609(b). In determining the prejudicial effect, the trial court must consider only
the conviction’s similarity to the charged offense and whether admission of the evidence would
affect defendant’s decision whether to testify. Id.
The trial court determined that defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree home
invasion contained an element of theft. In discussing this matter, defense counsel agreed that
second-degree home invasion contained an element of theft. The court then properly weighed
the probative value against the prejudicial effect inherent in the admission of the conviction. The
court found that the prior conviction was indicative of defendant’s veracity. The court aptly
noted that the charge of assault with intent to rob turned on the issue of credibility. Crespi
testified that defendant attempted to rob him, while the defense argued that this was a case of
“road rage” and defendant had no intent to rob Crespi. The trial court noted that the conviction
was only two years old, which heightened its probative value. Cross, supra (a conviction had
“heightened probative value because [it] was only two years old”). Further, there was no
indication that admission of the prior conviction affected defendant’s decisional process. The
trial court noted that defendant had already decided to testify, and defense counsel acknowledged
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that defendant would testify to present his defense. Additionally, the trial court provided a
cautionary instruction to the jury regarding the proper use of the evidence. On balance, the trial
court’s decision to admit the prior conviction was not an abuse of discretion.
III. Jury Instructions
We reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight.
“The determination whether a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the case lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 189; 585 NW2d 357
(1998).
“It is well established in Michigan law that evidence of flight is admissible” to support an
inference of “consciousness of guilt.” Coleman, supra at 4. The term “flight” has been applied
to such actions as fleeing the scene of the crime, running from the police, and attempting to
escape custody. Id. Here, after assaulting Crespi, defendant returned to his car and “sped off
down the street.” Defendant admitted that he thereafter attempted to escape the police, and was
driving 45 miles over the speed limit. After defendant’s car crashed, he fled the car and hid in a
dumpster until he was discovered by the police. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, his actions
could properly be considered evidence of “flight.” Id. Consequently, the trial court did not err
by providing the instruction.
Defendant argues that the instruction was improper because it was “duplicative” of the
fleeing and eluding instruction. Defendant has not provided any authority to support his
argument that the trial court was prohibited from instructing the jury on both flight and fleeing
and eluding. As the appellant, defendant is required to do more than merely announce his
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims. See
Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984). Furthermore, the two
instructions are not duplicative. See CJI2d 4.4 and CJI2d 13.6c. Defendant is not entitled to
appellate relief.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor
impermissibly vouched for the police officers when he stated, “The cops are telling the truth.”
We disagree.
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s remark, we review this claim for
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-753, 763-764; 597
NW2d 130, reh den 461 Mich 1205 (1999). “No error requiring reversal will be found if the
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s conduct could have been cured by a timely instruction.”
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370, lv den 463 Mich 927 (2000),
abrogated in part on other grounds in Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L
Ed 2d 177 (2004).
Although a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of witnesses by conveying that
he has some special knowledge that the witnesses are testifying truthfully, People v Knapp, 244
Mich App 361, 382; 624 NW2d 227, lv den 465 Mich 934 (2001), the challenged remark did not
suggest that the prosecutor had special knowledge that the police witnesses were credible.
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Rather, the remark was part of a permissible argument concerning credibility based on the
testimony produced at trial. The police testimony concerned defendant’s acts of fleeing and
eluding and hiding in a dumpster, and defendant’s statement. Defendant’s own testimony was
consistent with the police testimony in this regard. The prosecutor discussed the evidence at
length, and told the jurors that it is their job to decide the facts and urged them to evaluate the
evidence. A prosecutor is free to argue from the facts that a witness is credible. People v Fisher,
220 Mich App 133, 156; 559 NW2d 318 (1996), lv den 456 Mich 874 (1997); People v
Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996), lv den 454 Mich 883 (1997).
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the witnesses’
credibility, and that the lawyers’ comments are not evidence. The instructions were sufficient to
dispel any possible prejudice. People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001),
lv den 465 Mich 952 (2002). Consequently, this claim does not warrant reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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