PEOPLE OF MI V FORREST L KNOX
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 1, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265999
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-200378-FH
FORREST LEE KNOX,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence
of liquor (OUIL), third offense, MCL 257.625, and driving with a suspended license, MCL
257.904. He was sentenced to five years’ probation, with the first year to be served in jail, and
fines of $1,250. He appeals by right, challenging the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to
dismiss the OUIL, third offense, charge on double jeopardy grounds. We affirm.
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis
of double jeopardy. People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 159; 695 NW2d 45 (2005). The double
jeopardy provisions in Const 1963, art 1, § 15, and US Const, Am V, are construed consistently.
People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 591; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). The prohibition against double jeopardy
provides the following related protections: “(1) it protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. at
574.
In this case, defendant’s motion implicates the second prosecution strand of the Double
Jeopardy Clause because defendant claimed that pending proceedings in the 47th District Court
prohibited a trial on the OUIL, third offense, charge in circuit court. We note that the March 1,
2005, transcript and other records from the 47th District Court which the parties have submitted
on appeal are not part of the circuit court record. “This Court’s review is generally limited to the
record of the trial court, and it will generally allow no enlargement of the record on appeal.”
People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 356; 578 NW2d 692 (1998), rev’d in part on other grounds
462 Mich 415 (2000). But pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(4), this Court is empowered to permit
additions to the record. See People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 99-100; 625 NW2d 87 (2000).
Under the circumstances, and because the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the records
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from the 47th District Court, we shall consider those records for the limited purpose of
determining whether defendant’s jury trial in this case was barred by double jeopardy.
It is apparent from the records in defendant’s district court case that there were
procedural deficiencies in the manner in which proceedings were initiated against defendant to
charge him with violating a prior probationary order based on various grounds, including his
commission of the charged OUIL offense in this case. The district court did not issue a
summons or arrest warrant as required by MCR 6.445(A) to initiate probation violation charges.
Further, the order signed by the district court which required defendant to appear to show cause
why he should not be held in criminal contempt for violating the probationary order was facially
defective because it was not supported by the required affidavit. See MCR 3.606(A); In re
Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich App 153, 159; 624 NW2d 504 (2000) (an absent or inadequate
affidavit deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over the person of the alleged contemnor).
But the consequence of any procedural error was a matter to be raised and resolved in the
district court case. Our concern in this case is whether the pending district court matter
precluded defendant’s trial for OUIL, third offense, in this case. Jeopardy does not attach for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause until a defendant is put on trial before the trier of fact.
People v Hicks, 447 Mich 819, 826; 528 NW2d 136 (1994) (Griffin, J.). Jeopardy attaches at a
bench trial when a trial court begins to hear evidence. Id. at 826-827.
We are not bound by defendant’s characterization of the March 1, 2005, district court
hearing at which the probation officer testified regarding defendant’s probation violations.
Johnston v City of Livonia, 177 Mich App 200, 208; 441 NW2d 41 (1989). Regardless of any
procedural error in the manner in which the district court proceeding was initiated, it is clear
from the record that the trial court only conducted a probation violation hearing. Probation
violation hearings are not criminal prosecutions and do not raise double jeopardy concerns. See
People v Burks, 220 Mich App 253, 256; 559 NW2d 357 (1996). Because the district court did
not conduct a criminal contempt hearing, defendant’s claim that his circuit court trial in this case
was prohibited on double jeopardy grounds fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, it unnecessary to consider the alternative grounds the prosecutor raises to
argue that no double jeopardy violation occurred.
We affirm.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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