IN RE CHYANNE KATHERINE CHADWICK MINOR

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS In the Matter of SHYANNE KATHERINE CHADWICK, Minor. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, UNPUBLISHED February 27, 2007 Petitioner-Appellee, v No. 270362 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 04-436117-NA LOUIS EUGENE MADDEN, Respondent-Appellant, and ANGELA MARIE CHADWICK and WILLIAM THOMAS EMORY, Respondents. Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ. MEMORANDUM. Respondent-appellant appeals by right from the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm. In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review that finding under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 356357; MCR 3.977(J). Although respondent-appellant had obtained housing and employment, there was conflicting testimony regarding his role as a father and his interaction with his daughter. Testimony revealed that when respondent-appellant and his daughter were living with the paternal grandmother, respondent-appellant did not contribute to the child’s care. Delores Guera, the caseworker, opined that respondent-appellant was not “invested” in being a parent. Guera also opined that respondent-appellant’s failure to care for his child posed a risk of harm. In addition, Guera expressed concern with respondent-appellant’s ability to address the child’s learning difficulties. The Clinic for Child Study evaluator testified that preventing Shyanne from living with respondent-appellant was not contrary to her best interests and that the prognosis for a successful long-term adjustment was “guarded at best.” -1- Based on the above evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondentappellant failed to provide proper care for his daughter, that there was no reasonable expectation that he would be able to provide such care within a reasonable time considering the child’s age, and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harmed if returned to his care. Thus, termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).1 Respondent-appellant’s failure to parent his child, and, consequently, his failure to bond with his daughter, supports the trial court’s finding that the evidence did not demonstrate that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was clearly contrary to the child’s best interests. We affirm. /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Jane E. Markey /s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 1 We agree with respondent-appellant’s contention that the trial court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The condition that led to adjudication was respondent-appellant’s lack of housing. At the time of the termination hearing, respondentappellant was living in a home that the caseworker determined suitable. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in finding that the condition that led to adjudication continued to exist. However, petitioner need prove only one statutory ground to justify termination of parental rights. -2-

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