GHALEB NAJIB HADDAD V WALEED MAMMO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GHALEB NAJIB HADDAD, Personal
Representative of the Estate of SHIBLI JAMIL
HADDAD, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 266646
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-001381-NH
WALEED MAMMO, D.D.S.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Saad and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court opinion and order granting defendant
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). We affirm. This case arose when
defendant, a dentist, allegedly told the decedent to abstain from a blood thinning medication
before defendant pulled out an aching tooth. The decedent’s family doctor warned the decedent
not to undergo the extraction, but the decedent ignored his doctor’s advice. He stopped taking
his medication and suffered a fatal stroke the day after the extraction. Defendant denied that he
performed the extraction.
Plaintiff first contends that the circuit court erred by granting defendant summary
disposition with respect to the fraudulent concealment issue. We disagree. We review de novo a
trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). The deposition testimony of plaintiff and several other members of the
decedent’s family shows that by the time of the decedent’s funeral in May 1999, the family knew
that (1) defendant had removed the decedent’s tooth on May 8, 1999, (2) defendant had
instructed the decedent to stop taking Coumadin, against the advice of the decedent’s regular
physician, and (3) on May 9, 1999, the decedent suffered a fatal stroke. Consequently, plaintiff
almost immediately had reason to know that defendant had treated the decedent and that his
questionable treatment probably played a role in causing the decedent’s death. See Craig v
Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86; 684 NW2d 296 (2004); Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of
the Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 643; 692 NW2d 398 (2004). Moreover, by
January 2000, plaintiff and the decedent’s other family members undisputedly knew about the
facts supporting a potential negligence claim against defendant and had hired an attorney to
investigate further the link between defendant’s treatment and the decedent’s demise. Doe,
supra. Because plaintiff did not file the complaint until April 2004, the fraudulent-concealment
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rule’s two-year grace period does not preserve this claim from summary disposition. MCL
600.5855.
Plaintiff next argues that the circuit court erred by retroactively applying Waltz v Wyse,
469 Mich 642; 677 NW2d 813 (2004), to this case. A medical malpractice plaintiff generally has
two years from the date the cause of action accrued in which to file suit. MCL 600.5805(6). A
malpractice claim against a dentist “accrues at the time of the act or omission that is the basis for
the claim of medical malpractice.” MCL 600.5838a(1). Because the alleged negligence of
defendant occurred on May 8, 1999, the date he extracted the decedent’s tooth, the malpractice
claim in this case accrued on May 8, 1999, and the limitations period expired on May 8, 2001.
However, plaintiff was appointed as personal representative on November 5, 2001, so the
wrongful death saving period gave him until November 5, 2003, to commence this action. MCL
600.5852. Although plaintiff provided defendant with a notice of his intent to sue on October
27, 2003, this notice did not toll the wrongful death saving period as it would have tolled the
statute of limitations. Waltz, supra at 648-651, 655. Instead, notices of intent to sue only toll
statutes of limitations, and the limitations period in this case had already expired. Id. Here,
plaintiff failed to file suit by November 5, 2003, so the trial court correctly dismissed the case as
time-barred. MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Plaintiff’s remaining challenges to Waltz lack merit. We concluded in Mullins v St
Joseph Mercy Hosp, 271 Mich App 503, 509; 722 NW2d 666 (2006), that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Waltz “applies retroactively in all cases.” More recently, a special conflict panel in
Ward v Siano, ___ Mich App ___, slip op at 2; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 265599, issued
November 14, 2006), rejected the proposition that “a wrongful death plaintiff may rely upon
equitable tolling to escape the retroactive effect of our Supreme Court’s decision in Waltz . . . .”
The Court in Ward held that “judicial tolling should not operate to relieve wrongful death
plaintiffs from complying with Waltz’s time restraints . . . .” Id. at 7. Finally, Waltz did not
shorten any available time limits, but merely held that the Legislature only intended a plaintiff’s
provision of statutory notice to toll the statute of limitations, not the wrongful-death saving
period. Waltz, supra at 652 n 14. Therefore, plaintiff’s due process argument is unfounded. See
Farley v Advanced Cardiovascular Health Specialists, PC, 266 Mich App 566, 576 n 27; 703
NW2d 115 (2005).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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