SHARON LYNN HIGGS V RICKEY LYNN HIGGS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHARON LYNN HIGGS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 27, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 264469
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 03-034852-DM
RICKEY LYNN HIGGS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Smolenski and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the judgment of divorce. We affirm.
After plaintiff filed complaints for divorce in December 2003, the parties entered into
several stipulations regarding the marital home, child custody, child support, other marital assets,
and marital debt. Among these stipulations, they agreed on the record to an equal distribution of
the marital debt. The court determined that the parties’ agreements represented a fair and
equitable resolution of the case and stated that a judgment would be entered reflecting the
parties’ agreements. Several months later, plaintiff moved to restore the case to the trial docket,
stating, among other things, that the parties could not agree on the distribution of marital assets
and debts. Defendant countered that the parties had placed an agreement on the record and
requested that the court enter a final judgment. The court concluded that, absent some sort of
fraud, deceit, or mistake of fact, plaintiff did not present grounds to prevent the court from
entering judgment, denied plaintiff’s motion to restore the case to the trial docket, and ordered
defendant to prepare a proposed judgment of divorce. Plaintiff subsequently objected to entry of
defendant’s proposed judgment, specifically objecting to reimbursing defendant for expenses
incurred during the pendency of the interim order and to the inclusion of credit card debt
incurred as of March 4, 2004, when the parties entered a stipulation into the record that plaintiff
could vacate the marital home. Following several hearings, the court entered a judgment of
divorce, allocating each parties’ responsibilities for the payment of various debts and ordering
plaintiff to reimburse defendant for some expenses related to care of the children and the marital
home that occurred during the pendency of the case.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the division of
property was equitable. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in identifying
and including expenses not contemplated by the parties’ settlement agreement, including certain
credit card debt and reimbursement expenses owed to defendant.
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“In a divorce action, this Court’s review of the trial court’s factual findings is limited to
clear error.” McNamara v Horner (After Remand), 255 Mich App 667, 669; 662 NW2d 436
(2003). If the trial court’s findings of fact are upheld, this Court must then decide whether the
dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Id. at 670. “A dispositional
ruling is discretionary and should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction
that the division was inequitable.” Id. Where a judgment of divorce is entered upon the
settlement of the parties, the settlement represents a contract, which, if unambiguous, is to be
interpreted as a question of law. In re Estate of Lobaina, 267 Mich App 415, 417-418; 705
NW2d 34 (2005). “Absent a showing of factors such as fraud or duress, courts act properly
when they enforce such agreements.” Id. at 418.
Here, in lieu of holding a trial or hearing on the issues, the parties entered into a
stipulation on the record with respect to all pending issues, including the property settlement
between the parties. At the stipulation hearing, the parties agreed only that they would divide
equally between themselves all the marital debt. No evidence or testimony was presented
regarding the date of valuation of the marital debt, and there was no objection presented at that
time regarding the issue of marital debt. In addition, plaintiff did not request a hearing on the
issue of marital debt, and she specifically agreed on the record that the parties’ stipulation settled
the issues regarding the division of marital assets and liabilities between the parties. On its face,
the parties made a clear and unambiguous agreement that they would divide the marital debt
equally.
Plaintiff now insists that the marital debt should be valuated as of the date she filed her
complaint for divorce rather than the time she vacated the marital home. The goal of a court
when apportioning the marital estate is to equitably divide it in light of all the circumstances.
Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 152; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). “The trial court need not achieve
mathematical equality, but the trial court must clearly explain divergence from congruence.” Id.
Setting the date of the valuation of the marital estate is within the trial court’s discretion. Gates v
Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 427; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). In Gates, this Court held that the trial
court did not err when it refused to permit the defendant to adjust the value and valuation dates
of certain property. Id. The Court noted that the defendant did not request a change in valuation
dates or in the amounts at trial in upholding the trial court’s decision. Id. Similarly, here,
plaintiff did not raise any issue surrounding the valuation date or valuation of debt on the date set
for trial. Rather, plaintiff entered into a stipulation that the marital debt was to be divided
equally, without contesting the valuation of the marital debt.
Regardless, it appears that the property settlement, as it concerned the parties’ debts, was
equitable in light of the circumstances. It is undisputed that plaintiff continued to reside in the
marital home from the time she filed the complaint for divorce until March 6, 2004. Defendant’s
credit card debt as of that date was valuated as marital debt. As the trial court may utilize its
discretion in determining the proper date to valuate the marital estate, no abuse of discretion
occurred in the trial court’s utilization of the date plaintiff vacated the marital home since both
parties presumably continued to contribute to marital expenses.1
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We also note that plaintiff did not raise an objection to the credit card debt and reimbursement costs until February
10, 2005, several months after the parties placed the settlement agreement on the record.
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Given this background, we are left with no other conclusion but that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion regarding the valuation of credit card debt into the marital debt.
The parties stipulated and agreed to equally divide the marital debt between them. The parties
agreed that the stipulation would constitute the full terms of their agreement and opted against
having an evidentiary hearing. The trial court entered judgment based on the parties’ stipulation.
The parties did not indicate on the record that valuations of debt and assets were outstanding
such that an adjournment or additional discovery was necessary. Based on the plaintiff’s choice
to enter into a settlement agreement rather than proceed to trial, she effectively waived her
position on appeal. See Grant v AAA Michigan Wisconsin, Inc, 272 Mich App 142, 148; 724
NW2d 498 (2006) (“A party who expressly agrees with an issue in the trial court cannot then
take a contrary position on appeal”). Having found that plaintiff waived this issue on appeal and
that the distribution appears to be equitable, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by including the credit card debt into the valuation of the marital estate.
Relative to the issue of reimbursement costs, plaintiff contests the inclusion of costs for
children’s expenses and groceries in the amount of $218.29, home expenses between December
2003 and March 6, 2004 in the amount of $1,166.50, and reimbursement for medical bills in the
amount of $705.48. While plaintiff contended below that she too should be reimbursed for
certain expenses, she presented no information regarding such expenses and merely argued that
neither party should be reimbursed for them.
We find that plaintiff’s argument that the reimbursement costs should not have been
included is inherently flawed. Plaintiff has relied on language in the judgment of divorce
indicating that the parties shall assume responsibility for payment of any indebtedness each has
individually incurred since the date the divorce action was filed to support her argument that she
should not be responsible for costs incurred by defendant during the pendency of the action. But
this language includes indemnity only for those costs “individually” incurred by either of the
parties. The provision does not necessarily include marital expenses incurred during the
pendency of the action. As plaintiff continued to reside in the marital home through March 6,
2004, it is reasonable that there would continue to be marital expenses and/or debt during that
time, relating to grocery expenses, children expenses, household expenses, and medical
expenses. Plaintiff has presented nothing by way of argument or otherwise that the
reimbursement expenses charged against her were incurred individually by defendant. Instead, it
appears that plaintiff has asserted a narrow interpretation of the trial court’s judgment while
ignoring the specific language of the court’s judgment. In addition, although plaintiff argues that
she too should have been reimbursed for such expenses, plaintiff again has presented no
evidence or calculation or other specific request for such costs. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in including such expenses as part of the marital debt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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