CHRISTOPHER DAWAYNE LAMAR V RAMADA FRANCHISE SYSTEMS INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER DAWAYNE LAMAR,
UNPUBLISHED
February 22, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
RAMADA FRANCHISE SYSTEMS, INC., SAM
SALMAN YONO, GANDHI DAVID YONO,
SAYO, INC., d/b/a RAMADA INN
SOUTHFIELD, d/b/a YESTERDAYS,
No. 272966
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-066668-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse. This case is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support of a claim. The motion should be granted if the evidence demonstrates that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 332; 628 NW2d 33 (2001). This Court reviews the trial
court’s decision de novo. Id.
Relying on MacDonald, supra, the trial court determined that the question whether
defendants made reasonable efforts to contact the police in response to a fight involving
numerous individuals on defendants’ premises was to be determined by the court as a matter of
law. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court misinterpreted MacDonald in this regard.
In MacDonald, the Court addressed a merchant’s duty to protect invitees from criminal
acts of third parties. The Court explained that “[a] merchant can assume that patrons will obey
the criminal law. This assumption should continue until a specific situation occurs on the
premises that would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to an
identifiable invitee.” Id., p 335 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that the duty owed by
the merchant at that point is limited to responding reasonably to a situation occurring on the
premises. Id. Fulfilling the duty requires that the merchant make reasonable efforts to contact
the police. Id., p 336.
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The trial court relied on the following excerpt from MacDonald in concluding that the
determination whether a merchant’s response was reasonable is a matter for the court to decide:
Having established that a merchant’s duty is to respond reasonably to
criminal acts occurring on the premises, the next question is what is a reasonable
response? Ordinarily, this would be a question for the factfinder. However, in
cases in which overriding public policy concerns arise, this Court may determine
what constitutes reasonable care. See Williams [v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc,
429 Mich 495, 501; 418 NW2d 381 (1988)], citing Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich
425, 438; 254 NW2d 759 (1977). Because such overriding public policy concerns
exist in the instant cases, the question of reasonable care is one that we will
determine as a matter of law. Williams, supra at 501. We now make clear that, as
a matter of law, fulfilling the duty to respond requires only that a merchant make
reasonable efforts to contact the police. We believe this limitation is consistent
with the public policy concerns discussed in Williams. [MacDonald, supra, p
336.]
Although the Court determined as a matter of law that the merchant’s duty to respond
required only reasonable efforts to contact the police, the Court indicated that the assessment of
the reasonableness of the efforts was for the trier of fact to determine. After discussing Williams,
supra, and Scott v Harper Recreation, Inc, 444 Mich 441; 506 NW2d 857 (1993), the Court
cautioned:
Consequently, in any case in which a factfinder, be it the trial court or a
jury, will be assessing the reasonableness of the measures taken by a merchant in
responding to an occurrence on the premises, a plaintiff may not present evidence
concerning the presence or absence of security personnel, or the failure to
otherwise resort to self-help, as a basis for establishing a breach of the merchant’s
duty. A jury thus must be specifically instructed with the principles of Williams
and Scott as we have outlined them here. [MacDonald, supra, p 338 (emphasis
added).]
Contrary to the trial court’s determination in this case, the foregoing discussion indicates that the
assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant’s efforts to contact the police is to be made by
the trier of fact, not by the court as a matter of law in every instance.
In this case, there are disputed issues of fact concerning when the fight started and how
long it had been going on before defendants’ employees contacted the police. Therefore, the
issue whether defendants’ employees made reasonable efforts to contact the police should be
decided by the trier of fact and summary disposition was improper.
Reversed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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