PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY DUANE WOODS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 22, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265840
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-202506-FH
ANTHONY DUANE WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Saad and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for third-degree fleeing and
eluding a police officer, MCL 257.602a(3)(a); carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227;
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; and two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual
offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to three to fifteen years’ imprisonment each for his fleeing
and eluding, carrying a concealed weapon, and felon in possession convictions, and to two years’
imprisonment for his felony firearm convictions. We affirm.
On the night of April 23, 2005, Officer Joseph Miller attempted to stop a van with a
broken taillight. Instead of stopping when Officer Miller activated the overhead police car lights,
the van’s driver, defendant, “took off.” Officer Miller followed the van at high speeds through
several blocks of a residential area. The van suddenly turned into a driveway, the driver’s side
door opened, and, while the van was still moving at about 35 m.p.h., defendant jumped from the
van and ran from the scene. The van crashed into the garage at the end of the driveway. Officer
Miller followed defendant on foot, and he was apprehended several blocks away.
After defendant was arrested, the van was towed to an impound lot, in keeping with the
policy of the local police department. Although it was also department policy to perform an
inventory search before a vehicle was impounded, Officer Miller failed to do so because he
errantly assumed that other officers had already completed an inventory search. The van could
not be secured at the impound lot because the driver’s-side window was broken out. Therefore,
following his own company’s policy, the tow-truck driver began to inventory and collect the
van’s contents. While doing so, he discovered a pistol on the floor of the passenger side and
called the police. In response to that call, Officer Miller went to the impound lot and found a
nine-millimeter pistol on the floor of the van. He then completed a full inventory search.
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Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court erred by excluding defendant from a
discussion regarding a supplemental instruction to the jury during deliberation. Defendant
claims that his absence from the courtroom violated his constitutional right to be present at all
phases of his trial. We agree with defendant that the trial court should not have discussed and
issued the instruction in defendant’s absence, but we disagree that the error requires reversal.
While the jury was deliberating, it sent the trial court a note asking it to define “taking part,” one
of the elements of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. The trial court consulted with
defense counsel and the prosecution. Defendant, however, remained in the prisoner holding area
during the discussion. The trial court then provided an instruction, which appears to have been
approved by both attorneys, stating “[i]t is for the jury to decide what the facts of this case are
and to apply the law to the facts. It is for the jury to decide what the meaning of ‘taking part’ is
within the context of the entire jury instructions.”
Nothing before us demonstrates that defendant waived his right to be present, so we
presume that defendant did not waive his rights. People v Armstrong, 212 Mich App 121, 129;
536 NW2d 789 (1995). Defendant correctly argues that he had a constitutional right to be
present when the instructions were provided. People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 247; 365 NW2d
673 (1984). Every absence, however, is not a violation of due process and grounds for automatic
reversal; “it is no longer the law that injury is conclusively presumed from defendant’s every
absence during the course of a trial.” People v Morgan, 400 Mich 527, 535; 255 NW2d 603
(1977). Rather, the test for whether the absence is an error requiring reversal is whether there is
any reasonable possibility that the defendant’s absence prejudiced him. Id. at 536.
When a communication with the jury outside of defendant’s presence is of a substantive
nature, which includes supplemental instructions on the law, prejudice is presumed and “may
only be rebutted by a firm and definite showing of an absence of prejudice.” People v France,
436 Mich 138, 143; 461 NW2d 621 (1990). Once a defendant objects to an instruction given in
his absence, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the instruction was not prejudicial. Id. at 143144. Here, the trial court’s instruction essentially restated the original instructions and merely
redirected the jury to the facts of the case and application of the law. Moreover, defense counsel
was present and approved the instruction, so the presumption that the instruction prejudiced
defendant has been effectively rebutted. Id. at 164-165. We also note that ordinarily defense
counsel fully represents a defendant’s interest and may exercise the privileges that defendant
could have exercised. People v Carroll, 396 Mich 408, 413; 240 NW2d 722 (1976). Here,
defendant was represented and counsel exercised defendant’s right to participate in the preinstruction discussion, so defendant’s absence did not prejudice him or undermine the reliability
of the jury’s verdict. France, supra. Because we find no prejudice from defendant’s absence
during the instruction, we will not reverse on this basis.
Defendant next argues on appeal that his motion to suppress the pistol found in the van
was wrongly denied because the pistol was the fruit of an illegal search. We will not disturb a
trial court’s findings of fact when deciding a motion to suppress unless the findings are clearly
erroneous. People v LoCicero, 453 Mich 496, 500; 556 NW2d 498 (1996).
Defendant argues that because he was lawfully in possession of the van and only left it
temporarily, he has standing to challenge the search. We disagree. The first inquiry in
approaching this standing question is whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the contents of the crashed and abandoned van. People v Mamon, 435 Mich 1, 6; 457 NW2d
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623 (1990) (Riley, C.J.). Ordinarily, a defendant may not challenge the search and seizure of
abandoned property, because the property’s abandonment destroys the possessor’s interest in it.
People v Taylor, 253 Mich App 399, 406; 655 NW2d 291 (2002). A defendant abandons his
property when he discards it. Mamon, supra at 7. In this case, defendant jumped from the van
while it was still moving. He left it crashed into a garage with the lights on, the door open, and
the keys in the ignition. He never tried to return to the van and was apprehended several blocks
away. Although he may not have wanted to relinquish his legal interests, he certainly shed the
van when it served his more immediate interest of escape. He also admitted that he fled from the
van because he did not want to be connected with the gun inside. By jumping out of the open
van and running, defendant abandoned the van to search by the owner of the home, the tow
company, and certainly the police. The trial court correctly held that defendant abandoned his
expectation of privacy and lacked standing to challenge the search of the van, so the denial of
defendant’s motion to suppress was not error. Moreover, defendant fails to establish how the
tow truck driver’s search of the automobile, or the police search it later prompted, could possibly
reach the level of an “unreasonable search and seizure” of the demolished van and its
contraband. See People v McKendrick, 188 Mich App 128, 141-142; 468 NW2d 903 (1991);
Michigan v Thomas, 458 US 259; 102 S Ct 3079; 73 L Ed 2d 750 (1982).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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