JFN INC V HAYNES REAL ESTATE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JFN, INC., d/b/a AMBASSADOR HALL,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272067
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 05-020015-CZ
HAYNES REAL ESTATE, INC., d/b/a
COLDWELL BANKER HAYNES REAL
ESTATE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant
under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff JFN, Inc., does business as Ambassador Hall, a rental hall facility with catering
services that is located in Monroe. For approximately half of 2004, defendant distributed, in a
real estate publication available to the general public, an advertisement depicting Ambassador
Hall. The advertisement also depicted Anthony’s Restaurant, which is adjacent to Ambassador
Hall and was the actual business for sale. The advertisement stated: “$150,000 BUSINESS
ONLY Turn Key Operation. No real estate being sold. All equipment including newly
purchased broasting oven, tables, chairs, dishes, silver, everything.” Approximately eight
thousand copies of the publication were produced and distributed.
Plaintiff alleged that the advertisement falsely implied that Ambassador Hall was for sale
and caused a slowdown of its business. Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 22, 2005, alleging a
violation of Michigan’s price and advertising act (PAA), MCL 445.351 et seq. Plaintiff stated
that the advertisement reduced its income and damaged its reputation. Defendant later moved
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (10). Defendant argued that plaintiff did
not have standing under the PAA to pursue its claim; that there was, at any rate, no cognizable
claim under the PAA; and that plaintiff’s damages were too speculative to support the claim.
After hearing oral arguments, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench. The court
ruled that the PAA “was designed to protect consumers in pricing and advertising of consumer
items” and that “what’s being sold here in this advertisement is a business, not a consumer good
or item . . . .” The court also indicated that “there’s no statement . . . that’s untrue, deceptive or
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misleading.” The court also appeared to adopt defendant’s argument that a violation of the PAA
can be determined by looking to the elements of common-law fraud. It stated that plaintiff did
not rely on the advertisement to its detriment, that the elements of common-law fraud were
therefore not satisfied, and that, accordingly, “the [PAA] does not apply to this situation.” The
court also stated:
The injuries suffered must be fairly traceable to the action of the
[d]efendant, and in this case . . . there’s no way of doing that. Everything is
speculative. And furthermore, there’s even an issue whether they lost any money
or not in this case because . . . the profit did not seem to change from year to year.
For all these reasons I’m satisfied that the [p]laintiff does not have
standing to bring . . . this action, and based upon the speculativeness of the
damages that there’s no issue of fact on that as well. They’re not able to say they
actually lost money as a result of this.
So for those reasons the motion is granted . . . .
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant.
We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich
App 146, 152; 673 NW2d 452 (2003). When reviewing a motion brought under MCR
2.116(C)(5), which concerns the lack of standing, we consider the “pleadings, depositions,
admissions, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.” Aichele,
supra at 152 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “This Court . . . examines the entire record
to determine whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jones v Slick,
242 Mich App 715, 718; 619 NW2d 733 (2000).
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate if “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment . . . as a matter of law.”
In reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we again “consider the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence . . . .” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich
368, 374; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). We view the pleadings and evidence “in favor of the party
opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party.” Id.
This case also involves statutory construction, and we review issues of statutory
construction de novo. Aichele, supra at 152.
The preamble to the PAA states that the PAA is
AN ACT to regulate the pricing of consumer items and the advertising of
consumer items, services, goods, merchandise, commodities, and real property; to
prescribe the powers and duties of certain state and local officials in relation
thereto; to provide remedies and penalties; and to repeal certain acts and parts of
acts. [1976 PA 449.]
MCL 445.356(1), a part of the PAA, states: “A person shall not knowingly make, publish,
disseminate, circulate, or place before the public an advertisement which contains a statement or
representation which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.”
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We agree with defendant and the trial court that plaintiff did not have standing under the
PAA to pursue its claim. 1976 PA 449 clearly indicates that the PAA was enacted “to regulate
the . . . advertising of consumer items, services, goods, merchandise, commodities, and real
property . . . .” The advertisement about which plaintiff complains was clearly not advertising
consumer items, services, goods, merchandise, commodities, or real property.
The
advertisement unequivocally stated that a “business only” was being sold and that “[n]o real
estate” was being sold. Therefore, even if it could be said that the advertisement was unfair to
plaintiff, the PAA simply does not provide a remedy for this unfairness.
It is true, as mentioned by plaintiff, that MCL 445.356(1), in referring to “an
advertisement,” does not indicate to what types of advertisements the statute applies. However,
“[w]hen reviewing questions of statutory construction, our purpose is to discern and give effect
to the Legislature's intent,” and statutory language that is clear is to be applied in accordance
with its plain meaning. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300
(2000). 1976 PA 449 makes clear that the Legislature’s intent in enacting the PAA was to
regulate the advertising of “consumer items, services, goods, merchandise, commodities, and real
property . . . .” Plaintiff’s claim simply does not fall within the purview of the act.
Moreover, “[a] plaintiff asserting a cause of action has the burden of proving damages
with reasonable certainty, and damages predicated on speculation and conjecture are not
recoverable.” Health Call of Detroit v Atrium Home & Health Care Services, Inc, 268 Mich
App 83, 96; 706 NW2d 843 (2005). Ambassador Hall’s annual profit and loss statement for
2000 indicates that, in that year, the hall’s gross profit was $210,373.70 and the net “profit”
(after subtracting expenses) was -$29,569.25 (or a loss of $29,569.25). For 2001, the gross profit
was $244,150.78 and the loss was $37,198.49; for 2002, the gross profit was $254,787.91 and
the loss was $42,992.17; for 2003, the gross profit was $260,082.60 and the loss was $60,956.25;
for 2004, the gross profit was $236,980.66 and the loss was $57,430.18; and for 2005, the gross
profit was $195,911.68 and the loss was $56,616.32. Plaintiff indicates in its appellate brief that
the advertisement in question ran from April 2004 through September 2004, and yet the available
evidence indicates that Ambassador Hall had less of a loss in 2004 than in 2003. Moreover,
although Joseph Perna, an officer of plaintiff, testified that he received a lot of cancellations for
bookings in 2004, he could not indicate why the cancellations had occurred except in the case of
one individual, a family friend. Nor, in the absence of speculation, could he determine why his
“phone stop[ped] ringing.” Under the circumstances, plaintiff has not set forth its damages, nor a
connection between the alleged wrong and the alleged resulting damages, with sufficient
specificity to survive a motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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