PEOPLE OF MI V LESLIE JAMES WARNSLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265201
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-002817-FH
LESLIE JAMES WARNSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Smolenski and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.11,
to 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury
instruction on self-defense. This Court reviews de novo the constitutional claim that defendant
was denied his right to present a defense. People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327; 654 NW2d
651 (2002). We also review de novo claims of instructional error. Id. The failure to give an
instruction on a theory of defense, which is supported by the evidence, deprives a defendant of
his due process right to present a defense. Id. at 327-328.
During trial, defendant did not testify, but his counsel attempted to argue that he stabbed
the victim in self-defense. The jury heard testimony that both men were arguing about the victim
tracking dirt into a kitchen where defendant was laying new flooring. During the argument,
defendant swung at the victim with the knife he had been using for his task. Defendant then
chased the victim across the street and stabbed him in the back. When the victim fell, defendant
kicked him in the head repeatedly.
Near the conclusion of trial, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on selfdefense based on the following record evidence: (1) the victim’s testimony that he initially
shoved defendant, (2) the victim’s testimony regarding his own reputation in the neighborhood
for possessing and carrying firearms, (3) the testimony of police officers regarding their
suspicion that a broken bottle found on the scene was used as a weapon, and (4) testimony from
the victim and a police officer regarding the victim’s statement that he intended to kill defendant.
The statement was made after the altercation. The trial court denied the request because the
evidence presented did not justify a self-defense instruction.
-1-
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court’s ruling on the self-defense instruction
was erroneous in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Harris, 458 Mich 310; 583
NW2d 680 (1998). However, we conclude that defendant has not persuasively translated the rule
of evidence from Harris into an argument in favor of his requested jury instruction. The
question in the instant case is whether there was sufficient evidentiary support for a self-defense
instruction, whereas Harris concerned the admissibility of character evidence in cases involving
a theory of self-defense.1
Defendant correctly states that Harris distinguishes between evidence of the victim’s
reputation for violence and evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim. Id. at 320.
However, defendant’s assertion that Harris allows for a theory of self-defense resting entirely on
evidence that the victim was the initial aggressor is inaccurate. Harris holds that a defendant
claiming self-defense may introduce “character evidence tending to show the victim’s violent
character . . . to show (1) that the victim was the likely aggressor, and (2) the defendant acted out
of self-defense.” Id. at 321. Where his purpose is to show that victim was the aggressor, the
defendant is not required to prove that he had knowledge of the defendant’s reputation.
“However, . . . the deceased’s violent reputation must be known to the defendant if he is to use it
to show that he acted in self-defense.” Id. at 316.
The trial court correctly found that the evidence of the victim’s affinity for firearms was
not relevant to defendant’s self-defense theory because there was no evidence tending to show
that defendant was actually aware that the victim owned or carried firearms. Evidence that the
victim was the aggressor is not sufficient evidence of self-defense standing alone. To establish a
claim of self-defense a defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that his life is in
danger, or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm. People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119; 649
NW2d 30 (2002). As the Harris Court noted, “it is obvious that the victim’s character, as
affecting the defendant’s apprehensions, must have become known to him, otherwise it is
irrelevant.” Harris, supra at 317, citing People v Walters, 223 Mich 676; 194 NW 538 (1923).
At trial, trial counsel argued that defendant should not be forced to testify in order to
establish that he knew of the victim’s character. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that a
defendant need not testify to merit an instruction on self-defense. People v Hoskins, 403 Mich
95, 100; 267 NW2d 417 (1978). However, the Court subsequently rejected the contention that “a
defendant may have the jury instructed on his state of mind without an evidentiary basis because
‘(a) ruling to the contrary compromises a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to have the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self
defense.’” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 81 n 14; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Rather, the Court
emphasized that “a defendant must consider the strength of the prosecutor’s evidence and the
1
In this case, the trial court did not exclude any evidence of the victim’s character for violence.
In fact, the victim himself brought his reputation for violence and affinity for firearms into
evidence. In his trial testimony, the victim replied to a question on direct examination regarding
whether defendant knew that he was running to get his gun. The victim replied, “Most of the
people around there that know me know I have guns. He probably had a good idea.”
-2-
importance of putting in evidence a basis for a jury instruction when determining whether to
testify.” Id.
After a comprehensive review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at
trial did not support a self-defense instruction. The evidence established that defendant and the
victim met for the first time on the day of the incident. There was no evidence that defendant
lived in the same neighborhood as the victim. Therefore, the exception mentioned by the Harris
Court, that “[r]eputation in the neighborhood where both live is sufficient [to prove that
defendant was aware of the victim’s character] with nothing more,” is inapplicable. Harris,
supra at 316. A bystander to the fight testified that she observed defendant chase the victim and
stab him in the back. Her testimony, along with the nature of the victim’s injury, supported that
defendant stabbed the victim’s back as he was running away. There was no testimony that the
victim brandished or threatened to use a weapon against defendant. Moreover, the broken glass
bottle that police found by the victim’s blood yielded neither fingerprints nor blood evidence to
connect it to the victim or the crime. Furthermore, the victim testified at trial that he was
unarmed at the time of the fight. As our Supreme Court has stated, “the touchstone of any claim
of self-defense, . . . is necessity.” Riddle, supra at 127. The evidence presented at trial provided
no fair indication that defendant acted out of necessity. The evidence in no way supported that
defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that his life was in danger or that there was a
threat of serious bodily harm. Id. at 119. Consequently, the trial court’s refusal to grant
defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction was proper.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring 25 points for offense variable
(OV) 3, MCL 777.33, at the time of sentencing. “A sentencing court has discretion in
determining the number of points to be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately
supports a particular score.” People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
“Scoring decisions for which there is any evidence in support will be upheld.” Id.
MCL 777.33(1) provides that OV 3 “is physical injury to a victim” and is to be scored by
determining which statutory description applies to the victim’s injury and “by assigning the
number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points.” Twenty-five
points are to be scored if life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.
MCL 777.33(1)(c). If “bodily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim” then a
trial court is to score only ten points. MCL 777.33(1)(d). Defendant asserts on appeal that there
was no record evidence to support a finding that the victim’s injuries were life threatening. The
testimony of the doctor who treated the victim, he contends, merely established that his injuries
would have been life threatening if left untreated. Therefore, defendant argues that the proper
score for this offense variable is ten points under MCL 777.33(1)(d). We disagree.
Defendant suggests that “bodily injuries requiring medical treatment,” by definition, have
the potential to cause death if left untreated. Consequently, if this Court were to accept the logic
of the trial court, any bodily injury serious enough to satisfy MCL 777.33(1)(d) could also be
scored under MCL 777.33(1)(c). Defendant asserts that such a result is contrary to the design of
MCL 777.33, which created separate categories to reflect the existence of varying degrees of
bodily injury. However, our Supreme Court recently recognized that sentencing courts will
frequently have the option of choosing between two applicable categories of injury under OV 3.
People v Houston, 473 Mich 399, 407; 702 NW2d 530 (2005). Where more than one factor
might apply, the Court advised that the plain language of MCL 777.33 “requires that trial courts
-3-
assess the highest number of points possible.” Id. at 402. The Court offered the example that
“when a life-threatening injury requires medical treatment . . . the one generating the highest
points is the correct one.” Id. at 408.
Here, the trial court acknowledged that each side’s argument on the scoring of OV 3 had
merit. However, he properly assigned the highest number of points that the facts would support.
There was ample record evidence to support the trial court’s scoring of OV 3. The victim’s
treating physician testified regarding the serious nature of the injury inflicted by defendant. The
physician explained that the victim’s laceration required a multi-stage surgery because of its
length and depth. He also explained that the wound was contaminated with debris because the
victim fell to the ground and, therefore, that it required significant cleaning prior to the surgery.
The physician’s conclusion that the victim may have succumbed to life-threatening blood loss or
systemic infection was hardly speculative. In light of the doctor’s testimony describing the
victim’s injuries, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion by assigning 25 points under
OV 3.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.