MARGO THOMAS V A ROBERT VANTUINEN MD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARGO THOMAS, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF MARGARET
THOMAS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 263613
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 02-006993-NH
A. ROBERT VANTUINEN, M.D., DAVID H.
WESORICK, M.D., and GRAND RAPIDS
ASSOCIATED INTERNISTS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted a March 25, 2004, order granting in part and denying in
part defendants’ motion for summary disposition and a June 9, 2005, final order granting
defendants’ renewed motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff, in her capacity as personal
representative of the deceased, claims that defendants’ medical malpractice caused the death of
her mother. Plaintiff, in her individual capacity, also makes a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. We reverse and remand.
In September 1999, the decedent, then 82 years old, suffered a “neurological event” and
began receiving treatment for a blood and vascular condition from defendants Dr. VanTuinen
and Dr. Wesorick, two internists and members of defendant Grand Rapids Associated Internists
(GRAI). VanTuinen prescribed Coumadin, an anticoagulant. Four times between January 6,
2000, and April 14, 2000, defendants monitored the decedent’s “internalized normalized ratio”
or INR, which reveals the effect of an anticoagulant on the blood. Apparently, a person’s INR
should be between 2.0 and 3.0. Although the decedent continued to take Coumadin, defendants
did not monitor the decedent’s INR after April 14, 2000.
On September 7, 2000, Robert Lamberts, a dermatologist, prescribed the decedent Cipro,
an antibacterial agent, without consulting with defendants. A pharmacist subsequently contacted
Lamberts about the fact that Cipro is known to sometimes increase Coumadin’s power as an
anticoagulant.
-1-
The decedent was admitted to the emergency room of Spectrum Hospital on the
afternoon of September 14, 2000. At that time, she had an extremely prolonged prothombin
time1 of 90.6 seconds and an INR of 9.0. Although VanTuinen was listed as the attending
physician for the decedent, her medical records demonstrate that a number of doctors treated her
at the hospital, including Dr. Verbrugge, an emergency room doctor, Dr. Bodley, a boardcertified internist, and Dr. Heilman, an intern. The records note that Dr. Bodley, who is also an
employee of GRAI, was covering for Dr. VanTuinen. Dr. Bodley conferred with emergency
room doctors before the decedent’s admission to the hospital.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on September 15, the antibiotic Levaquin, which is known to
increase the anticoagulant effect of Coumadin, was administered to the decedent. At that time,
the decedent's prothrombin time was 98.3 seconds and her INR was 9.8. At 9:00 a.m. Dr.
VanTuinen saw the decedent for the first time. He noted his plan to order oral Vitamin K, but he
apparently never made the order. At approximately 1:25 p.m. the decedent exhibited signs and
symptoms of hemorrhagic shock. Critical care doctors then gave her Vitamin K and fresh frozen
plasma at 4:30 p.m. to reverse the effects of Coumadin. Shortly thereafter, the decedent died
from gastrointestinal bleeding due to coagulopathy.
On July 18, 2002, plaintiff, the decedent’s daughter, filed her complaint against Dr.
Wesorick, Dr. VanTuinen, and GRAI, alleging that defendants breached the standard of care
owed to the decedent by failing to monitor her INR and by not immediately giving her
potassium, Vitamin K and plasma when she arrived at the emergency room (count I) and that
defendants negligently inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff (count II).
On October 8, 2003, plaintiff deposed Alan Neiberg, M.D., who opined that Drs.
Wesorick and VanTuinen breached the standard of care in two ways that caused the decedent’s
death: (1) by not correcting the decedent’s prothrombin time level and reducing her INR at the
time of her admission to the hospital, and (2) by prescribing Levaquin. With regard to the first
breach, Dr. Neiberg testified that the decedent’s presenting INR of 9.0 indicated a “poison level”
of Coumadin and severe coagulopathy, which demanded immediate treatment. He indicated that
the appropriate treatment for an 82-year-old patient with INR levels as high as those of the
decedent would have been to give her fresh frozen plasma immediately to counteract the
Coumadin. With regard to the second breach, Dr. Neiberg testified that the Levaquin caused the
increase in INR observed after the decedent’s admission to the hospital.
On January 23, 2004, defendants Wesorick, VanTuinen and GRAI filed a joint motion for
summary disposition. The trial court heard defendants’ motion February 20, 2004. The trial
court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part on March 25, 2004. The
malpractice claim against Dr. Wesorick was dismissed because plaintiff provided no evidence
that he was involved in the decedent’s care during the relevant time period.
With regard to Dr. VanTuinen, the trial court granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s
malpractice claim “to the extent that it relies on [the] purported breach of the standard of care”
1
Prothombin time is the “blood clotting time.” A normal prothombin time is 11.5 to 12 seconds.
-2-
for failure to immediately treat the decedent’s prothrombin level when she was admitted to the
hospital. During the hearing on the motion, defense counsel alleged that the signature on the
order for Levaquin belonged to a Dr. VanDyke and that Dr. Neiberg mistook Dr. VanDyke’s
name for Dr. VanTuinen’s name. However, the trial court found that “defendant VanTuinen’s
signature is on the very physician’s order that he purports not to have made.” Therefore, the
court denied the motion with regard to the remaining malpractice claim against Dr. VanTuinen
because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether he breached the standard of care
by administering Levaquin to the decedent.
Defendants renewed their motion for summary disposition on February 23, 2005, based
on new evidence that allegedly resolved the outstanding factual issue related to the signature on
the Levaquin order. They alleged that the signature on the order belonged to a senior resident at
Spectrum, named “Dr. Varma.” The deposition of Dr. Heilman was presented on this point.
During her deposition, Dr. Heilman reviewed the Levaquin order and testified that, based on the
handwriting and the signature, that Dr. Varma signed the order. Dr. Heilman stated that it was
customary practice not to involve an attending physician for whom another doctor was on call in
decisions about which drugs to order for a patient. Defendants also cited the deposition
testimony of Dr. Bodley, who was on call for Dr. VanTuinen until 7:00 a.m. on September 15,
2002. Dr. Bodley was not asked to identify the signature on the Levaquin order, but he did
testify that a senior resident has the authority to prepare the order and have it filled by the
hospital pharmacy without approval from an attending physician. He also testified that, under
customary practice, the treating doctors would not have consulted with Dr. VanTuinen about the
Levaquin.
Along with the argument about the persons responsible for the Levaquin order,
defendants argued that they were entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law because
plaintiff failed to establish causation. Defendants characterized the deposition testimony of Dr.
Neiberg as stating that the decedent’s coagulopathy was irreversible by 9:00 a.m. on September
15, 2000. Therefore, any malpractice by Dr. VanTuinen after that time was not the proximate
cause of her death. Based on these arguments, the trial court granted defendants’ motion.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in making findings of fact and granting
summary disposition in favor of Dr. VanTuinen and GRIA where questions of material fact
existed. Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), summary disposition is proper where, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. This Court reviews a trial court’s
decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557,
561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003).
“Proof of a medical malpractice claim requires the demonstration of: (1) the applicable
standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4)
proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury.” Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich
216, 222; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). A prima facie case of medical malpractice must establish that
“the defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within
that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other
facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of defendant
failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.” MCL 600.2912a. Furthermore,
-3-
proximate causation under MCL 600.2912a(2) must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 86; 684 NW2d 296 (2004).
Here, the record establishes at least two unresolved issues of material fact regarding Dr.
VanTuinen’s participation in medical decisions that, according to Dr. Neiberg, violated the
standard of care and caused the decedent’s death. Dr. Neiberg indicated that giving Levaquin to
a patient with an INR of 9.0 violated the relevant standard of care for a board-certified internist.
Plaintiff alleged that Dr. VanTuinen either made the order for Levaquin or approved of its use
when time remained to reverse the decedent’s coagulopathy. In contrast, defendants argued that
hospital protocol proves that Dr. VanTuinen would not have been involved in drug orders made
at a time when another doctor was on-call for him. With regard to the signature, defendants
assert that Dr. Neiberg mistakenly identified the signature on the pharmacy order for Levaquin as
that of Dr. VanTuinen. In fact, they allege, the signature belonged to another doctor.
Defendants asserted that a “Dr. VanDyke” signed the order.
The trial court initially rejected the argument that plaintiff misidentified the signature,
finding that “VanTuinen’s signature is on the very physician’s order that he purports not to have
made.” At the time of the second motion hearing, defendants presented testimony from an intern
that she “thought” she recognized the handwriting and the signature as that of one of her senior
residents, Dr. Varma. The trial court then resolved the disputed factual issue in favor of the
moving party based on this very slight evidence.
Furthermore, evidence in the record supports plaintiff’s claim that Dr. VanTuinen agreed
with the Levaquin order, even if he did not sign the order. Dr. VanTuinen testified that he did
not discontinue the Levaquin when he saw the decedent at 9:00 a.m. on September 15. Instead,
the Levaquin was discontinued only after the decedent was transferred to critical care that
afternoon. Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to create a question of fact concerning whether
Dr. VanTuinen was responsible for the initial or continued use of the Levaquin, the use of which
was identified by Dr. Neiberg as a breach of the standard of care.
A genuine issue of fact also exists with regard to the time on September 15 at which the
decedent became “medically unsalvageable.” Defendants argued in their renewed motion that
Dr. Neiberg’s testimony conceded that the decedent was not salvageable as of 9:00 a.m. on
September 15 when Dr. VanTuinen saw her. Therefore, they maintained that plaintiff failed to
establish that any malpractice committed by Dr. VanTuinen contributed to causing the death.
Dr. Neiberg testified at his first deposition that, without fresh frozen plasma,“[b]y about
10 o’clock the door was closed.” Neiberg gave an extended explanation of his interpretation of
the decedent’s laboratory results during the day of September 15, 2000. He estimated her
progression of blood loss based on the patterns in her laboratory levels of chlorides, potassium,
phosphorus, and her INR. Neiberg said, with the benefit of hindsight, he saw the “curves
colliding” at approximately 10 a.m., at which point all of these levels would have been at or
above toxic levels. He admitted it was possible the decedent was already unsalvageable at 9:00
a.m. but stated that his best guess put that point between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m.
In his second deposition, Neiberg testified:
-4-
“The patient was salvageable at 9:00 in the morning. The patient was
hemodynamically stable with reversible forms of shock from the way it came out.
Looking at what evolved and looking at the, where the patient came from, and
looking at the information that’s there, I truly believe that at 9:00 in the morning
the patient could have had the coagulopathy reversed and the bleeding stopped.
Clearly, the contention that the decedent’s condition at 9:00 a.m. was not in dispute is not
an accurate reflection of the record. Because of the competing evidence on whether Dr.
VanTuinen’s conduct contributed to the death, summary disposition was inappropriate. Viewed
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient evidence to survive a motion
for summary disposition on the issue of causation. “[A] court may not weigh the evidence
before it or make findings of fact; if the evidence before it is conflicting, summary disposition is
improper.” Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 265 Mich 432, 437; 695 NW2d 84 (2005),
quoting Lysogorski v Bridgeport Charter Twp, 256 Mich App 297, 299; 662 NW2d 108 (2003).
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendants Dr.
VanTuinen and GRAI.
Plaintiff also argues that summary disposition in favor of defendants Dr. VanTuinen and
GRAI was improper because a genuine issue of fact exists with regard to whether the residents or
other treating physicians were under the control of Dr. VanTuinen. We agree.
As previously discussed, plaintiff provided evidence that the decedent was admitted to
the hospital under Dr. VanTuinen’s care, that she was treated by his on-call colleague, that Dr.
VanTuinen reviewed her chart after the Levaquin order was administered, and that he made no
changes to those orders. Even if the disputed question of the signature on the Levaquin order
were resolved in favor of defendants, summary disposition in favor of defendants is improper
because plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to refute the factual question of whether Dr.
VanTuinen was the principle of any intern, resident, or on-call physician who negligently
prescribed the Levaquin. MCR 2.116(G)(4). Thus, the existence and scope of an agency
relationship between Dr. VanTuinen and the treating physicians are questions of fact for the jury.
Whitmore v Fabi, 155 Mich App 333, 338; 399 NW2d 520 (1986).
The vicarious liability of attending physicians is analyzed under the general principles of
agency. Barnes v Mitchell, 341 Mich 7, 10; 67 NW2d 208 (1954) (finding physician vicariously
liable for the negligence of nurse in performing X-ray within the scope of her employment).
“Vicarious liability is based upon principal-agent and master-servant relationships and involves
the imputation of negligence of the agent or servant to the principal or master without regard to
the fault of the principal or master.” McClaine v Alger, 150 Mich App 306, 316-317; 388 NW2d
349 (1986).
As a general rule, a supervising physician is vicariously liable for the negligence of
subordinate physicians acting as his agent. For example, in Orozco v Henry Ford Hosp, 408
Mich 248, 253; 290 NW2d 363 (1980), the Court found that the doctor with primary
responsibility for an operation was bound by the admission of an unknown fellow doctor,
overheard by the patient, that he made a cut in the wrong part of the body. Supervisory
physicians may also be held directly liable for negligent supervision of a resident. See
McCullough v Hutzel Hospital, 88 Mich App 235, 238; 276 NW2d 569 (1979), where this Court
upheld a jury verdict in favor of a patient whose tubal ligation surgery was negligently
-5-
performed by a resident working under the supervision of the defendant physicians. Although
the issue in that case related to the qualification of an expert witness, as part of its decision this
Court described the duty that an attending physician owes to the patient of one of his residents:
When plaintiff entered Hutzel Hospital for gynecological surgery,
defendants assumed responsibility for her care. Even though the surgical
procedure was actually performed by a resident, defendants were under a duty to
see that it was performed properly. It is their skill and training as specialists
which fits them for that task, and their advanced learning which enables them to
judge the competency of the resident's performance. Their failure to take
reasonable care in ascertaining that the surgery was competently performed
renders them liable for the resulting damages. We reject defendants’ argument
that supervision of a patient’s care does not constitute practice of medicine.
[McCullough, supra at 239.]
If the facts ultimately establish that Dr. VanTuinen was serving in a supervisory position to the
resident and intern who allegedly wrote the Levaquin order, he could be held liable based on
either negligent supervision or vicarious liability. Moreover, there was evidence presented that
Dr. VanTuinen failed to exercise reasonable care in making sure that the treatment the decedent
received before he saw her, specifically the prescribing of Levaquin, was competent. Likewise,
if Dr. Bodley ordered Levaquin for the decedent, Dr. VanTuinen may be liable for Dr. Bodley’s
negligence as his principal. At the time of the decedent’s death, Dr. Bodley was a partner in the
professional corporation of which Dr. VanTuinen was the president.2 This Court acknowledged
that one physician might be the agent of another in a variety of factual scenarios, including
where they are jointly employed or acting jointly on a case. Whitmore, supra at 338-339.
One problem with both parties’ vicarious liability arguments is that they rely on generic
labels to describe the relationships between the physicians. For example, defendants argue that
Dr. Bodley was “on-call” for Dr. VanTuinen. They cite a somewhat analogous case of the New
York Court of Appeals holding that the negligence of an “on-call” doctor will not be imputed to
the attending doctor. Kavanaugh v Gonzalez, 71 NY2d 535, 547; 523 NE2d 284; 528 NYS2d 8
(1988). However, the facts in that case are easily distinguishable from the facts that are
ascertainable from the record as it now stands. There, the physicians were not partners in a
practice, did not share an office, and had no fee sharing arrangement. Id. at 545. The New York
court found that, “in the absence of some recognized traditional legal relationship such as
partnership, master and servant, or agency, between physicians in the treatment of patients, the
imposition of liability on one for the negligence of the other has been largely limited to situations
of joint control in the diagnosis or treatment of one by the other.” Id. at 547, quoting Graddy v
New York Med Coll, 19 AD2d 426, 429; 243 NYS2d 940 (NY App, 1963). Here, Dr. Bodley
was “on call” for VanTuinen, but the underlying relationship was apparently a traditional
2
Defense counsel asserted, at the May 13, 2005 hearing, that Dr. Bodley was not a member of
the professional corporation in September 2000. Thus, his professional status at the time of the
incident is also a disputed factual issue.
-6-
partnership. Furthermore, there are disputed factual issues regarding the joint action to diagnose
and treat the decedent in this case. A reasonable inference from the record is that Dr.
VanTuinen’s 9:00 a.m. examination of plaintiff’s decedent, during which he failed to terminate
the Levaquin or to order fresh frozen plasma, created joint action with Dr. Bodley, the residents,
and the other treating physicians.
Based on the record before us, Dr. VanTuinen clearly had a physician-patient relationship
with the decedent independent of the hospital setting. She was admitted to the hospital under his
care, and Dr. VanTuinen consulted with residential medical staff of the hospital about her care
on the morning of September 15,2005. Because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding
the existence and scope of an agency relationship, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Dr.
VanTuinen is not liable for the negligence of the resident alleged to have ordered the Levaquin
for the decedent. Summary disposition in favor of Dr. VanTuinen and GRIA was improper.
Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.