MILTON GIBSON V CINCINNATI MILACRON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MILTON GIBSON, ANITA SEVERN, AMOS
MCPHERSON, WILLIAM FISHER, DAVID
WILBURN, LOUIS BECOATS, WADELL
FLETCHER, PAUL MULNIX, JOHN MCCOMB,
GARY THORNBURG, MICHAEL TROTTER,
and LAVERNE SEBERT,
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2007
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
CINCINNATI MILACRON, a/k/a CINCINNATI
MILACRON MARKETING COMPANY, a/k/a
CINCINNATI MILACRON PRODUCTS
DIVISION,
No. 269965
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-066596-NO
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this products liability action, defendant appeals by leave granted an order of the trial
court denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) solely in regard to
plaintiffs Louis Becoats, John McComb, Paul Mulnix, Gary Thornburg, Michael Trotter, and
David Wilburn. Defendant argued that the claims of these particular plaintiffs were time-barred.
The trial court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to when these
plaintiffs should have discovered their injuries and the causal link to defendant’s product. We
reverse.
This appeal arises out of a products liability lawsuit brought by General Motors (GM)
employees against defendant, a manufacturer of metalworking fluids used by GM in its assembly
and production processes. Because grinding, cutting, and boring methods used in the production
of metal parts generate tremendous heat and abrasion, metalworking fluid is sprayed onto the
work surface, cooling and providing lubrication. Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered from
respiratory ailments and other illnesses as a result of their exposure to defendant’s metalworking
fluids during their employment with GM. Suit was initiated on November 5, 1999, and an
amended complaint adding plaintiffs Becoats, McComb, Mulnix, Thornburg, Trotter, and
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Wilburn as parties was filed on January 24, 2000. The parties do not dispute that, for purposes
of determining whether plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the date of the
amended complaint is the relevant date to consider.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 683 NW2d 611 (2004). Similarly, we review de novo the
legal question concerning whether the applicable statute of limitations bars a cause of action. Ins
Comm’r v Aageson Thibo Agency, 226 Mich App 336, 340-341; 573 NW2d 637 (1997). MCR
2.116(C)(7) applies to a motion for summary disposition predicated on an argument that the
action is time-barred. Under (C)(7), this Court must consider not only the pleadings, but also
any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the
parties. Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). The contents of
the complaint must be accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence. Sewell
v Southfield Pub Schools, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576 NW2d 153 (1998). This Court must consider
the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Herman v Detroit,
261 Mich App 141, 143-144; 680 NW2d 71 (2004). If there is no factual dispute and reasonable
minds cannot differ on the legal effect of the facts, whether a plaintiff’s claim is time-barred or
precluded by any other theory set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law for the court to
decide. Farm Bureau Mut Ins v Combustion Research Corp, 255 Mich App 715, 720; 662
NW2d 439 (2003); Huron Tool & Engineering Co v Precision Consulting Services, Inc, 209
Mich App 365, 377; 532 NW2d 541 (1995). However, if a factual dispute exists, such as to
matters regarding whether a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered a possible cause of
action relative to accrual of a limitations period, summary disposition is not appropriate. Id.;
Mascarenas v Union Carbide Corp, 196 Mich App 240, 245; 492 NW2d 512 (1992).
The statute of limitations in a products liability action is three years. MCL 600.5805(13).
In general, “the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues.” MCL 600.5827.
Furthermore, a “claim accrues at the time provided in [MCL 600.5829] to [MCL 600.5838], and
in cases not covered by these sections the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the
claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827. No
argument is made by the parties that any of the provisions set forth in MCL 600.5829 through
MCL 600.5838 are applicable to our analysis.
In Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 12; 506 NW2d 816 (1993), a products
liability case, our Supreme Court stated that the term “wrong” as used in the general accrual
statute, MCL 600.5827, “specified the date on which the defendant’s breach harmed the plaintiff,
as opposed to the date on which the defendant breached his duty.” This is no benefit to plaintiffs
here because they allegedly suffered harm from defendant’s breach more than three years before
the amended complaint was filed. However, the Moll Court additionally noted that “our concern
about barring a plaintiff’s cause of action prematurely has led to our adoption of the discovery
rule under proper circumstances.” Moll, supra at 12. Pursuant to the discovery rule, “the
plaintiff’s claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered, the two later occurring elements: (1) an injury, and (2) the
causal connection between plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s breach.” Id. at 16. Rejecting an
argument that a plaintiff should first know the “likely cause” of an injury, the Supreme Court
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ruled, “Once a claimant is aware of an injury and its possible cause, the plaintiff is aware of a
possible cause of action[,]” thereby triggering the commencement of the applicable limitations
period. Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added). The plaintiff need not know the details of the evidence
by which to establish the cause of action. Id. at 24. A cause of action is not held in abeyance
until the plaintiff obtains professional assistance to determine the existence of the cause of
action. Mascarenas, supra at 245. The Mascarenas panel indicated that the discovery rule is
used to measure “the accrual date of latent occupational diseases in products liability cases.” Id.
at 244.
With these guiding principles in mind, we now turn to the documentary evidence
regarding the individual plaintiffs involved in this appeal.
A. Louis Becoats
Becoats worked for GM from 1976 to 1997, and he started suffering breathing and
respiratory problems in the 1980s. He was on sick leave because of these problems from 1986 to
1993. Although Becoats testified that his pulmonary lung disease was attributed to the dust in
the plant and was never expressly linked to metalworking fluids, he also stated that when he
returned to work in 1993 as a tool grinder, he “knew that OSHA was saying stuff like that wasn’t
good for you.” Becoats noted that in the 1980s GM started instructing workers to wear masks
while operating machinery to limit exposure to the metalworking fluid mists. Becoats expressly
stated that he “knew about it” and “stayed away from” the metalworking fluids. He also made
complaints about ventilation related to the fluids after he became supervisor in the 1990s, and
expressly associated his disease with exposure to the fumes. We conclude, therefore, that
Becoats was aware of his respiratory injury in the 1980s and that he discovered or should have
discovered the possible causal connection between the injury and the metalworking fluids around
that same time period, and certainly long before January 1997, which was three years before the
complaint was filed. Thus, because he did not file suit until 2000, the trial court erred by
denying summary disposition as to Becoats’s claim.1
1
We note that, in general, there was evidence of a 1985 UAW-GM handbook regarding
workplace hazards that identified the potential adverse health effects of exposure to
metalworking fluids, evidence of a GM training program that included a video devoted to
potential health risks associated with exposure to metalworking fluid mist, and evidence of a
1984 UAW newsletter listing metalworking fluids as a health risk in that they could cause skin,
nose, eye, and throat irritation, allergic reactions, and increase cancer rates. Also, there was
evidence of a 1985 UAW newsletter indicating that metalworking fluids and mists can be
hazardous to workers’ health and need to be controlled, evidence of a study (Harvard study)
conducted in the 1980s by a health and advisory board that was jointly established by the UAW
and GM, which showed the adverse health effects of exposure to metalworking fluids, and
evidence of a 1990 GM-UAW collective bargaining agreement that acknowledged a need to
focus on the adverse health effects of metalworking fluids, and which further indicated that
(continued…)
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B. John McComb
McComb worked for GM until 1992. According to McComb, he started getting a cough
in 1988 or 1989 that continued to worsen. In 1989, 30 percent of his lungs was removed due to
the presence of an abnormal growth. McComb asserted that he suffers shortness of breath due to
the lung removal, an injury he now attributes to metalworking fluid exposure. Although he
testified that he attended GM hazard communication training, he also claimed that he was never
given any information from GM or his union regarding the hazards of working with
metalworking fluids. However, McComb also indicated that he was aware that fellow
employees were complaining in the 1980s about work conditions, demanding better ventilation
in the work areas because of the problem of exposure to metalworking fluids and mists, which
you could see in the air according to McComb. We conclude, therefore, that McComb was
aware of his injury in 1988-1989 and that he discovered, or should have discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, the possible causal connection between the injury and the
metalworking fluids long before January 1997. Thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion for summary disposition with respect to McComb.
C. Paul Mulnix
Mulnix testified that on October 21, 1992, he was injured when he breathed PCB
contaminated air in the plant. Mulnix stated that the symptoms he experienced following the
accident—lack of breath, sweats, vomiting, burning in the throat and lungs, dizziness,
disorientation, high blood pressure, skipped heart beats, lung damage, and chest pains—were
symptoms that he suffered all at once that day. However, Mulnix also testified that although
these symptoms had improved from the time of the original injury in 1992, they had “very
slowly, but progressively been getting worse and worse every year.” Mulnix further testified
regarding recurrent breathing problems in the early 1990s and that he was diagnosed as suffering
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder and emphysema in 1992. His doctor thought or
believed that the cause of the emphysema was his smoking, the poor air quality where he
worked, and exposure to workplace fluids. Mulnix was confronted with a 1992 document from
his employment record, which indicated that he had claimed that exposure to oil mist and
(…continued)
“[m]edical surveillance for respiratory effects of machining fluids will be offered to employees
who regularly work in operations with machining fluids.” All subsequent GM-UAW collective
bargaining agreements contained similar provisions. Further, in 1990, every UAW member was
sent Solidarity magazine that noted the dangers of metalworking fluids, and a 1994 issue of the
magazine stated that “there is now sufficient evidence to conclude that exposure to machine
fluids poses a risk of occupational cancer and respiratory illness.” In a 1992 union newsletter,
the findings from the above-referenced Harvard study were summarized, explaining that the
study “confirms long-standing concerns of the UAW for dangers of exposures in machining
operations,” that the “findings are a cause for concern for our members in machining
operations,” and that “now that we are aware of the connection between exposure and illness, we
can do something about the future.” Accordingly, there was a plethora of information available
in the 1980s and 1990s regarding the possible adverse health effects of exposure to metalworking
fluids.
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foundry dust caused his emphysema. Mulnix acknowledged the document, and he stated that he
had indeed attributed his emphysema to, in part, oil mist, which he explained encompassed
hydraulic and motor oils and metalworking fluids. We conclude, therefore, that Mulnix was
aware of his injuries in 1992 and that he discovered the possible causal connection between the
injuries and the metalworking fluids in 1992, long before January 1997. Thus, the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition with respect to McComb.
D. Gary Thornburg
Thornburg testified that his physician told him in 1988 that his exposure to metalworking
fluid mists might be “aggravating or causing” his breathing problem. Additionally, Thornburg
stated that the “heavy, wet mist” made him physically ill, and that “you just kind of thought that
that was probably what was doing it.” Furthermore, Thornburg testified that he knew health
concerns about the mists were discussed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988 or 1989, he
even went so far as to request a study on the mist because of the breathing problems he suffered
at the time. Thornburg testified that in 1988 his physician placed him on restrictions with respect
to exposure to “dust and the air and mist,” suggesting a connection between Thornburg’s injury
and the fluid mist. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying summary disposition as to
Thornburg’s claim.
E. Michael Trotter
Trotter testified that he had worked at GM and was exposed to metalworking fluids and
mists throughout the 1980s. In the late 1980s, he experienced headaches and nosebleeds at work
that he determined were caused by inhalation of metalworking fluid mist. Trotter subsequently
suffered from coughing and shortness of breath. In December 1989, he requested a transfer to a
different plant because, in part, he wanted to avoid any further exposure to metalworking fluids
in light of his concerns about their danger. In December 1991, Trotter was diagnosed with
obstructive airway disease, and in 1993 or 1994, he was diagnosed with sarcoidosis, which his
doctor explained was quite possibly caused by exposure to metalworking fluids. We conclude,
therefore, that Trotter was aware of his respiratory injuries in the early 1990s and that he
discovered or should have discovered the possible causal connection between the injuries and the
metalworking fluids around that same time, and most certainly long before January 1997. Thus,
the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition with respect to
Trotter.
F. David Wilburn
Wilburn testified that he was exposed to metalworking fluids and the mist they created
and that he first suffered injury in 1991 or 1992. Wilburn testified that he was given “quite a bit
of training” on all types of fluids, including training involving health and exposure issues with
respect to metalworking fluids. Wilburn also stated that he changed plants in 1994 due to his
exposure to metalworking fluids and expressly stated that in the mid to late 1980s he attributed
his trouble breathing to exposure to metalworking fluids. These facts indicate that Wilburn knew
his injury was caused by the exposure to these fluids. The fact that his physician has told him
that his shortness of breath is related to his weight, congestive heart failure, and the fact that he
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smoked for several years, does not undermine the conclusion that he knew or reasonably should
have known of the possible cause of his injury. Thus, the trial court erred in denying summary
disposition as to Wilburn’s claim.
We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendant with respect to
plaintiffs involved in this appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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