PEOPLE OF MI V DERRICK E HIGGINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 262756
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007531-01
DERRICK E. HIGGINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 263966
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007593-01
DERRICK HIGGINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Davis and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 262756, the prosecutor appeals as of right a judgment sentencing
defendant to 18 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for defendant’s jury trial conviction of
delivery of 50 or more but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). In Docket
No. 263966, the prosecutor appeals by leave granted from a judgment sentencing defendant to 1
to 30 years’ imprisonment for defendant’s plea-based conviction of delivery of 225 or more but
less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii).1 We vacate defendant’s sentences and
remand for resentencing.
1
After defendant committed the instant offenses, MCL 333.7401 was amended by 2002 PA 665
to reclassify the amounts of controlled substances necessary for conviction under each
subsection. The amendment does not affect these appeals.
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At the time defendant committed the instant offenses, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii) required a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment, and MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii) required
a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.2 The Legislature authorized a
sentencing court to deviate from these mandatory minimum sentences, however, if “substantial
and compelling” reasons supported the departure. MCL 333.7401(4); People v Johnson (On
Remand), 223 Mich App 170, 172; 566 NW2d 28 (1997). In People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 6869; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), our Supreme Court held that substantial and compelling reasons
supporting a departure must be based on objective and verifiable factors. Whether a particular
factor exists is a factual determination for the sentencing court that this Court reviews for clear
error. Id. at 77. This Court reviews as a matter of law a sentencing court’s determination
whether a particular factor is objective and verifiable. Id. at 77-78. Further, we review for an
abuse of discretion a sentencing court’s determination that substantial and compelling reasons
exist to support a departure from a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. People v IzarrarasPlacante, 246 Mich App 490, 497; 633 NW2d 18 (2001). Only in exceptional cases should a
sentencing court deviate from a mandatory minimum sentence. Id.
The prosecutor argues that the trial court failed to articulate substantial and compelling
reasons supporting the downward departures. We agree. The record establishes that the trial
court relied on several factors in departing from the mandatory minimum sentences, including
defendant’s age, his work history with the Department of Transportation, his minimal criminal
record, his honorable discharge from the National Guard, the fact he completed over 600 hours
of court-ordered community service, and the fact that he owned his own home and was paying
taxes at the time of the offenses. These factors are objective and verifiable, and our Supreme
Court has specifically approved of the consideration of many of these factors. See Fields, supra
at 77. Nonetheless, these factors are not substantial and compelling because they do not
“keenly” or “irresistibly” grab one’s attention and are not “of considerable worth” in determining
the length of defendant’s sentences. Id. at 67. In short, these factors do not render this case
“exceptional” such that deviation from the mandatory minimum sentences was justified. People
v Daniel, 462 Mich 1, 7; 609 NW2d 557 (2000).
The trial court also relied on the fact that defendant turned himself in to the police and
appeared at every hearing since failing to appear at the June 21, 2001 sentencing hearing and
remaining a fugitive for over three years. Although this factor is objective and verifiable, it is
not a substantial and compelling reason supporting a downward departure because it does not
favor defendant. Because defendant’s own wrongdoing created the necessity for defendant to
turn himself in, this factor does not “keenly” or “irresistibly” grab our attention and should not
have been recognized as being “of considerable worth” in determining the length of defendant’s
sentences. Fields, supra at 67. Thus, this factor is not substantial and compelling. Id.
2
The amendment to MCL 333.7401, enacted pursuant to 2002 PA 665, eliminated the
mandatory minimum sentences under that section at issue in these appeals. The amendment does
not affect these appeals because it does not apply retroactively. People v Doxey, 263 Mich App
115, 123; 687 NW2d 360 (2004).
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The trial court also relied to a considerable extent on the actions of James Brian King, the
police informant. The court stated:
Okay. In this particular case, as it relates to Case Number 9-8-7-5-3-1 and
the factual basis for 9-8-7-5-9-3, I sat and listened as the trial judge for the case
that went to trial – again, that’s 7-5-3-1 – heard the motions as they were related
to it and specifically heard the testimony of one Mr. King, who is from Western
Michigan and from the Grand Rapids area; came to where Mr. Higgins was in the
Detroit area.
There were, as I recall, over 60 taped conversations and contacts with Mr.
Higgins to try to get Mr. Higgins to sell Mr. King drugs. There were four trips
that Mr. King says that he made from the Grand Rapids area to the Detroit area to
try to get in contact – well, to get in contact with Mr. Higgins where Mr. Higgins
didn’t, quote/unquote, “come through with the promise” that Mr. King had said
that he was going to do to sell him cocaine.
Mr. King testified that he had had a prior record for controlled substance
and that still with that prior conviction, he was offered 7411 by the judge and
received a 7411 sentence for a subsequent drug conviction for which he was
trying to work off by finding somebody to get them to cooperate.
Mr. Higgins’ second case, the one that was under advisement for
sentencing purposes – and that’s 9-8-7-5-9-3 – also involved Mr. King and also
was at or around – or was after this offense where Mr. King was trying to get Mr.
Higgins to sell him a greater weight of cocaine. That was just all a part of this,
and it happened, if I’m not mistaken, over a five-month period of time.
So it wasn’t a situation where he came in, contacted, quote/unquote, “his
source.” He had mentioned that Mr. Higgins had been a friend of his for more
than 20 years, and I didn’t find Mr. King’s testimony necessarily to be credible in
regards to – I don’t think that it included everything. He was unsupervised when
he came to the Detroit area. There was no way for anybody to determine how
many phone messages he might have left for Mr. Higgins, but Mr. King estimated
it at 60 to 70 phone calls, and I’m sure he low-balled it because he tried to present
himself in the best image.
From this reasoning, it appears that the sentencing court adhered to its previous
determination, reversed by this Court in People v Higgins, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued October 6, 2000 (Docket No. 220697), that defendant had been
entrapped into committing the cocaine sale at issue in LC No. 98-007593-01. At the very least,
the trial court apparently believed that King induced defendant’s actions in both cases. In
reversing the lower court’s entrapment ruling, this Court stated that the circumstances of these
cases are not unusual and involve a typical situation where an individual charged with a crime
agrees to act as a police informant. This Court recognized that before King became an
informant, defendant sold cocaine to King intermittently over a 10- to 15-year period. This
Court specifically stated that defendant and King were merely “continuing a long-standing
course of conduct of defendant procuring cocaine for King, who became a police informant” and
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that “[n]either the police’s nor the informant’s actions in furthering this course of conduct can be
described as anything other than unremarkable.” Higgins, supra, slip op at 2-3. Thus, this Court
has previously rejected the lower court’s reasoning that King wrongfully induced defendant’s
actions giving rise to these cases.
Moreover, the trial court’s subjective views regarding King’s motives and his purported
influence on defendant’s actions are not objective and verifiable, and thus cannot be considered
substantial and compelling. Fields, supra at 68-69. As such, the trial court erred by relying on
this reasoning to support the departures. Because the trial court failed to articulate substantial
and compelling reasons supporting the departures, we vacate defendant’s sentences and remand
these cases to the trial court for resentencing.
The prosecutor further argues that even if the trial court articulated substantial and
compelling reasons supporting the departure, the reasons do not support the extent of the
departures. In imposing a minimum one-year sentence in LC No. 98-007593-01, the court
departed below the statutory mandatory minimum 20-year sentence by 19 years. In addition, in
imposing a minimum 18-month sentence in LC No. 98-007531-01, the trial court departed below
the statutory mandatory minimum 10-year sentence by eight years and six months. A statutory
mandatory minimum sentence is presumptively proportionate. People v Perry, 216 Mich App
277, 284; 549 NW2d 42 (1996). In Johnson, supra at 175, this Court recognized that a
sentencing “court must consider the extent of deviation it orders to avoid imposing a lenient, and
hence, disproportionate, sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) Here, the trial court made no effort
to justify the extent of the significant departures imposed. Thus, if the trial court finds that
substantial and compelling reasons exist to support a sentencing departure on remand, it shall
consider the extent of the departure to avoid imposing a disproportionately lenient sentence. See
Perry, supra at 284.
Remanded for resentencing.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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