IN RE ASHLEY MARLANA ELLIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHLEY MARLANA ELLIS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 271499
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 96-344960-NA
CLARENCE LAVELLE ELLIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARLIN ROXANA ALFARO,
Respondent.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Davis and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.
The minor child came to the trial court’s attention after respondent mother took the child
to the hospital emergency department complaining that she was having trouble breathing and had
vomited. Respondent mother also said that the minor child, at less than two years old, was
having suicidal thoughts, hearing voices, and taking lithium. The child was dressed
inappropriately for the cold weather, wearing no shoes or socks. The attending physician called
protective services because of respondent mother’s extreme anxiety and reluctance to answer
questions regarding the lithium. Respondent mother has an extensive history of mental health
issues and her parental rights to four other children have been terminated. Respondent father
also has an extensive history of mental health issues and his parental rights to two other children
have been terminated. Petitioner sought permanent custody of the minor child in its initial
petition.
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Although respondent father concedes that subsection (l) was established by evidence of
the termination of his parental rights to his older children, he contends that the trial court clearly
erred in finding that subsections (g), (i), and (j) were established by clear and convincing
evidence. He also asserts that the termination of his parental rights was not in the child’s best
interest. We disagree.
In In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 540; 702 NW2d 192 (2005), this Court set forth the
standards for reviewing these issues:
In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find that at least one of
the statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b has been met by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 21-22; 610 NW2d 563
(2000). Once a ground for termination is established, the court must order
termination of parental rights unless the court finds that termination is clearly not
in the child’s best interest. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 365; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). This Court reviews “for clear error both the court’s decision that a ground
for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and, where
appropriate, the court’s decision regarding the child’s best interest.” Id. at 356357. “An appellate court should not reverse the findings of a trial court in such a
case unless its findings are clearly erroneous.” In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). When reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact, this
Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id.
The trial court did not clearly err in its determination that grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence under subsections (g), (i), and (j). Subsection (i)
requires the court to find that a prior termination occurred “due to serious and chronic neglect or
physical or sexual abuse and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful.”
In December 2001, both parents’ rights were terminated as to their child Clarenzo Ellis after the
trial court found that respondent mother had a history of serious mental illness that continued
after extensive treatment and hospitalization. While the parents lived together, they had to call
the child’s grandparents for food and they had resorted to feeling the child sugar water. At the
time of that petition, respondent father said he did not know where the respondent mother or
child were as they had been missing for three days. Less than one year later, the parents’ rights
were terminated as to their other child Christian Ellis. Ashley Ellis was born to the couple in
2004. The incident giving rise to the petition in this case occurred when the child was left with
the respondent mother despite her well-established mental instability. Given this course of
conduct, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the prior terminations were due to
chronic neglect and respondent father has not succeeded in rehabilitation. This factor was
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Subsection (g) requires the trial court to find that the parent, “without regard to intent,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that
the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering
the child’s age.” In this case, respondent father, despite his assertions that he would be able to
provide proper care and custody for his child, failed to present any evidence to support this
assertion. There is no evidence that he will provide a stable living environment or avoid the
mother, who poses a danger to the child. Respondent father and mother have a long and ongoing
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history of domestic violence for which respondent father has sustained convictions. The most
recent occurrence was in March 2006. Thus, while respondent father testified that he had been
living with his sister in her home for one month, that is insufficient to demonstrate a permanent
living situation away from respondent mother and free of domestic violence. The trial court did
not clearly err in finding that petitioner established subsection (g) by clear and convincing
evidence.
Subsection (j) requires the trial court to find “a reasonable likelihood, based on the
conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to
the home of the parent.” In this case, unfortunately, the record evidence does not show that
defendant has the will to extricate himself from the violent relationship he and respondent
mother have maintained over the years. As such, respondent father’s continued contact with
respondent mother and his prior record of leaving the child with the mother despite her severe
mental instability demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood” that the child will be harmed if she is
returned to his care. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established
subsection (j) by clear and convincing evidence.
We also agree with the trial court that termination was in the child’s best interest. The
protective service worker testified that termination was in the minor child’s best interest because
of respondent parents’ extensive protective services history, extensive mental health issues,
criminal histories, and involvement in a domestic violence relationship. Respondent father
testified that he loved his daughter, that he saw her daily, and that she spent about half her time
living with him. He had not seen her since she went to the hospital, a period of roughly four
months, because visitation was not permitted. The minor child was two years old at the time of
the termination hearing. Respondent father did not reside with respondent mother and did not
plan to reunite with her. Respondent father’s parental rights to his two other children were
previously terminated and respondent father failed to complete a treatment program at that time.
However, five years had passed since then and respondent father claims to have corrected his
mental health issues with medication. Respondent father testified that he had a strong bond with
the minor child and that he was responsible for doctor’s appointments and filling out any
required paperwork for her. However, the evidence nonetheless supports the trial court’s
determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. As discussed above, the evidence
demonstrates that respondent father has a history of neglecting his children and neglecting this
child, including leaving her in the care or respondent mother who has proved to be a danger.
Moreover, respondent father has not demonstrated any significant strides in improving or
avoiding his violent relationship with respondent mother. On the basis of the record evidence,
we cannot say that the trial court’s termination of respondent father’s parental rights was not in
the child’s best interest.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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