PEOPLE OF MI V KEWAYNE HERSEL CARTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 266550
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-005310-01
KEWAYNE HERSEL CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of intimidating or interfering with a
witness in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is
more than ten years, or for which the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life or any term
of years, MCL 750.122(7)(b). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty
of intimidating or interfering with a witness in a criminal case punishable by more than ten years.
We disagree.
This Court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence de novo. People v Mayhew, 236
Mich App 112, 124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). Where a claim of insufficient evidence follows a
bench trial, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280, 282; 530
NW2d 174 (1995).
The witness intimidation statute, MCL 750.122, identifies and criminalizes the many
ways individuals can prevent or attempt1 to prevent a witness from appearing and providing
1
An attempt consists of: (1) an intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which
would in law amount to a crime, and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which goes beyond
mere preparation. Mere preparation consists of making arrangements or taking steps necessary
(continued…)
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truthful information in some sort of official proceeding. People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426,
438; 661 NW2d 616 (2003). Under subsection six of the statute, “[a] person shall not willfully
impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct or attempt to willfully impede, interfere with,
prevent, or obstruct the ability of a witness to attend, testify or provide information in or for a
present or future official proceeding.” MCL 750.122(6); Greene, supra at 432.
To prove that a defendant has violated MCL § 750.122(6), . . . the prosecutor
must prove that the defendant (1) committed or attempted to commit (2) an act
that did not consist of bribery, threats or intimidation, or retaliation as defined in
MCL § 750.122 and applicable case law, (3) but was any act or attempt that was
done willfully (4) to impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct (5) a witness’s
ability (6) to attend, testify, or provide information in or for a present or future
official proceeding (7) having the knowledge or the reason to know that the
person subjected to the interference2 could be a witness at any official proceeding.
[Greene, supra, pp 442-443 (footnote added).]
Although the prosecutor must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, he need not
negate every reasonable theory of innocence to prove his case. People v Martin, 271 Mich App
280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences arising
from the evidence may constitute sufficient evidence of the elements of a crime. People v Jolly,
442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
Under MCL 750.122(7)(b) a defendant is guilty of a felony where a violation of MCL
750.122(6) is committed in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the
violation is more than ten years, or for which the violation is punishable by imprisonment for life
or any term of years. Abandonment is an affirmative defense to an attempted crime where the
burden is on the defendant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he voluntarily
and completely abandoned the criminal purpose. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 555; 675
NW2d 863 (2003).
Defendant claims that the evidence needed to show more than defendant’s mere
preparation. We agree that there was no direct evidence that defendant posted the letter or
caused someone else to post it. However, circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences are
sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. Jolly, supra at 466. We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of intimidating or interfering with a witness in a
criminal case.
Specifically, the evidence supported an inference by a rational trier of fact that defendant
attempted to interfere with a complainant’s ability to testify in an official proceeding. The
undisputed evidence established that defendant had an assault with intent to commit murder case
(…continued)
for the commission of a crime, and attempt consists of some direct movement toward
commission of the crime, which would lead immediately to the completion of the crime. MCL
750.92; People v Jones, 443 Mich 88, 100; 504 NW2d 158 (1993).
2
This Court would note that the term interference includes all types of conduct proscribed in
subsection six of the statute. Greene, supra at 442-443.
-2-
pending against him in which he could receive life imprisonment or imprisonment for a lesser
term of years. Defendant wrote a letter to his friend, Montez, advising Montez to make sure that
the complainant in that case did not come to court and testify. Defendant addressed the envelope
to Montez and included defendant’s own return address.
Also, inmate Mohamed Ali Berry made remarks that bolstered the evidence regarding
defendant’s intent to have Montez interfere with the complainant’s ability to testify in the case
pending against defendant. Berry remarked that defendant authored a letter asking that
complainant be taken care of. It was the jail policy that inmates slide their letters into the slot to
have them posted and defendant had access to that slot. A rational trier of fact could infer that
defendant had the opportunity and intent to mail the letter, and thus, slid it in the slot.
Defendant argues that the affirmative defense of abandonment was “an improper shifting
of the burden of evidence.” We disagree. In his closing remarks at trial, defendant argued that
the prosecutor could not overcome the issue of abandonment. Defendant based this on two
reasons. First, as there was no direct evidence that defendant had placed the letter in the slot, the
prosecutor could not disprove that defendant had a change of heart after he wrote the letter.
Second, Berry, rather than defendant, sealed and posted the letter as there was no other
explanation for Berry knowing its contents.
The affirmative defense of abandonment requires defendant to prove that he completely
and voluntarily abandoned his criminal purpose by a preponderance of the evidence. Akins,
supra at 555. As defendant introduced no evidence that he changed his mind and decided not to
post the letter, and there was no evidence that Berry had been seen near the slot on the day in
question, defendant could not meet this burden. Defendant’s theorizing that Berry placed the
letter in the slot cannot prove abandonment. Furthermore, the evidence establishes only that
Berry had general knowledge of the letter’s message and not that he was aware of its details and
must have therefore read it. The prosecutor proved the essential elements of her case, as she was
not required to negate every reasonable theory of innocence. Martin, supra at 340.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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