ALLEN PUEBLO V CRYSTAL LAKE IMPROVEMENT ASSN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLEN PUEBLO, DEBBY PUEBLO, STEPHEN
RYDER, and SHEILA RYDER,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2007
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 263231
Barry Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000626-CH
CRYSTAL LAKE IMPROVEMENT
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Allen and Debby Pueblo, and Stephen and Sheila Ryder, appeal as of right from
a final judgment entered in favor of defendant Crystal Lake Improvement Association, Inc.,
following a bench trial. We affirm, but in part for reasons not articulated by the trial court.
This case involves a dispute concerning the legality of bylaws adopted by defendant
regarding the use of residential property within its subdivision, the dues payable to defendant,
and whether additional lots could be made part of defendant by vote of its members, without
amending the subdivision’s plat.
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the continuing wrong
doctrine to find that their challenge to defendant’s 1979 bylaws was not time-barred. Defendant
argues that not only is the continuing wrong doctrine inapplicable, but that all of plaintiffs’
claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions, MCL
600.5807(8). We agree with defendant.
Whether the continuing wrong doctrine applies is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo. Garg v Macomb Co Mental Health Services, 472 Mich 263, 272; 696 NW2d 646 (2005),
amended 473 Mich 1205 (2005). The continuing wrong doctrine was created by federal courts to
overcome the harsh effects of the statute of limitations in civil rights cases. See Garg, supra at
278-281. As the Supreme Court stated in Garg, however, “whatever the merits of the policy”
behind the continuing wrong doctrine, “[f]undamental canons of statutory construction” require
that courts apply clear and unambiguous statutes as written. Id. at 281. In Garg, the Court
determined that application of the continuing wrong doctrine would extend the limitations period
beyond that intended by the Legislature. Id. at 282. Because the doctrine would conflict with
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the clear requirements of the statute, it cannot apply. Id. at 283-285. Thus, the Court overruled
Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986), and held that the
continuing wrong doctrine no longer applies to Michigan civil rights cases. Id. at 284.
In the present case, the trial court determined that plaintiffs’ claims were governed by
MCL 600.5801, which provides:
No person may bring or maintain any action for the recovery or
possession of any lands or make any entry upon any lands unless, after the claim
or right to make the entry first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he
claims, he commences the action or makes the entry within the periods of time
prescribed by this section.
***
(4) In all other cases under this section, the period of limitation is 15
years. [Emphasis added.]
We agree with defendant, however, that this is not an action to recover possession of land or one
involving entry upon land. Therefore, by its plain language, MCL 600.5801 does not apply.
Rather, this is an action challenging the validity of defendant’s bylaws. Bylaws are a
contract between a corporation and its shareholders. Allied Supermarkets, Inc v Grocer’s Dairy
Co, 45 Mich App 310, 315; 206 NW2d 490 (1973), aff’d 391 Mich 729 (1974). Therefore, we
conclude that this action is governed by the six-year limitations period applicable to contract
actions, MCL 600.5807(8).
The applicable accrual statute, MCL 600.5827, states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs
from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in
sections 5829 to 5838, and in cases not covered by these sections the claim
accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless
of the time when damage results. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs’ claims is six years. Because this action
was not filed until 2003, plaintiffs’ challenges to defendant’s 1992 and 1996 bylaws are timebarred. The trial court erred in allowing those claims to proceed, and in striking the 1992 and
1996 bylaws as improperly adopted.
With respect to the continuing wrong doctrine, we note that the pertinent language in §
5807 is substantively identical to the statute of limitations considered by the Supreme Court in
Garg, and that the accrual statute is also the same. Accordingly, as in Garg, applying the
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continuing wrong doctrine to plaintiffs’ claims would extend the statute of limitations beyond the
period intended by the Legislature. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to apply it.1
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in applying the doctrines of laches and
estoppel to bar plaintiffs’ challenge to defendant’s decision to allow the Terburg lot owners to
vote on association matters.
Although defendant’s articles of incorporation authorize only 55 shares, and have never
been amended, the Terburg lot owners have voted and paid dues since 1985. Thus, allowing the
Terburg lot owners to vote violates defendant’s articles of incorporation. However, defendant’s
1992 and 1996 bylaws, as well as a 1992 resolution (effective nunc pro tunc to 1985), formally
provide that the Terburg lot owners are voting/dues-paying members of the association. As
plaintiffs note, MCL 450.2231(2) provides that a corporation’s bylaws may only contain
provisions that are consistent with the articles of incorporation. As we previously concluded,
however, plaintiffs’ challenges to the 1992 and the 1996 bylaws are barred by the statute of
limitations. For this reason, it is unnecessary to reach the applicability of the doctrines of laches
and estoppel.
Plaintiffs next argue that the Land Division Act, MCL 560.101 et seq., required
defendant to file a circuit court action every time it sought to amend its bylaws to modify the
applicable restrictive covenants. We disagree.
To the extent that plaintiffs attack defendant’s bylaws, or the 1992 resolution, their
challenges are time-barred. Nonetheless, we note that the Land Division Act defines a “plat” as
“a map or chart of a subdivision of land.” MCL 560.102(a) (emphasis added). Plats must be
topographic, and must include any lots, public streets and highways, drainage and floodplains,
and may include private dedications such as private parks, private streets, and the like. See MCL
560.111; see also Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 553, 562; 677 NW2d 319 (2004).
MCL 560.222 provides that in order “[t]o vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any
part of a recorded plat, a complaint shall be filed in the circuit court . . . .” An action under the
Land Division Act is “the exclusive means available when seeking to vacate, correct, or revise a
dedication in a recorded plat.” Martin v Beldean, 469 Mich 541, 542-543; 677 NW2d 312
(2004) (emphasis added); see also Williams v City of Troy, 269 Mich App 670, 676; 713 NW2d
805 (2005) (a Land Division Act action is necessary to change the boundaries of a plat).
The bylaws and restrictive covenants at issue in this case are not maps or charts, and are
not contained in a plat. Therefore, contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, defendant was not required
to file an action under the Land Division Act in order to amend them. Rather, a restrictive
1
The trial court properly precluded plaintiffs’ challenge to the 1979 bylaws, albeit under the
wrong statute of limitations.
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covenant generally can be amended as provided in the covenant itself. Maat v Dead River
Campers, Inc, 263 Mich App 604, 609; 689 NW2d 491 (2004).2
Additionally, defendant association and the recorded plat have separate legal identities.
As provided by the Land Division Act, the plat is the recorded chart or map of the Crystal Lake
Estates subdivision. Conversely, defendant is a nonprofit corporation created years after the
subdivision was platted. In holding that the owners of the Terburg lots are voting members of
the association, as provided by defendant’s bylaws, the trial court did not change the recorded
Crystal Lake Estates subdivision plat.
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the Terburg termination agreement prohibits defendant from
imposing dues greater than $12.00 a year. We again disagree.
An action to enforce a restrictive covenant sounds in contract. Stuart v Chawney, 454
Mich 200, 210; 560 NW2d 336 (1997). The meaning and scope of a restrictive covenant is a
question of law to be reviewed de novo. Terrien v Zwit, 467 Mich 56, 60-61; 648 NW2d 602
(2002).
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the Tamarack termination agreement does not remove
the provision allowing adjustments for inflation contained in the Tamarack covenant. Rather, the
Tamarack termination agreement merely lists which of the restrictions contained in the Tamarack
covenant would be applicable to any additional lands bordering on Crystal Lake that may later be
platted by the signators to the agreement. Thus, the dues provision contained in the Tamarack
covenant remained unchanged.
The 1979 bylaws explicitly allow defendant’s board of directors to set the annual
assessments imposed on each lot. That provision is repeated in the 1992 and the 1996 bylaws.
Because plaintiffs’ challenges to the bylaws are time-barred, defendant may impose assessments
as permitted by the bylaws, and plaintiffs may not rely on the Tamarack covenant or the
termination agreement to avoid paying them.
2
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Polcyn v Turner, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued November 26, 2004 (Docket No. 230960), and Novi v Nanda Enterprises, Inc,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 17, 2005 (Docket No.
256389), is misplaced. Setting aside the fact that they have no precedential value whatsoever,
unlike this case, those cases involved attempts to change dedications contained in recorded plats.
Similarly, Eveleth v Best, 322 Mich 637, 639, 641-643; 34 NW2d 504 (1948), is inapposite
because, in the present case, the original owner and grantor of all the lots in the subdivision, the
Tamarack Corporation, recorded a restrictive covenant specifically providing that all landowners
of the Crystal Lake Estates subdivision would automatically become members of the association
and “shall be subject to all the rules, regulations, bylaws and charter provisions of said
association.”
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Affirmed as modified.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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