PEOPLE OF MI V CALVIN A PRICE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 273530
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-017633-FH
CALVIN A. PRICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant is charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii),
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and maintaining a drug house, MCL
333.7405(1)(d). Much of the evidence supporting these charges was seized upon execution of a
search warrant. The warrant was obtained as a result of contraband found during a protective
sweep of the house where defendant was detained. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence,
asserting that there was no basis for a protective sweep. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. It is from this order that the prosecution
appeals by delayed leave granted. We reverse. This case is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The prosecution’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly granted
defendant’s motion to suppress given that the emergency aid, protective sweep. and exigent
circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement are applicable. Factual findings made in
conjunction with a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. People v Stevens (After
Remand), 460 Mich 626, 650-631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). However, to the extent that the trial
court’s decision is based upon issues of law, appellate review is de novo. People v Kaslowski,
239 Mich App 320, 323; 608 NW2d 539 (2000). Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo.
People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263; 564 NW2d 93 (1997).
“Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 749; 630 NW2d
921 (2001). “The lawfulness of a search or seizure depends on its reasonableness.” Generally, a
search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it was conducted pursuant to an
established exception to the warrant requirement. Id., at 749. Under the emergency aid
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exception to the search warrant requirement, an officer may enter a dwelling without a warrant if
he reasonably believes that a person inside needs immediate aid. Id.,at 756. The officer must
possess specific and articulable facts which merit that conclusion, and the officer may do no
more than is reasonably necessary to determine whether a person needs assistance and to provide
that assistance. Id., at 756. Unlike the other exceptions to the warrant requirement, when
entering a constitutionally protected area pursuant to the emergency aid exception, police
officers are not required to have the probable cause traditionally required in searches for
evidence. People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 11-12; 497 NW2d 910 (1993). Once lawfully within a
dwelling, “[t]he Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in connection
with an in-home arrest if the police reasonably believe that the area in question harbors an
individual who poses a danger to them or to others.” Beuschlein, supra at 757, citing Maryland v
Buie, 494 US 325, 337; 110 S Ct 1093; 108 L Ed 2d 276 (1990). The United States Supreme
Court has discussed principles with regard to protective sweeps incident to the arrest of someone
in a dwelling. The Buie Court stated that incident to arrest, without any level of cause at all,
officers can, as a precautionary matter, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining
the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. But, beyond this, “there
must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, supra at 334. Furthermore, once
police officers are lawfully in a position to view an item pursuant to a protective sweep, they
may seize items if their incriminating character is immediately apparent. Beuschlein, supra at
758..
Defendant does not contest the legality of the officers’ initial entry into his home, but
does contest the legality of the subsequent search of the basement. A review of the evidentiary
hearing record reveals that officers were dispatched to defendant’s home after receiving a report
regarding a man waving a gun out of a car and trying to abduct a woman at a nightclub. On
arriving at the home, a woman approached the officers indicating that a female was inside the
house, possibly being raped or killed by defendant. Officers went to the side door and heard a
woman screaming hysterically. Given these facts, it was reasonable for the officers to believe
that the hysterical female was in need of immediate aid. Consequently, entry into the home to
check on the woman was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.
Beuschlein, supra at 756.
Once the officers gained entry to the home, they observed a partially clothed female lying
on the floor of the landing and defendant standing over her. After officers took hold of
defendant, the woman ran out of the house screaming. Officer Torrey Ruffin placed defendant in
handcuffs in the kitchen, which was one step up from the landing where defendant was initially
discovered. While placing defendant in handcuffs, Ruffin did not notice any weapons on
defendant’s person. Ruffin took defendant outside to the police cruiser and patted defendant
down, finding a small baggie of cocaine and some money. Defendant was then arrested. Given
that the dispatch message indicated that the suspect had a gun, yet no gun was found in
defendant’s possession, officers became concerned that there might be another perpetrator in the
house. Moreover, the serious nature of the incident a man with a gun was reportedly trying to
abduct, rape, or kill a woman only served to amplify the danger faced by police and other
potential victims in the house. The officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep to
dispel the suspicion of danger. The sweep, a walk through, was limited in scope and duration
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and was a reasonable means of securing their persons and others at the house. Discovering what
appeared to be cocaine in plain view, a warrant was obtained. Given the circumstances, a limited
protective sweep was proper. Buie, supra at 327 (an officer performing a protective sweep is
entitled to perform a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person may be hiding to
dispel the suspicion of danger); Beuschlein, supra at 758 (“[a]lthough police intervention was in
response to a domestic dispute and [the woman inside the residence] appeared to be uninjured,
other persons or children could have been present in the home, justifying at least a walk through
the house to confirm that no one else was in danger.”) With regard to the contraband discovered
in plain view during the sweep, the police properly seized it pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
Beuschlein, supra at 758.
Defendant contends that because the woman outside the house referred only to two
persons, a man and a woman, the officers were not justified in thinking that it was possible that
other persons were in the house. However, the witness’s statement to police, referring to one
man and one woman, did not preclude the possibility that there were other persons in the house.
The officers arrived at the scene, promptly addressed the immediate situation at hand, and
determined that in order to protect themselves and others they should search the home for other
persons. Their actions must be considered according to their perceptions. People v Cartwright,
454 Mich 550, 559; 563 NW2d 208 (1997).
Apart from the protective sweep justification, officers had an additional basis to enter and
conduct a warrantless search of defendant’s home. Pursuant to the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement, police may enter a dwelling without a warrant if the
officers possess probable cause to believe that a crime was recently committed on the premises,
and probable cause to believe that the premises contain evidence or perpetrators of the suspected
crime. Beuschlein, supra at 749-750. The officers must further establish the existence of an
actual emergency on the basis of specific and objective facts indicating that immediate action is
necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, protect the officers or others, or
prevent the escape of a suspect. Id., at 749-750. If the police discover evidence of a crime
following the entry without a warrant, that evidence may be admissible. Cartwright, supra at
559.
Given the information relayed to the officers via dispatch, the witness’s statement
concerning what was occurring inside the house, and the hysterical screams the officers heard
when they approached the side door, there was probable cause to believe that a crime was
recently committed on the premises, and the premises contain evidence or perpetrators of the
suspected crime. Once inside, officers were justified in conducting a limited search of the home
because they reasonably deemed it necessary for the protection of themselves or others who
might be in the home. Beuschlein, supra at 755-756. The serious nature of the report the
officers were responding to, the discovery of a hysterical, partially unclothed woman, and the
fact that the assailant was reported to be armed with a gun, yet defendant was unarmed, led the
officers to reasonably believe that they and/or others in the house might very well be in danger.
The record displays that the search was limited. Police engaged only in a cursory visual
inspection looking for other assailants lying in wait or other victims who might be in need of aid.
Accordingly, the entry and limited search of the residence was appropriate under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Beuschlein, supra at 755-756. Therefore,
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the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that no exception to
the warrant requirement was applicable.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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