KATHLEEN KLEIN V LAKE ORION NURSING CENTER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHLEEN KLEIN, Personal Representative of
the Estate of NELSON KLEIN, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
LAKE ORION NURSING CENTER, G. COOK,
and G. P. HITCHCOCK,
No. 266663
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-061842-NH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right, challenging a circuit court order granting defendants’ motion
for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
We review de novo the circuit court’s summary disposition ruling.
Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001).
Beaudrie v
Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is
barred by the statute of limitations. In determining whether summary disposition
was properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court “consider(s) all
documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of
the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically
contradict them.” [Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642, 647-648; 677 NW2d 813 (2004),
quoting Fane v Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68, 74; 631 NW2d 678 (2001).]
“Whether a period of limitation applies to preclude a party’s pursuit of an action constitutes a
question of law that we review de novo.” Detroit v 19675 Hasse, 258 Mich App 438, 444; 671
NW2d 150 (2003).
The parties dispute whether plaintiff’s provision of notice of her intent to sue defendants,
as required by MCL 600.2912b, tolled the applicable period for filing this wrongful death
medical malpractice action. In Waltz, supra at 648-651, 655, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that under the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 600.5856, the filing of a notice of intent
to sue during the two-year malpractice period of limitation in MCL 600.5805(6) operates to toll
-1-
this period, but that the giving of notice does not toll the period in MCL 600.5852, which
constitutes a wrongful death saving period, “an exception to the limitation period” and not a
period of limitation itself. (Emphasis in original.) In Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 271 Mich
App 503, 509; 722 NW2d 666 (2006), lv pending, a special conflict panel concluded that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Waltz “applies retroactively in all cases.” More recently, in Ward v
Siano, 272 Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 265599, issued November 14, 2006), lv
pending, another special conflict panel rejected the proposition that “a wrongful death plaintiff
may rely upon equitable tolling to escape the retroactive effect of our Supreme Court’s decision
in Waltz v Wyse.” Ward, supra, slip op at 1-3.
In this case, the decedent’s claims accrued by September 29, 2001, the date of his second
fall at the nursing home, and thus the two-year period of limitation in MCL 600.5805(6)
extended through September 29, 2003. But plaintiff’s appointment as personal representative on
March 29, 2002, gave her until March 29, 2004, to commence this action within the wrongful
death saving period. MCL 600.5852. Plaintiff gave notice of her intent to sue defendants on
March 2, 2004, but the notice did not toll the wrongful death saving period pursuant to MCL
600.5856(c). Waltz, supra at 648-651, 655.1 Consequently, plaintiff’s filing of this action on
September 2, 2004, occurred more than five months after the wrongful death saving period
expired.
Because the holding in Waltz applies retroactively to this case, Mullins, supra at 509, and
because this Court’s decision in Ward, supra, slip op at 1-3, precludes the applicability of
equitable or judicial tolling under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court correctly found
that defendants were entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
1
This Court has rejected plaintiff’s contention that her giving of notice within the two-year
period in MCL 600.5852 tolled this wrongful death saving period because she subsequently and
timely filed suit within the three-year time limit also referenced in § 5852. “[T]he three-year
ceiling in the wrongful death saving provision is not an independent period in which to file suit;
it is only a limitation on the two-year saving provision itself. Therefore, the fact that the threeyear ceiling was not yet reached when [the plaintiff] filed suit is irrelevant.” Farley v Advanced
Cardiovascular Health Specialists, PC, 266 Mich App 566, 575; 703 NW2d 115 (2005).
Waltz squarely held that the notice tolling provision (MCL 600.5856(d))
explicitly applies only to the statute of limitations or repose, and therefore does
not operate to toll the additional period permitted under (MCL 600.5852) for
filing wrongful death actions. This holding clearly applies to the two-year period
in the wrongful death saving provision (MCL 600.5852). [Id. at 575 (internal
quotations omitted).]
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.