DOROTHY FOWLER V SHEILA STANTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DOROTHY FOWLER,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265303
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-120570-CH
SHEILA STANTON,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,
and
ASSOCIATES HOME EQUITY SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Associates Home Equity Services, Inc. (“defendant”) appeals by leave granted
from a circuit court order denying its motion for relief from judgment. We affirm. This case is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion to set
aside a prior judgment, Heugel v Heugel, 237 Mich App 471, 478; 603 NW2d 121 (1999),
including a default judgment, AMCO Builders & Developers, Inc v Team Ace Joint Venture, 469
Mich 90, 94; 666 NW2d 623 (2003).
MCR 2.603(D)(1) governs the setting aside of a default judgment. AMCO Builders,
supra at 95. The rule provides:
(1) A motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good
cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.
(2) Except as provided in MCR 2.612, if personal service was made on the
party against whom the default was taken, the default, and default judgment if one
has been entered, may be set aside only if the motion is filed
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(a) before entry of a default judgment, or
(b) if a default judgment has been entered, within 21 days after the default
judgment was entered.
(3) In addition, the court may set aside a default and a default judgment in
accordance with MCR 2.612.
Although the rule indicates that relief may also be granted under MCR 2.612, in Alken-Ziegler
Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 234 n 7; 600 NW2d 638 (1999), the Court
explained that the “any reason justifying relief” provision of MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) “should not be
read so as to obliterate” the “good cause” and “meritorious defense” requirements of MCR
2.603(D)(1) as analyzed in that case.
Here, defendant completely ignored MCR 2.603. It did not address “good cause,” which
requires a party to establish (1) a substantial defect or irregularity in the proceeding upon which
the default is based,” or (2) a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the requirements that
created the default . . . .” AMCO Builders, supra at 95 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Nor did it file “an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense . . . .” MCR
2.603(D).
Moreover, we are not persuaded by defendant’s claim that it established the requirements
necessary for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). Heugel, supra at 478-479. Defendant did not
show “extraordinary circumstances” that “mandate setting aside the judgment to achieve justice.”
Defendant argued below, and plaintiff conceded, that service did not comply with MCR
2.105(D). Although defendant complains that there has been no showing that the person who
signed for the certified mail as defendant’s employee is known, defendant disregards that it, as
the party seeking relief, bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to relief from the
judgment. Mere assertions that certain facts are unknown do not satisfy that burden. Moreover,
as noted by the trial court, MCR 2.105(J)(2) states that “[a]n action shall not be dismissed for
improper service of process unless the service failed to inform the defendant of the action within
the time provided in these rules for service.” (Emphasis added.) This rule supports the trial
court’s determination that improper service alone does not amount to “extraordinary
circumstances” requiring a trial court to set aside a judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). In the
absence of evidence showing that the service did not provide actual notice, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the mere failure to comply with MCR 2.105(D) did not
constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” requiring relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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