JOHN P KELMENDI V CITIZENS INS CO OF AMERICA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN P. KELMENDI,
UNPUBLISHED
February 8, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 264019
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-032771-NI
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
RAMADEVI NAVARASLA,
Defendant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Sawyer and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the jury verdict of no cause of action on his claim for
damages arising from injuries, and exacerbation of preexisting injuries, sustained in an
automobile accident. We affirm.
On June 24, 1998, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. On June 22, 2001,
plaintiff filed the instant action to recover first-party benefits under the Michigan no-fault act,
MCL 500.3101 et seq, for allowable expenses, medical expenses, lost wages, and replacement
services incurred after June 22, 2000,1 from defendant, Citizens Insurance Company.
Plaintiff asserts on appeal that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by failing
to properly instruct the jury on how to consider evidence that the 1998 accident aggravated his
pre-existing injuries arising from two slip-and-fall incidents in 1981 and 1983 and a motor
vehicle accident in 1994. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo claims of instructional error.
1
Pursuant to the one-year-back rule set forth in MCL 500.3145(1), plaintiff was precluded from
recovering benefits for expenses incurred before June 20, 2000.
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Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Mgrs, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). Jury instructions are
reviewed in their entirety to determine whether they accurately and fairly presented the
applicable law and the parties’ theories. Jury instructions should include all the elements of the
plaintiff’s claims and should not omit material issues, defenses, or theories if the evidence
supports them. Hill v Hoig, 258 Mich App 538, 540; 672 NW2d 531 (2003); Meyer v City of
Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 566; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).
To preserve a jury instruction issue for review, a party must object on the record before
the jury retires to deliberate. MCR 2.516(C).2 When properly preserved, this Court reviews
assertions of instructional error de novo. Cox, supra. However, appellate review of an
unpreserved instructional error is limited to instances in which the failure to review would result
in manifest injustice. Meyer, supra; Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 537; 564 NW2d
532 (1997). Manifest injustice occurs when a defect in an instruction is so great as to constitute
plain error requiring a new trial or when it pertains to a basic and controlling issue in the case.
Shinholster v Annapolis Hospital, 255 Mich App 339, 351; 660 NW2d 361 (2003), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds 471 Mich 540 (2004); Phinney, supra.
In this case, evidence was presented that plaintiff had pre-existing injuries and medical
conditions, and that he suffered an injury in the June 24, 1998, accident. An instruction, such as
M Civ JI 50.11,3 may have been useful to instruct the jury on how to evaluate plaintiff’s claim
alleging aggravation of his pre-existing injuries. However, plaintiff did not request an
instruction on this issue, did not object to the trial court’s failure to give the instruction, and,
further, affirmatively acquiesced to the instructions as given. Therefore, plaintiff effectively
2
MCR 2.516(C) provides:
A party may assign as error the giving of or the failure to give an instruction only
if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict (or,
in the case of instructions given after deliberations have begun, before the jury
resumes deliberations), stating specifically the matter to which the party objects
and the grounds for the objection. Opportunity must be given to make the
objection out of the hearing of the jury.
3
M Civ J I 50.11 instructs in pertinent part:
If an injury suffered by plaintiff is a combined product of both a preexisting
[disease/injury/state of heath] and the effects of defendant's negligent conduct, it
is your duty to determine and award damages caused by defendant's conduct
alone. You must separate the damages caused by defendant's conduct from the
condition which was preexisting if it is possible to do so.
However, if after careful consideration, you are unable to separate the damages
caused by defendant's conduct from those which were preexisting, then the entire
amount of plaintiff's damages must be assessed against the defendant.
-2-
waived this issue. Chastain v General Motors Corp (On Remand), 254 Mich App 576, 591; 657
NW2d 804 (2002); Phinney, supra at 537-538.
Moreover, plaintiff has not shown any manifest injustice in the verdict rendered. The
instructions as given accurately and fairly presented the applicable law. They instructed the jury
as to the types of damages available to plaintiff under the no-fault act, as well as the elements
plaintiff was required to establish in order to recover such damages, including that the damages
sought must have resulted from injuries arising from the 1998 accident. Based on those
instructions, the jury affirmatively found that plaintiff did not suffer recoverable damages as a
result of injuries arising from the 1998 accident. Thus, there was no need for the jury to
apportion plaintiff’s damages between the injuries suffered in the 1998 accident and plaintiff’s
pre-existing injuries and medical conditions. Accordingly, the court’s alleged failure to give an
instruction on the proper handling of plaintiff’s pre-existing injuries was, at worst, harmless
error.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in admitting a videotape of plaintiff
because its probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. We
disagree. This Court reviews the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Chmielewski v Xermac Inc, 457 Mich 593, 614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). “Relevant
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Michigan, these rules, or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.” MRE 402. However, a trial court has discretion to
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. MRE 403; Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 199; 670 NW2d 675 (2003).
Unfair prejudice does not mean merely damaging to a party’s case. Rather, evidence is unfairly
prejudicial only if there is a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury. Id.; Franzel v Kerr Mfg Co, 234 Mich App 600, 618; 600 NW2d
66 (1999).
Before trial, the court denied plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude a video surveillance
tape of plaintiff made shortly after the 1998 accident for litigation of plaintiff’s claims for thirdparty benefits arising from a prior motor vehicle accident, in 1994. The tape shows plaintiff
walking around his home on July 15, 1998, and changing a tire on his car on September 8, 1998.
It tends to refute plaintiff’s trial testimony that he was in excruciating pain following the 1998
accident, which limited his activities and his ability to care for himself and his dependents.
Thus, the video was relevant to the jury’s determination of whether plaintiff was disabled by the
1998 accident and whether he incurred recoverable expenses and required replacement services
for his daily living as a result of injuries sustained in that accident. Further, while the videotape
is damaging to plaintiff’s assertion that he suffered the claimed damages as a result of the 1998
accident, there is no indication that the jury gave it undue or preemptive weight. Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape into evidence.
Finally, plaintiff claims that the jury verdict was inconsistent because it found that
plaintiff suffered accidental bodily injury in the 1998 accident but that plaintiff was not eligible
for any personal injury protection benefits for expenses incurred after June 22, 2000. We
disagree. This Court reviews de novo claims of inconsistent jury verdicts. Lagalo v Allied Corp,
-3-
457 Mich 278, 282-285; 577 NW2d 462 (1998); Payton v Detroit, 211 Mich App 375, 397; 536
NW2d 233 (1995). A jury’s verdict is not inconsistent if there is an interpretation of the
evidence that can explain the findings. Lagalo, supra at 282. Every attempt must be made to
harmonize a jury’s verdicts. Only if the verdicts are so logically and legally inconsistent that
they cannot be reconciled will they be set aside. Id., citing Granger v Fruehauf Corp, 429 Mich
1, 7, 9; 412 NW2d 199 (1987).
The jury unanimously concluded that (1) plaintiff timely provided written notice to
defendant within one year of the accident; (2) plaintiff suffered a bodily injury in the 1998
accident; (3) plaintiff did not incur any allowable expense after June 22, 2000, as a result of
injuries suffered in the 1998 accident; (3) plaintiff was not unable to return to work after June 22,
2000, as a result of injuries suffered in the 1998 accident; (4) plaintiff did not incur any
household replacement services after June 22, 2000, as a result of injuries suffered in the 1998
accident; and (5) payment for any expenses that plaintiff was entitled to after June 22, 2000,
were not overdue.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the jury’s finding that plaintiff suffered an accidental
bodily injury in 1998 is not logically inconsistent with the jury’s finding that plaintiff was not
entitled to any personal injury protection benefits after June 22, 2000, as a result of injuries
suffered in the 1998 accident. Based on the evidence presented at trial, including the videotape
of plaintiff’s activities shortly after the accident and extensive testimony regarding plaintiff’s
pre-existing injuries and medical conditions, the jury could reasonably conclude that the injuries
plaintiff suffered during the 1998 accident were minor and/or did not cause the damages, if any,
that plaintiff experienced after June 22, 2000.
We affirm.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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