PEOPLE OF MI V KOLLIN WINBUSH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 6, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 265567
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-002855-FH
KOLLIN WINBUSH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f. Defendant was also
charged as a second controlled substance offender, MCL 333.7413(2), and as a second habitual
offender, MCL 769.10. The trial court dismissed the charges against defendant due to the
prosecution’s failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order. The prosecutor appeals as of
right, and we affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant waived a preliminary examination and pleaded not guilty. Defendant was
bound over to the circuit court for trial. On March 22, 2005, the chief judge of the Kent Circuit
Court sent an order to the parties that required all requests for discovery to be filed with the court
no later than fourteen days from the date of the order.
Defense counsel requested discovery on March 17, 2005, and as of the status conference
held on May 3, 2005, the defense had yet to receive a lab report regarding the drugs allegedly
found in defendant’s house. At the status conference, the prosecution put a plea offer on the
record. However, defense counsel stated that his client was unable to make an intelligent
decision on the offer because discovery had not been completed.
On May 13, 2005, defense counsel filed a motion to enforce discovery compliance by the
prosecution. Counsel argued that he could not properly prepare a case without the relevant lab
reports. The trial court ruled that it would hold a show cause hearing to determine whether the
case should be dismissed.
At the show cause hearing, the prosecution indicated it had yet to comply with discovery
because defense counsel had never contacted its office other than with a standard discovery
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request. The trial court confirmed on the record that the defense had made a proper and regular
discovery request on March 17, 2005, and that a copy of that request was in the court file along
with the chief judge’s discovery order. The trial court then questioned the prosecutor as to
whether there was any ground on which to deny of the defense’s discovery request. The
prosecutor argued that contrary to the practice of law in the community and the “standard rule,”
defense counsel never asked the particular prosecutor assigned to the case for discovery.
The trial court ordered the case dismissed without prejudice because the laboratory
reports sought on March 17th had yet to be produced by the prosecutor in violation of the court’s
order.
On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
the criminal prosecution against defendant. We cannot agree. A trial court’s decision regarding
the appropriate remedy for noncompliance with a discovery order is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. MCR 6.201(J); People v Davie (After Remand), 225 Mich App 592, 597-598; 571
NW2d 229 (1997). The abuse of discretion standard recognizes that there may be no single
correct outcome in certain situations; instead, there may be more than one reasonable and
principled outcome. When the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, it has not
abused its discretion and so the reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s judgment. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the principled
range of outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). In addition,
the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding noncompliance with a discovery order involves a
balancing of interests of the courts, the public, and the parties. Davie, supra at 598. The
exercise of discretion “requires inquiry into all the relevant circumstances, including ‘the causes
and bona fides of tardy, or total, noncompliance, and a showing by the objecting party of actual
prejudice.”’ Id., quoting People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 482; 406 NW2d 859 (1987).
In Davie, this Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
case for a violation of a pretrial discovery order. Davie, supra at 598-599. This Court wrote that
dismissal of the charges was not unwarranted or unnecessarily harsh, stating that neither the
police nor the prosecutor in that case had complied with discovery orders, claiming instead to be
following an unwritten informal procedure. Id. This Court noted that while the prosecutor and
the public had an interest in seeing the case to trial, the trial court had a great interest in forcing
present and future compliance with formal discovery orders, maintaining proper judicial
supervision of the discovery process, and eliminating the use of informal methods. Id. at 599.
The instant case also involves the violation of a pretrial discovery order. Here, the trial
court gave the prosecution several opportunities to turn over the discoverable material or explain
why the material had yet to be produced. As in Davie, the prosecution argued that it was
following an informal discovery procedure. The prosecution submitted that the informal
procedure of the local legal community dictated that defense counsel was to personally contact
the particular prosecutor assigned to the case regarding discovery. The prosecution failed to
otherwise justify the delay in discovery and was unable to cite any court rule or case law in
support of its position.
Like the court in Davie, the trial court here had a strong interest in eliminating reliance on
informal methods of discovery. While the prosecutor and the public undoubtedly had an interest
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in seeing this matter proceed to trial, the trial court in the present case had a great interest in
forcing present and future compliance with its formal discovery orders.
In addition, defendant was able to show actual prejudice by the delay in that he could not
intelligently consider a plea offer. The prosecution suggests that the trial court could have
avoided actual prejudice to defendant by the less severe remedy of granting a continuance of the
plea-offer deadline. However, this is not a case in which granting a continuance as a remedy
would have allowed defendant to properly prepare the case and thereby avoid prejudice. The
trial court had already given the prosecution ample time to comply with the discovery order and
the court rules, but the prosecution had demonstrated that it was not able to comply with these
extended deadlines. Moreover, this is not a case in which excluding the evidence of the lab
reports would have been a proper remedy. Excluding the evidence would have been paramount
to dismissal since the prosecution would have been unable to prove the necessary drug charges
without the laboratory reports. The prosecution’s continued defiance of the discovery order gave
the trial court no option other than dismissal of this case without prejudice, allowing the
prosecution to refile charges in the future should it so desire. See id. at 600. The court properly
balanced the interests of the court, the public, and the parties, and did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the charges against defendant without prejudice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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