PEOPLE OF MI V BERT TERRENCE BURNS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 6, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263393
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-008220-FH
BERT TERRENCE BURNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver
less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and possession of less than 25 grams of
heroin, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). The trial court sentenced defendant, as an habitual offender,
fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 3-1/2 to 50 years’ imprisonment for his possession with intent to
deliver cocaine conviction, and 2-1/2 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his possession of heroin
conviction. We affirm.
I
According to trial testimony, on May 26, 2004, police officers Gregory Bauer and Aaron
Rossin were on patrol in a high crime area when they observed a car, driven by defendant,
directly ahead of them. It appeared, through the car’s tinted rear window, that defendant’s
passenger was not wearing a safety belt. Accordingly, the officers activated their vehicle’s
overhead lights, initiating a traffic stop for the possible safety belt violation. Defendant
continued to drive an additional .25 miles before stopping his car. During the time defendant
continued to drive, he appeared to unbuckle his seat belt and lean over for several seconds before
sitting upright and refastening his seatbelt.
When the officers approached defendant’s car after stopping, they observed that
defendant’s passenger was, in fact, wearing his safety belt, but that the shoulder strap was
improperly tucked under his arm. In response to Bauer’s questions, defendant denied removing
his own safety belt, and said that he did not use drugs and was not a drug dealer. Upon Bauer’s
request, defendant exited his car and consented to be searched. Bauer recovered a plastic bag
containing a white chunky substance, which he believed to be crack cocaine, from defendant’s
pocket. Bauer subsequently arrested defendant. Rossin then searched defendant’s car and found
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heroin inside the car’s center console. Defendant denied having any knowledge of the cocaine or
heroin. Later, during an interview with Detective Cathleen Postmus, however, defendant
admitted to possessing the 2.76 grams of cocaine found in his pocket, but he maintained that he
had no knowledge of the heroin in his car.
II
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence that officers found on his person
and in his vehicle, arguing that the evidence was obtained after he was unlawfully detained and
searched. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to
suppress.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
Specifically, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
drug evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Defendant claims that the
initial stop of his car was unreasonable because the circumstances surrounding the stop were
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, any evidence
obtained as a result of the stop should have been suppressed. We review a trial court’s factual
findings on a motion to suppress for clear error, but, to the extent that the trial court’s ruling
involves an interpretation of the law, or the application of a constitutional standard to essentially
uncontested facts, our review is de novo. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636
(2005); People v Harrington, 258 Mich App 703; 672 NW2d 344 (2003).
“[T]he reasonableness of a search and seizure depends on ‘whether the officer’s action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.’” Williams, supra at 314, quoting Terry v Ohio,
392 US 1, 20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). An officer may stop a vehicle if he has
probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or is occurring. People v Davis, 250
Mich App 357, 363; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). An actual violation need not be proved; all that is
required is that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a violation may have occurred. People
v Fisher, 463 Mich 881, 881-882; 617 NW2d 37 (2000) (Corrigan, J., concurring); People v
Chambers, 195 Mich App 118, 121-122; 489 NW2d 168 (1992).
In this case, the officers initiated the stop because they perceived a safety belt violation.
Failure to wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt in a moving vehicle constitutes a
civil infraction. MCL 257.710e(3), (7). Although the officers discovered, after effectuating the
stop, that defendant’s passenger was actually wearing his safety belt, the belt appeared
unfastened because the strap was improperly tucked under the passenger’s arm. Further,
according to the officers, defendant removed his own safety belt while continuing to drive after
they initiated the stop.
We conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe a safety belt violation
occurred and, therefore, the initial stop of defendant’s car was valid. In reaching our conclusion,
we note that defendant argues that the tinting on his car’s rear windows made it impossible for
the officers to see inside the vehicle. But, to the extent that defendant challenges the officers’
veracity, the trial court ultimately concluded that the officers provided credible testimony
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concerning the civil infraction and found that the initial stop was valid, and we defer to a trial
court's credibility determination. People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 209; 600 NW2d 634 (1999).
In regard to the initial stop of his car, defendant also alleges that, because the incident
occurred in a high crime area, the officers used the safety belt violation as a mere pretext to
search for drugs. In People v Haney, 192 Mich App 207; 480 NW2d 322 (1991), we held that,
regardless of an officer’s subjective intent in making a stop, the stop will be deemed
constitutionally valid where the officer’s actions do not exceed what he is legally permitted and
objectively authorized to do. Therefore, because the officers in this case stopped defendant’s car
pursuant to an observed civil infraction, the stop itself was valid, despite any subjective
motivations the officers may have harbored at the time of the stop.
In affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, we additionally find that
the officers were justified in detaining and questioning defendant after the initial stop. When a
traffic stop is premised on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may briefly
detain the driver and inquire into matters related to the stop. Williams, supra at 315. The
determination whether a traffic stop is reasonable includes consideration of the evolving
circumstances, and if new circumstances are revealed, an officer may extend the detention long
enough to resolve his suspicions, including through further questioning of the driver or
passengers. Id. at 315-316. In determining whether there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity, “[c]ommon sense and everyday life experiences predominate over
uncompromising standards,” and therefore, we defer to experienced officers who state that
certain behavior by particular individuals fits a certain crime. People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626,
635-636; 505 NW2d 266 (1993).
At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that after initiating the traffic stop,
defendant’s behavior led them to believe that criminal activity was afoot. According to the
officers, after they activated their overhead lights, defendant drove an additional .25 miles at
approximately 25 mph. He turned on his left turn signal, removed his safety belt, leaned to the
right for five to ten seconds, returned to an upright position, reclasped his safety belt, and turned
onto a side street. After the officers approached the car, and questioned defendant about the
safety belt violations, defendant appeared to be excessively nervous and denied removing his
safety belt. The officers testified that defendant’s behavior, coupled with their law enforcement
experience in high crime areas, led them to believe that defendant was attempting to conceal
contraband or weapons in his vehicle. On the basis of this testimony, we agree with the trial
court’s determination that the officers were justified in asking defendant questions regarding
drugs and weapons, and we find that the officers were justified in detaining and questioning
defendant even after the reason for the initial stop was resolved. See Williams, supra at 315;
Nelson, supra at 636.
With regard to the search of defendant’s person, the trial court found that defendant
consented to be searched. A warrantless search may be reasonable when based upon voluntary
consent. Williams, supra at 318; People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338, 342; 711 NW2d 386
(2005). Bauer testified that he “consent searched” defendant. While defendant denied that he
consented to the search, the trial court determined that Bauer provided credible testimony
concerning defendant’s consent. Accordingly, because we defer to a trial court's credibility
determination, Farrow, supra at 209, and because we determined that defendant was not being
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unlawfully detained when asked to consent to the search, we find that the search was reasonable.
Furthermore, we find that the subsequent search of defendant’s car was valid because the officers
conducted the search pursuant to a lawful arrest. People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 26; 485 NW2d
866 (1992). The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
III
Defendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to find him
guilty of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine. In reviewing a claim of
insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the charged
crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697
NW2d 494 (2005); People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We will not
interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses, People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004), because it is for
the trier of fact, rather than this Court, to determine what inferences can be fairly drawn from the
evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded to the inferences, People v Hardiman, 466
Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
To support a conviction of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine, the prosecution must prove that 1) the recovered substance is cocaine, 2) the cocaine is
in a mixture weighing less than fifty grams, 3) the defendant was not authorized to possess the
substance, and (4) the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine with the intent to deliver.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 516-517; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201
(1992); People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 225-226; 663 NW2d 499 (2003).
Defendant admits to unlawful possession of 2.76 grams of cocaine, but he claims there
was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to deliver the cocaine. We disagree. Intent to
deliver may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the quantity of cocaine in a
defendant’s possession. Wolfe, supra at 524; Gonzalez, supra at 226. Furthermore, because of
the difficulty of proving a defendant’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to establish intent to deliver. Id.
Here, according to Postmus’ testimony, the amount of cocaine in defendant’s possession
was consistent with the amount that drug dealers carry. Postmus explained that one “rock” of
cocaine is equivalent to one-tenth of a gram of cocaine, and that users typically carry one or two
“rocks” on their person because that is an immediately usable, and less costly, amount of
cocaine. In comparison, defendant admitted to carrying 2.76 grams, or approximately 27
“rocks,” of cocaine. Postmus stated that, in 19 years investigating drug related crimes, she has
never encountered a person who carried as many as 27 “rocks” of cocaine for personal use.
Bauer offered similar testimony, stating that, in his experience, drug users carry substantially less
than 2.76 grams of cocaine for their own consumption. Further, testimony provided by
defendant’s parole supervisor, that defendant repeatedly tested negative for cocaine in May 2004
and that there was no cocaine detectable in his system on the day of the arrest, undermined
defendant’s claim that the cocaine was for personal use.
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Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Tombs, supra at
459, a rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed less than 50
grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Reversal of defendant’s conviction is unwarranted on
the ground of insufficient evidence.
IV
Defendant finally argues on appeal that he is entitled to resentencing. Because defendant
did not raise his sentencing issues at sentencing, or in a motion for resentencing, they are not
properly preserved. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 669-670; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
We review for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Id. at 670; Carines, supra at 764.
Reversal is warranted only if defendant is actually innocent or an “‘error seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s
innocence.” Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
Defendant admits that the sentences imposed by the trial court fall within the appropriate
sentencing guidelines range, with habitual offender enhancement, but he argues, nonetheless,
that he is entitled to resentencing. He claims that the trial court imposed cruel and unusual
punishment, US Const, Am VIII and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, and violated his Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury, US Const, Am VI, in fashioning his sentences. Generally, when a sentence
falls within the appropriate guidelines range, we must affirm the sentence unless the trial court
erred in scoring the guidelines or relied on inaccurate information in determining the sentence.
MCL 769.34(10); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 261; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). However, we
have held that this limitation on review of sentences imposed within the guidelines range is
“inapplicable to claims of constitutional error.” People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 316; 715
NW2d 377 (2006). Thus, we will review defendant’s claim of error.
Defendant argues that, in failing to consider his strong family support, remorseful
attitude, mental health, and history of substance abuse, the trial court imposed disproportional
sentences and violated constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. We
disagree. In determining whether a sentence is “cruel and unusual,” we consider whether the
harshness of the penalty is proportional to gravity of the offense, given the goal of rehabilitation.
People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 715; 555 NW2d 485 (1996).
Here, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record supports that the trial court considered
information regarding defendant’s family, mental health, and history of substance abuse, and
recommended that defendant participate in a rehabilitation program. Moreover, because
defendant’s sentences are within the appropriate guidelines range, they are presumptively
proportionate. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). Proportionate
sentences do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. People v Drohan, 264 Mich App 77,
92; 689 NW2d 750 (2004), aff'd 475 Mich 140; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). And, habitual offender
enhancements do not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
People v Curry, 142 Mich App 724, 732; 371 NW2d 854 (1985); see also People v Potts, 55
Mich App 622, 639; 223 NW2d 96 (1974). For these reasons, we find no merit in defendant’s
argument that his sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
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Defendant also asserts that he was sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment, US
Const, Am VI, and Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court’s reliance on facts at sentencing, which were
not found by a jury, does not violate either the Sixth Amendment or the United States Supreme
Court’s rulings in Blakely. In Drohan, supra, 475 Mich 159-161, the Court definitively ruled
that Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme is not affected by the rulings in Blakely, supra,
that were designed to protect defendants from higher sentences based on facts not found by a
jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See also People v McCuller, 475 Mich 176; 715
NW2d 798 (2006).
Defendant also argues he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court based
defendant’s sentences on inaccurate information. Generally, a sentence is invalid when it is
based on inaccurate information. MCL 769.34(10); People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d
299 (1997). However, defendant provides no basis for his claim that the trial court considered
inaccurate information in imposing his sentences. Defendant has not specified the particular
facts relied on by the trial court, if any, that were incorrect. Therefore, defendant’s claim is
abandoned. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
Defendant further argues he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to
articulate its reasons for the sentences imposed. Although a trial court is generally required to
articulate its reasoning, on the record, at the time of sentencing, “[t]he articulation requirement is
satisfied if the trial court expressly relies on the sentencing guidelines in imposing the sentence
or if it is clear from the context of the remarks preceding the sentence that the trial court relied
on the sentencing guidelines.” Conley, supra at 312-313. Here, the trial court acknowledged
that defendant should “be sentenced consistent with the verdict of the jury,” and that he was a
fourth felony offender under the habitual offender laws. The trial court also noted the specific
sentencing guidelines range in issuing the sentence for defendant’s possession with intent to
deliver cocaine conviction. Because it is clear from the trial court’s remarks that it relied on the
sentencing guidelines in imposing defendant’s sentences, the articulation requirement is satisfied
and resentencing is unwarranted. Id.
In a supplemental brief, defendant seeks a remand to the trial court with regard to
sentencing for a possible credit for the time served in jail while awaiting trial in this case.
Defendant contends that a remand is necessary to determine the status of his parole sentence, to
then determine whether he is entitled to a credit against the sentence imposed in this case
pursuant to MCL 769.11b.1 Defendant has failed to establish any factual or legal basis for his
argument, and we find it without merit. Because this issue was not raised before the trial court,
our review is for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. McLaughlin, supra at 670.
Defendant acknowledges that credit for jail time served by a defendant on parole, while
awaiting trial on a new offense, must generally be applied against the sentence for the paroled
1
MCL 769.11b provides that if the court is sentencing a defendant who has served time in jail
before sentencing because he or she could not afford or was denied bond, the court must credit
the defendant with time served. People v Stead, 270 Mich App 550, 551; 716 NW2d 324 (2006).
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offense, not the sentence for the new offense. People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705; 686
NW2d 821 (2004); People v Watts, 186 Mich App 686, 687-690; 464 NW2d 715 (1991). “A
parolee who is sentenced for a crime committed while on parole must serve the remainder of the
term imposed for the previous offense before he serves the term imposed for the subsequent
offense.” Seiders, supra at 705, citing MCL 768.7a(2); see also People v Stead, 270 Mich App
550, 552; 716 NW2d 324 (2006). Time spent in jail is normally credited against the unexpired
portion of the defendant’s paroled sentence. Seiders, supra at 706.
Defendant nevertheless asserts that it is unclear whether he, in fact, received jail credit
against his paroled sentences or whether a parole violation hearing was even held. He argues
that if no hearing was held, or if a hearing was held, but he was not required to serve any
additional time on his paroled sentence(s), there would be no earlier sentence against which to
credit his jail time and, thus, he would be entitled to a credit against the sentence in this case
pursuant to MCL 769.11b. We disagree.
Defendant relies on authority and reasoning that is no longer valid. In Seiders, this Court
determined that MCL 769.11b does not apply if a defendant was held on a parole detainer,
thereby overruling earlier case law to the contrary. Seiders, supra at 703, 707. A parole detainee
convicted of a new offense is entitled to have jail credit applied exclusively to the sentence from
which parole was granted. Stead, supra at 552. “Credit is not available to a parole detainee for
time spent in jail attendant to a new offense, because ‘bond is neither set nor denied when a
defendant is held in jail on a parole detainer.’” Id., quoting Seiders, supra at 707. If a defendant
is held on a parole detainer, the question of bond is not an issue, and MCL 769.11b does not
apply. Seiders, supra at 707.
The presentence investigation report in this case stated that defendant was on parole at
the time of the instant offense and was ineligible for any jail credit with regard to sentencing for
the instant offense. Defendant does not dispute that he was on parole, and therefore held on a
parole detainer while awaiting trial in this case. Under Seiders, defendant would not be entitled
to credit for time served with regard to the sentence in this case regardless of the status of his
parole sentence.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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