CALIFORNIA CHARLEY'S CORP V CITY OF ALLEN PARK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CALIFORNIA CHARLEY’S CORPORATION
and GERARD TRUDEL,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2006
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
CITY OF ALLEN PARK, JOHN CIOTTI,
ANTHONY NICHOLAS, MARTIN DELOACH,
and GREGORY MURPHY,
No. 266383
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-409295-CZ
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DAVID TAMSEN, KENNETH DOBSON,
LEVON KING, BEVERLEY KELLEY,
FRANCESCO TUCCI, and KEVIN WELCH,
Defendants.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Markey and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Allen Park (“the city”), and individual defendants John Ciotti, Anthony
Nicholas, Martin Deloach, and Gregory Murphy (“the individual defendants”) appeal by right
from a circuit court order denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). Defendants’ appeal concerns only whether plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by governmental immunity. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The individual defendants served in appointed positions for the city. Defendant Ciotti
was the building inspector; defendant Nicholas the assistant building inspector; defendant
Deloach the fire chief, and defendant Murphy the fire inspector. Plaintiffs’ first amended
complaint essentially alleges that out of personal animosity and political influence defendants
deliberately interfered with plaintiffs’ attempts to open a nightclub. The complaint includes
counts styled as “Concert of Actions,” “Civil Conspiracy,” “Tortious Interference with
Contracts,” “Tortious Interference with Business Relationships and/or Expectancies,”
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“Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” “Business and Personal Defamation,” and
“Intentional Violations of Plaintiff Trudel’s Civil Rights as a Person with a Disability.”
On appeal, defendants first argue that the trial court should have granted summary
disposition to the city on the basis of governmental immunity.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
A party may support a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. If such material is
submitted, it must be considered. MCR 2.116(G)(5). . . . Unlike a motion under
subsection (C)(10), a movant under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is not required to file
supportive material, and the opposing party need not reply with supportive
material. The contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted
by documentation submitted by the movant. [Maiden, supra at 119.]
MCL 691.1407 provides that governmental agencies (which include municipalities) are
immune from tort liability when the agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function. The immunity is subject to certain statutory exceptions that are not
applicable here. For example, a claim for damages against the state for the state’s violation of
the Michigan Constitution is not necessarily barred by governmental immunity. Smith v Dep’t of
Pub Health, 428 Mich 540, 544; 410 NW2d 749 (1987). But, the holding in Smith does not
extend to claims against municipalities or individual defendants. As explained in Jones v
Powell, 462 Mich 329; 612 NW2d 423 (2000), a central concern that prompted the decision in
Smith, i.e., the unavailability of any other remedy, is not present in actions against municipalities
and individual defendants. “A plaintiff may sue a municipality in federal or state court under 42
USC 1983 to redress a violation of a federal constitutional right.” Jones, supra at 337. Thus,
Jones indicates that an action under 42 USC 1983 against a municipality is not barred by
immunity, but an action against a municipality founded on an alleged violation of the Michigan
Constitution is precluded.
In the present case, however, plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege an action under 42
USC 1983. None of the 243 paragraphs in plaintiffs’ amended complaint refers to 42 USC 1983
or a violation of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs do not even address 42 USC 1983 in
their brief on appeal. Therefore, we agree with defendants that the city was entitled to summary
disposition with respect to plaintiff’s tort claims.
Defendants also argue that the trial court should have granted the city summary
disposition with respect to Trudel’s claim under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., because he failed to state a claim, he did not identify his
disability, what rights were allegedly denied, and how the city denied them. But, defendants did
not preserve this argument because it is not in the statement of the questions required by MCR
7.212(C)(5). Preston v Dep’t of Treasury, 190 Mich App 491, 498; 476 NW2d 455 (1991).
With respect to the individual defendants, defendants note that MCL 691.1407(5)
provides for immunity for the highest appointive executive officials of all levels of government
and that defendant Deloach is the city’s fire chief falls within the statutory provision.
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Pursuant to MCL 691.1407(5), "the elective or highest appointive of all levels of
government [is] immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or
she is acting within the scope of his or her . . . executive authority." Whether an entity is a “level
of government” depends on “whether the entity shares aspects of governance with other political
subdivisions, such as the power to levy taxes, the power to make decisions having a wide effect
on the members of a community, or the power of eminent domain,” or possesses “broad-based
jurisdiction or extensive authority similar to that of a judge or legislator.” Grahovac v Munising
Twp, 263 Mich App 589, 593; 689 NW2d 498 (2004)(citations omitted). In Grahovac, this
Court held that the immunity did not extend to a township fire chief because there was no
evidence that the township fire department had any powers of governance. In contrast, in Davis
v City of Detroit, 269 Mich App 376, 381; 711 NW2d 462 (2006), this Court held that the city of
Detroit Fire Department was a “level of government,” and, therefore, the highest appointed
official was entitled to immunity. The Court distinguished Grahovac because of the autonomous
authority granted to the department in the Detroit city charter and the Detroit city code. In the
present case, defendants assert that Deloach was the fire chief, but they do not address whether
the Allen Park Fire Department is a “level of government.”
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position
or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the
basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. [Mitcham v Detroit,
355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).]
Because the record is insufficient to determine that the Allen Park Fire Department is a level of
government as a matter of law, and defendants do not address this issue, defendants have not
established that defendant Deloach was entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1407(5).
Defendants also argue that there was “no showing” that they acted improperly. With
respect to a motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), however, “[t]he contents of the
complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant.”
Maiden, supra at 119. Defendants did not present any documentation with their motion; they
attached only a copy of the complaint.
Defendants include in their brief only short discussions of plaintiffs’ specific claims and
assertions that plaintiff failed to demonstrate various elements of the claims. These discussions
raise separate issues that are outside the scope of this appeal and the statement of questions
involved, which concern only governmental immunity. MCR 7.212(C)(5); Preston, supra at
498. In any event, these arguments do not persuade us that defendants were entitled to summary
disposition. They amount to a contention that defendants were entitled to summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). But, when a motion is filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the moving
party is required to submit affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in
support of the grounds asserted in the motion. See MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Quinto v Cross &
Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Although defendants cited MCR
2.116(C)(10), they failed to support their motion as required by MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b). Under the
circumstances, defendants failed to establish that they were entitled to summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
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In sum, we reverse the trial court’s order denying summary disposition to the city with
respect to plaintiffs’ tort claims and affirm the denial of summary disposition in all other
respects.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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