SANDRA DAY V LAVERNE J MOLITOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA DAY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 256489
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 03-042622-CH
LAVERNE J. MOLITOR and DIANE C.
MOLITOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Bandstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a bench trial finding of no cause of action on her complaint
alleging a prescriptive easement over a portion of defendants’ land. We reverse.
The parties here have an adjoining property line that is not in dispute. Plaintiff seeks a
prescriptive easement over a small parcel of land known as the “stub parcel,” which abuts both
properties and is approximately 29 square feet. Plaintiff purchased her property in 1976. The
property was and still is surrounded by a chain link fence with a double-wide gate opening onto
the stub parcel. Defendants purchased their property in 1977 and mistakenly believed until 2003
that the stub parcel was part of their property. Plaintiff’s investigation revealed the true owner in
2002, whom she approached with an offer to purchase; however, the true owner subsequently
transferred the parcel to defendants by quit claim deed. After defendants erected a fence
blocking plaintiff’s access to the stub parcel, she filed suit seeking a prescriptive easement across
the parcel.
At trial, plaintiff and her family testified that they used the stub parcel for access to Oak
Knoll Drive since 1976. They testified that they used the parcel for yard waste removal, for
access to store vehicles, for deliveries, and for home improvement projects. They also testified
that from the 1980s until 1995, they used the parcel to store vehicles used in plaintiff’s former
husband’s used car business. Plaintiff testified that they used the parcel for this purpose two to
three times a week during the summer. Defendants’ non-family witnesses confirmed some use
of the parcel for the used car business; however, each of them denied plaintiff’s claimed
frequency. Although not every one of defendants and their witnesses confirmed each instance of
the other uses plaintiff claimed, each confirmed some portion of them. The trial court found no
cause of action for plaintiff.
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Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the non-family witnesses’
testimony corroborated defendants’ testimony that her use of the parcel was rare, sporadic, and
infrequent. Plaintiff challenges three facets of the trial court’s findings: first, that the non-family
witnesses’ testimony was the most credible; second, that she did not use the stub parcel two to
three times a week; and finally, that the non-family witnesses’ testimony corroborated
defendants’ testimony that her use was rare, sporadic, and infrequent. A trial court’s findings of
fact may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C); Sands Appliance Svcs, Inc v
Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). A finding is clearly erroneous where,
although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court, on review of the entire
record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ambs v
Kalamazoo Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich App 637, 652; 662 NW2d 424 (2003). “An appellate court
will give deference to ‘the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses
who appeared before it.’” Id., quoting Rellinger v Bremmeyr, 180 Mich App 661, 665; 448
NW2d 49 (1989).
Considering the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses, its
determination that the non-family witnesses’ testimony was most credible is not clearly
erroneous. Because those witnesses adamantly testified that plaintiff did not use the stub parcel
two to three times a week in the summer, that finding is also not clearly erroneous. However,
defendants and their witnesses also testified that plaintiff regularly used the parcel to remove
yard debris to Oak Knoll Drive, for delivery of various materials for home improvement or
landscaping projects, and for access to store various vehicles or other large items in the back
yard. This testimony corroborated the bulk of plaintiff’s claim of use; we conclude that the trial
court’s finding that the use was “rare, sporadic, and infrequent” was clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we also conclude that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate the continuous use necessary to create a prescriptive easement over the stub
parcel. Actions to determine an interest in land are equitable in nature, MCL 600.2932;
accordingly, the trial court’s findings are reviewed de novo. Gorte v Dep’t of Transportation,
202 Mich App 161, 165; 507 NW2d 797 (1993). A prescriptive easement arises from the use of
a servient estate that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for 15 years. Killips v
Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256, 258-259; 624 NW2d 224 (2001). An easement does not displace
general possession of the land by its owner, but grants the easement holder qualified possession
only to the extent necessary for enjoyment of the rights conferred by the easement. Schadewald
v Brulé, 225 Mich App 26, 35; 570 NW2d 788 (1997).
Plaintiff’s use of the servient estate was open, notorious, and adverse for the prescriptive
period. The only question is whether plaintiff’s use meets the continuity requirement, as
described by our Supreme Court:
The correct rule as to continuity of user, and what shall constitute such continuity,
can be stated only with reference to the nature and character of the right claimed.
An omission to use when not needed does not disprove a continuity of use, shown
by using it when needed, for it is not required that a person shall use the easement
every day for the prescriptive period. It simply means that he shall exercise the
right more or less frequently, according to the nature of the use to which its
enjoyment may be applied. [von Meding v Strahl, 319 Mich 598, 613-614; 30
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NW2d 363 (1948), quoting St Cecelia Society v Universal Car & Service Co, 213
Mich 569, 577; 182 NW 161 (1921), quoting 9 RCL, Easements, § 34.]
In its opinion, the trial court emphasized the “more or less frequently” phrase in the last sentence
of the rule. In so doing, the trial court apparently elevated that factor to such an extent that it
failed to consider the “nature of the use” at issue. Plaintiff merely claims a prescriptive easement
over the stub parcel for ingress and egress from Oak Knoll Drive to her back yard. The
testimony at trial consistently demonstrated that plaintiff used the stub parcel for backyard access
for more than 27 years when occasion required, and, by maintaining the gated fence,
continuously claimed the right to do so. St Cecelia, supra at 576. When a user “maintains a
consistency of purpose, the prescriptive use continues even if actual physical use ceases, so long
as the open or notorious requirement is met.” 1 Restatement Property, 3d, § 2.17, p 279
comment i.
We reverse.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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