RELIANCE INSURANCE CO V RONALD JOHNSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2005
Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellant,
v
RONALD JOHNSON and STACY JOHNSON,
No. 256025
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 02-004552-NZ
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs-
Appellees.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Saad and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s orders that dismissed its complaint
without prejudice and denied its motion for reconsideration. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The instant case arose after defendant Ronald Johnson suffered an injury in a workplace
accident and received worker’s compensation benefits from plaintiff, his employer’s insurance
carrier. Johnson entered into a settlement agreement with DeJager Construction, the third party
responsible for his injuries. Plaintiff then filed suit claiming that, under MCL 418.827(5),1 it was
entitled to be reimbursed out of the settlement fund for the benefits it paid Johnson. In response,
Johnson filed a counterclaim asserting that, when plaintiff suddenly ceased paying his worker’s
compensation benefits, plaintiff intentionally or negligently caused him to suffer emotional
distress. Because of the counterclaim, plaintiff filed a motion requesting a stay of the
1
This provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act states in pertinent part:
Any recovery against the third party for damages resulting from personal injuries
or death only, after deducting expenses of recovery, shall first reimburse the
employer or carrier for any amounts paid or payable under this act to date of
recovery and the balance shall immediately be paid to the employee or his or her
dependents or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance payment
by the employer on account of any future payments of compensation benefits.
-1-
proceedings pursuant to an Order of Liquidation issued by the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.
The liquidation order, dated October 3, 2001, contains the following pertinent provisions.
3. Commissioner M. Diane Koken and her successors in office (the
“Commissioner”) are hereby APPOINTED Liquidator of Reliance and the
Liquidator or her designees (the “Liquidator”) are directed immediately to take
possession of Reliance’s property, business and affairs as Liquidator, and to
liquidate Reliance in accordance with Article V of the Insurance Department Act
of 1921, as amended (40 P.S. §§211 et esq.) (the “Act”), and to take such action
as the interest of the policyholders, creditors or the public may require.
*
*
*
5. The commissioner, as Liquidator, is vested with title to all property, assets,
contracts and rights of action (“assets”) of Reliance, of whatever nature and
wherever located, whether held directly or indirectly, as of the date of the filing of
the Petition for Liquidation.
Additionally, paragraph 20 of the liquidation order granted the liquidator “the discretion to pay
as costs and expenses of administration . . . the actual, reasonable and necessary costs of
preserving or recovering assets of Reliance.” And in paragraph 21, the Pennsylvania court
enjoined plaintiff, its affiliates, employees, or attorneys from “the institution or further
prosecution of any action in law or equity on behalf of or against Reliance.”
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff’s
request for a stay and dismissing plaintiff’s claim without prejudice on the ground that “the
Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the correct party at interest.”
Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that the insurance commissioner
granted Cambridge Integrated Services (Cambridge) the authority to pursue outstanding claims
on behalf of Reliance. Plaintiff therefore requested that the trial court allow it to amend its
pleadings and list Cambridge as the actual party in interest. The trial court denied the motion
and the instant appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court (1) should have granted its motion for
summary disposition on the worker’s compensation claim, (2) should have dismissed defendant’s
legally insufficient counterclaims, and (3) erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim and failing to
grant its motion for reconsideration. Because resolution of the third issue renders plaintiff’s
remaining claims moot, we limit our review to the jurisdictional issue.
The determination as to whether a party has standing is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo. Nat'l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471 Mich 608, 612; 684
NW2d 800 (2004). A trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 82; 669 NW2d 862 (2003).
Such abuse “involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion.” Dep’t of Transportation v
Randolph, 461 Mich 757, 768; 610 NW2d 893 (2000). Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs
-2-
only when the result is “so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not
the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not
the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.” Spaulding v Spaulding, 355 Mich 382, 384385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).
In Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 42-43; 490 NW2d 568 (1992), our Supreme Court stated:
One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private rights,
or maintain a civil action for the enforcement of such rights, unless one has in an
individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a
legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
This interest is generally spoken of as “standing.” [quoting 59 Am Jur 2d, Parties,
§ 30, p 414).]
Further, a court may sua sponte consider the issue of standing at any time during the
proceedings. 46th Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co, 266 Mich App 150, 178; 702 NW2d 588
(2005).
Whether plaintiff has standing to bring its claim depends upon the liquidation order
issued by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution states that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." US Const, art IV, § 1. The
purpose of this clause "is to prevent the litigation of issues in one state that have already been
decided in another." LME v ARS, 261 Mich App 273, 285; 680 NW2d 902 (2004). Michigan
courts are therefore “obligated to enforce the orders of other states' courts.” Jones v State Farm
Ins Co, 202 Mich App 393, 406; 509 NW2d 829 (1993), mod on other grounds Patterson v
Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 433 n 3, 434 n 6; 526 NW2d 879 (1994).
In the instant case, the liquidation order appointed the insurance commissioner of
Pennsylvania to serve as Reliance’s liquidator and take possession of the company’s property,
business, and affairs. Further, it gave the liquidator title to all of the company’s assets, including
rights of action, and granted her the authority to spend funds to “preserve or recover” such assets.
The liquidation order also enjoined plaintiff, its affiliates, employees, or attorneys from “the
institution or further prosecution of any action in law or equity on behalf of or against Reliance.”
Based on the Commonwealth Court’s order, only the commissioner or her agents have standing
to file suit seeking to recover funds belonging to Reliance. And under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the trial court was required to enforce the liquidation order.
Plaintiff filed its complaint in the name of Reliance Insurance Company and gave no
indication that it was acting under the authority of the insurance commissioner of Pennsylvania.
Moreover, at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to stay the proceedings, the trial court stated that
to its knowledge plaintiff did not file its complaint on instructions from the liquidator. It then
asked plaintiff’s attorney if she was aware of any discussions before the filing of the lawsuit
regarding plaintiff’s authority to file suit in Calhoun Circuit Court. She responded that to her
knowledge no discussion of the liquidation order or plaintiff’s authority occurred before the
filing of the complaint. Based on the information available to it at the time, the trial court did not
err in finding that plaintiff lacked standing. Consequently, the order dismissing plaintiff’s
-3-
complaint without prejudice correctly held that the insurance commissioner of the Pennsylvania
constituted the correct party at interest.
Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. Under MCR 2.119(F)(3), the party requesting reconsideration must establish
that the trial court made a palpable error and that a different disposition would result from
correction of the error. Herald Co, supra, 82. Here, the trial court did not err when making its
initial finding that plaintiff lacked standing because plaintiff was unable to establish that it had
the authority to act on behalf of the insurance commissioner of Pennsylvania.
Furthermore, in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiff asserted that Cambridge had been
granted such authority and requested that it be allowed to amend the complaint and substitute
Cambridge as the plaintiff. As the trial court noted, it dismissed the complaint without prejudice
and there was nothing to prevent the claim from being refiled by the proper party in interest.
Although the trial court could reasonably have granted plaintiff’s motion, its denial of the request
was not “grossly violative of fact and logic.” Consequently, we find that no abuse of discretion
occurred and affirm the trial court’s decision.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.