QUAL-PROP LLC V CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
QUAL-PROP, LLC,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORP,
No. 263029
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-425449-CH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary disposition. We reverse and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
This appeal concerns a dispute over a mortgage interest, ostensibly obtained by each
party through two separate chains of title, in property located at 5050 Dickerson in Detroit.
Rather than apply Michigan’s race/notice statutes, MCL 565.25 and MCL 565.29, to resolve the
dispute, the trial court granted plaintiff Qual-Prop, LLC’s motion for summary disposition after
concluding that an assignment of mortgage by Chase Manhattan Bank to plaintiff’s predecessor
in interest also served to assign defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation’s separate
mortgage interest.
Defendant first asserts that plaintiff received no interest in the property. Specifically,
defendant argues that before the parties’ common predecessor in title, Detroit Revitalization,
Inc., quit-claimed its interest to plaintiff’s predecessor, it had already conveyed its interest to
Mortgage Corporation of America (MCA), from which chain of title defendant ultimately
received its mortgage interest. We agree.
Initially, we acknowledge that because the trial court did not apply the race/notice
statutes but instead entered summary disposition in favor of plaintiff based on equity, this issue is
unpreserved for review. Regardless, we review this issue because it involves the application of
law, i.e., the race/notice statutes, to undisputed facts, i.e., the deeds and assignments attached to
plaintiff’s complaint. Steward v Panek, 251 Mich App 546, 554; 652 NW2d 232 (2002).
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). Furthermore, a trial court’s
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decision regarding an action to quiet title, which is an equitable action, is reviewed de novo, as is
its decision regarding the applicability of a statute, which is a question of law. Fowler v Doan,
261 Mich App 595, 598; 683 NW2d 682 (2004). Summary disposition was appropriately
granted if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(5); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
As noted by this Court in Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Personal Residence Trust
v Emmet Co Rd Comm, 236 Mich App 546, 550; 600 NW2d 698 (1999):
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and must
make out a prima facie case of title. If the plaintiffs make out a prima facie case,
the defendants then have the burden of proving superior right or title in
themselves. [Citations omitted.]
Within its complaint, plaintiff alleged a series of property interest transfers to
demonstrate its right to the mortgage interest in question, and appropriately attached copies of
the referenced deeds and assignments. In Michigan, pursuant to MCL 565.29 and MCL 565.25,
the priority of property interests generally depends on the order in which those interests are
recorded. Specifically, MCL 565.29 provides in relevant part:
Every conveyance of real estate within the state hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this chapter, shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same
real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
The fact that such first recorded conveyance is in the form or contains the terms
of a deed of quit-claim and release shall not affect the question of good faith of
such subsequent purchaser, or be of itself notice to him of any unrecorded
conveyance of the same real estate or any part thereof. [Emphasis added.]
A mortgage is a conveyance within the meaning of the recording acts. MCL 565.35; Stover v
Bryant & Detwiler Improvement Corp of Detroit, 329 Mich 482, 484; 45 NW2d 364 (1951).
Furthermore, recorded liens, rights, and interests in property take priority over subsequent
owners and encumbrances. MCL 565.25(4).
As evidenced by the deeds and assignments attached to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant
received its mortgage interest in the property from an assignment executed by Prism Mortgage
Company on October 18, 1999, which defendant recorded on August 22, 2001. Plaintiff
received its interest in the property from a conveyance by Chayne Holding Group, LLC,
executed by quit-claim deed on March 8, 2004, and recorded on March 17, 2004.
Interestingly, the parties share a predecessor in title, Detroit Revitalization, Inc., which
attempted to convey its interest in the property on two separate occasions: First, Detroit
Revitalization executed a quit-claim deed on November 18, 1997, to MCA, which recorded the
deed on August 19, 1998. Defendant ultimately received its mortgage interest through this chain
of title. Second, Detroit Revitalization executed another quit-claim deed on June 24, 1999, to
39119, LLC, which recorded the deed on December 23, 1999. Plaintiff ultimately claims an
interest through this chain of title.
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Pursuant to MCL 565.3, the execution of a quit-claim deed conveys all the interests in a
property the grantor can lawfully convey. Because defendant’s predecessor in title, MCA,
recorded its deed on August 19, 1998, approximately ten months before Detroit Revitalization
attempted to convey its interest in the property a second time, MCA obtained title to the property
and, consequently, the second quit-claim deed executed by Detroit Revitalization is void because
the corporation had no remaining interest in the property to convey. Therefore, plaintiff obtained
no interest in the property from this second chain of title.
We likewise agree with defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred in concluding that,
for the purposes of Chase Manhattan Bank’s attempted conveyance and assignment of interest in
the property, the bank and defendant were the same.
Michigan recognizes the separateness of related corporate entities “unless doing so would
subvert justice or cause a result that would be contrary to some other clearly overriding public
policy.” Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 650; 364 NW2d 670 (1984). In
the present case, the trial court granted plaintiff summary disposition after concluding that there
was only one mortgage on the property and, therefore, “Chase Manhattan Bank for purposes of
this transaction [the bank’s June 5, 2001 conveyance and assignment of interest in the property]
was the same as Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company.” However, the trial court’s conclusion
focused simply on whether more than one mortgage existed against the property and it ignored
both the separate chains of title from which each party claims its interest and the bank’s specific
role in the transaction as a “warehouse bank” as noted in a May 14, 2001 bankruptcy order
attached to plaintiff’s complaint. With this order in mind, the bank’s June 5, 2001 conveyance
via quit-claim deed and assignment of mortgage interests on behalf of itself and as agent for
39119, LLC, evidences the bank’s distinct role regarding the property, which was separate from
the mortgage interest obtained by defendant from Prism Mortgage Company. Furthermore,
plaintiff made no allegation that the corporate forms of the bank and defendant were created to
subvert justice. Therefore, the trial court erred by simply concluding that the two entities were
the same for purposes of the bank’s conveyance and assignment of interests.
We reject plaintiff’s argument that Chase Manhattan Bank was acting as defendant’s
ostensible/apparent agent during the June 5, 2001 conveyance and assignment. As noted by this
Court in Chapa v St Mary’s Hospital of Saginaw, 192 Mich App 29, 33-34; 480 NW2d 590
(1991):
[T]he following three elements . . . are necessary to establish the creation
of an ostensible agency: (1) the person dealing with the agent must do so with
belief in the agent’s authority and this belief must be a reasonable one, (2) the
belief must be generated by some act or neglect on the part of the principal sought
to be charged, and (3) the person relying on the agent’s authority must not be
guilty of negligence. [Citations omitted.]
In the present case, we find no merit to plaintiff’s argument that its belief that the bank
was defendant’s agent was reasonable because “the names appeared to be the same and
[plaintiff] was never informed that the two agencies were in fact different.” The bank’s
corporate name is Chase Manhattan Bank while defendant’s corporate name is Chase Manhattan
Mortgage Company. The two entities’ names do not “appear to be the same.” Indeed, their
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differences should have informed plaintiff that the two corporations, although related, are
separate.
Moreover, plaintiff’s belief must be based on an “act or neglect” by defendant, yet
plaintiff submits no evidence that defendant did anything to confuse or otherwise create
plaintiff’s belief that the bank was acting as defendant’s agent. Defendant simply recorded a
mortgage interest it was assigned by Prism Mortgage Company. In fact, plaintiff offers no
evidence that defendant even knew about the bank’s June 2001 execution of a quit-claim deed
and assignment of mortgage and, without such knowledge, defendant would have no reason to
specifically inform plaintiff that the bank was not its agent.
Finally, for similar reasons, plaintiff’s belief was based on its own negligence in failing to
properly investigate the property’s chain of title. The names of defendant and Chase Manhattan
Bank, while similar, are not the same and the chain of title clearly shows that plaintiff’s
predecessor in title, Detroit Revitalization, had already conveyed any interest it held in the
property to defendant’s predecessor in interest. Therefore, plaintiff had notice of defendant’s
interest and of a possible defect in its own title yet apparently made no further inquiries. Instead
plaintiff merely assumed that Chase Manhattan Bank and Chase Manhattan Mortgage
Corporation were one and the same. Thus, plaintiff’s belief was not reasonable, and plaintiff has
failed to prove the existence of an ostensible agency between Chase Manhattan Bank and
defendant. The trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was incorrect.
Furthermore, because defendant holds a superior mortgage interest in the property and
because plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence that Chase Manhattan Bank was acting as
defendant’s agent when it attempted to convey and assign interests in the property on behalf of
39119, LLC, defendant is entitled to summary disposition because no genuine issue of material
fact remains and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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