WILLIAM ALLEN SIMPSON V WASHTENAW COUNTY CLERK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM ALLEN SIMPSON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 262724
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-001356-NZ
WASHTENAW COUNTY CLERK and
WASHTENAW COUNTY ELECTION
ADMINISTRATOR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Neff and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq.,
plaintiff, acting in propria persona, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
In a letter served at the office of the Washtenaw County Clerk on August 16, 2004,
plaintiff requested certain materials and information referenced by former Washtenaw County
Election Administrator Melanie Weidmayer in an affidavit provided by Weidmayer in a separate
suit regarding a failed attempt to institute proceedings to recall several elected Ypsilanti
Township officials. Specifically, plaintiff requested that he be provided the opportunity to
examine and selectively copy the qualified voter and master card files referenced by Weidmayer
in her affidavit, as well as “all annotations made during recall petition evaluation, in electronic
form.”1 Plaintiff also requested the software associated with the electronic qualified voter file, as
well as any related instructional or descriptive documentation.
1
The “qualified voter file” is an interactive electronic database that catalogs and allows voter
registration information to be shared between local jurisdictions and the Department of State,
which created and maintains the database pursuant to statute. See MCL 168.509o. The “master
card file” contains the signature of each registered voter in a jurisdiction. See MCL 168.501.
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On August 18, 2004, Judy Kramer, the Washtenaw County FOIA Coordinator, informed
plaintiff that she was unilaterally extending the statutory five-day period for response to a FOIA
request by an additional ten business days, and that his request would be “granted, denied, or
granted in part and denied in part by September 7, 2004.” Kramer thereafter, in a letter dated
September 1, 2004, but which the parties agree was not mailed until the following day, granted
plaintiff’s request in part.
Citing MCL 15.232, which expressly exempts “software” from the definition of a public
record for purposes of the FOIA, Kramer denied plaintiff’s request to inspect or copy the
software associated with the electronic qualified voter file. Kramer also denied plaintiff’s
request for “all annotations made during recall petition evaluation, in electronic form,” indicating
that “no such records exist.” In all other respects, Kramer granted plaintiff’s requests and quoted
the fees to obtain that information, including $5.00 per CD-R copy and $.20 per page, should he
choose to pursue his request further. Kramer concluded her letter by informing plaintiff of his
statutory right to either appeal her decisions to the county administrator or seek judicial review
of her FOIA compliance through an action in the circuit court. See MCL 15.240(1). Without
response to Kramer, plaintiff chose to pursue the latter of these options and on December 29,
2004 filed the instant suit alleging that defendants had improperly failed to respond and produce
the records requested by him, and sought to impose fees that “greatly exceed[ed]” the actual
incremental cost of complying with his request.
In lieu of answering the complaint, defendants moved for summary disposition. Relying
on documentary evidence, including plaintiff’s written FOIA request as well as Kramer’s
extension notice and ultimate response, defendants asserted that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether plaintiff had received a response that was both timely and
appropriate under the requirements of the FOIA. In response, plaintiff submitted a self-attested
affidavit in which he declared himself to be an expert in the field of “computers” and recall
elections, who had “designed and implemented a petition analysis program used . . . in multiple
states and many causes.” Plaintiff further indicated that, on the basis of his experience, he did
not believe that Weidmayer could have verified the recall petition signatures without “a voter
file, with annotations particular to each voter that had been successfully identified during the
analysis.”
After reviewing the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court found
that defendants had, “as a matter of law,” complied with plaintiff’s request to the extent required
by the FOIA. Finding further that the fees challenged by plaintiff were not excessive, the trial
court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10). On appeal,
plaintiff challenges the trial court’s ruling in this regard on a number of grounds.
II. Analysis
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Glancy v
City of Roseville, 457 Mich 580, 583; 577 NW2d 897 (1998). In doing so, however, we limit our
review to the evidence presented to the trial court at the time the motion was decided. Peña v
Ingham Co Road Comm, 255 Mich App 299, 313 n 4; 660 NW2d 351 (2003). A motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim. Corley v
Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). A trial court may grant summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
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the nonmoving party, it determines that no genuine issue concerning a material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Coblentz v City of Novi, 264 Mich
App 450, 452-453; 691 NW2d 22 (2004). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds could differ.” West v GMC, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).
Plaintiff first argues that because the documentary evidence clearly indicates that Kramer
failed to provide a reason for extending the period of response to his request, the trial court erred
in finding that defendants had complied with his request to the extent required by the FOIA.
Although we agree that Kramer’s failure in this regard precludes a finding of full compliance
with the requirements of the FOIA, we do not find such noncompliance sufficient to preclude
summary disposition.
MCL 15.235(2) requires that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed to in writing by the person
making the request,” a public body must respond to a FOIA request within five business days of
receiving the request. Pursuant to MCL 15.235(2)(d), however, a public body may unilaterally
extend the period of response by an additional ten business days by issuing notice of such
extension to the requesting party. Plaintiff is correct, however, that MCL 15.235(6) requires that
any such notice also “specify the reasons for the extension and the date by which the public
body” will either grant or deny the request in whole or part.2 Relying on Kramer’s failure to so
explain the basis for extending the period for a response to his request, plaintiff asserts that
Kramer’s unilateral extension of the time period for response was invalid, thereby rendering her
response untimely and, in effect, a complete denial of his request. See MCL 15.235(3)
(providing that the “[f]ailure to respond to a request pursuant to [MCL 15.235](2) constitutes a
public body’s final determination to deny the request”); see also Scharret v City of Berkley, 249
Mich App 405, 412; 642 NW2d 685 (2002) (failure to timely respond to a FOIA request
constitutes a final determination to deny the request). Thus, plaintiff argues, he was entitled to
file and maintain the instant action in order to recover actual and punitive damages. We do not
agree.
Plaintiff’s argument ignores the nature of the right of action provided for under the FOIA,
which is to compel disclosure of records improperly withheld by a public body, see MCL
15.240(1),3 as well as the reality that Kramer in fact responded to his request within the
extension period she sought to assert. Although Kramer’s failure to provide a reason for
unilaterally extending the period of response rendered her substantive response untimely, she did
nonetheless respond and in doing so indicated that plaintiff could obtain the bulk of the requested
2
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, a public body seeking to extend the time for response to a
FOIA request under MCL 15.235(2)(d) is not limited to the “unusual circumstances” necessary
to unilaterally extend the statutorily prescribed ten-day period of response for an appeal to the
head of a public body from the denial of a request in whole or part. See MCL 15.232(g) and
15.240(2)(d).
3
MCL 15.240(1)(b) provides that where “a public body makes a final determination to deny all
or part of a request,” the requesting party may “[c]ommence an action in the circuit court to
compel the public body’s disclosure of the public records . . . .”
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information after paying a portion of the estimated fees. While Kramer also denied a portion of
plaintiff’s request, her failure to state a reason for the extension was not material to the
dispositive legal question at issue in a suit to compel disclosure under the FOIA, i.e., the
propriety of the public body’s denial of the request. Consequently, under the circumstances
presented here, the mere fact that Kramer failed to state a reason for the extension did not
preclude summary disposition in favor of defendants.4 See Auto Club Ins Ass’n v State
Automobile Mut Ins Co, 258 Mich App 328, 333; 671 NW2d 132 (2003) (to preclude summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a disputed factual issue “must be material to the
dispositive legal claim”).
Indeed, consistent with this reasoning this Court has held that punitive damages, fees, and
other costs associated with a FOIA action are not appropriate merely because there were
violations of the FOIA. Scharret, supra at 414-416; Bredemeier v Kentwood Bd of Ed, 95 Mich
App 767, 773; 291 NW2d 199 (1980). Rather, for any such award to be proper, the violation at
issue must have rendered the plaintiff’s lawsuit reasonably necessary to compel disclosure.
Scharret, supra; Bredemeier, supra. Because the mere fact that Kramer failed to provide a
reason for extending the period of response is not itself sufficient to compel disclosure, plaintiff
was not entitled to maintain an action for damages solely on the basis of that violation.
Consequently, the mere fact that Kramer failed to state a reason for the extension did not
preclude summary disposition in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff also argues that summary disposition in favor of defendants was improperly
granted because they failed to meet their burden of justifying the denial of his requests for the
software associated with the electronic qualified voter file and “all annotations made during
recall petition evaluation, in electronic form.” Although we find no error in the grant of
summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s request for “software,” we agree that summary
disposition of plaintiff’s claim concerning recall petition evaluation annotations was premature.
Under the FOIA, a public body must disclose all public records that are not specifically
exempt under the act. MCL 15.233(1); Scharret, supra at 411. Any denial of such a request
must be contained in a writing setting forth the reason for the denial, including an explanation of
the basis for any claimed exemption from disclosure. MCL 15.235(4)(a); Federated
Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 102; 649 NW2d 383 (2002). Where the basis
for denial is that the public record requested does not exist, the public body must also provide the
requesting party with “[a] certificate that the public record does not exist under the name given
by the requester or by another name reasonably known to the public body.” MCL 15.235(4)(b).
The public body denying the request for a public record, as defined in the FOIA, has the burden
to justify its denial. MCL 15.240(4); Thomas v New Baltimore, 254 Mich App 196, 203; 657
NW2d 530 (2002).
4
Moreover, because no further factual development could alter this fact, summary disposition
prior to the completion of discovery was not premature. See Trentadue v Buckler Automatic
Lawn Sprinkler Co, 266 Mich App 297, 306; 701 NW2d 756 (2005).
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The term “public record” is defined in MCL 15.232(e) as “a writing prepared, owned,
used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the performance of an official function,
from the time it is created. Public record does not include computer software.” (Emphasis
added). As previously noted, Kramer relied on this exclusion of “software” from the definition
of a “public record” to deny plaintiff’s request for the software associated with the electronic
qualified voter file and, in doing so, specifically cited MCL 15.232 as the basis for denying
disclosure of that information. Plaintiff fails to provide any authority to support his claim that
Kramer’s response in this regard was insufficient to meet her burden of explaining or otherwise
justifying the denial, and we find to the contrary that such explanation was sufficient for that
purpose. Indeed, in requiring that a public body inform a requester of the basis for its denial, the
FOIA requires only “[a]n explanation of the basis under this act or other statute for the
determination that the public record, or portion of that public record, is exempt from disclosure.”
MCL 15.235(4)(a). Kramer’s citation of the statutory provision excluding software from the
definition of a public record subject to disclosure under the FOIA was sufficient for that purpose.
Moreover, while plaintiff is correct that the term “‘[s]oftware’ does not include computer-stored
information or data, or a field name” see MCL 15.232(f), we note that Kramer acknowledged
this fact by granting his request “to the extent that [his] request was for computer data or field
names.”
However, with regard to plaintiff’s claim that summary disposition was improper because
Kramer failed to include with her response a certificate that the electronic annotations requested
by plaintiff do not exist, MCL 15.235(4)(b), we find that although such failure is itself
insufficient to create a question of material fact regarding the propriety of defendants’ denial of
the request, Auto Club, supra, summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim in this regard was,
nonetheless, improper. As plaintiff correctly notes, a motion for summary disposition is
generally premature if discovery on a disputed issue has not been completed, unless “further
discovery does not stand a reasonable chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing
party’s position.” Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 266 Mich App 297, 306;
701 NW2d 756 (2005). Here, in opposing summary disposition plaintiff submitted an affidavit
in which he attested that, based on his professional experience as a programmer of electionrelated software, he believed it would be impossible for Weidmayer to have reviewed the
validity of each petition signature without having created an electronic annotation file. When
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, his affidavit, against which defendants offered no
contrary evidence, was sufficient to raise a question of material fact warranting additional
discovery regarding the existence of the annotations sought by plaintiff. Consequently, there
being no basis to conclude that such discovery “does not stand a reasonable chance of
uncovering support for [plaintiff’s] position,” summary disposition on that issue was premature.
Id.; Coblentz, supra.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on the
ground that the fees quoted by Kramer to obtain the requested information were not excessive.
We agree.
The trial court’s decision regarding the appropriateness of the fees charged in connection
with a request under the FOIA constitutes a finding of fact that we review for clear error. See,
generally, Tallman v Cheboygan Area Schools, 183 Mich App 123; 454 NW2d 171 (1990). A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous where there is no evidence to support the finding, or the
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reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id. at 126.
MCL 15.234(1) provides that “[a] public body may charge a fee for a public record
search, the necessary copying of a public record for inspection, or for providing a copy of the
public record.” Such search and copying fees must, however, be limited to “actual mailing costs,
and to the actual incremental costs of duplication or publication including labor, the cost of
search, examination, review, and the deletion and separation of exempt from nonexempt
information as provided in [MCL 15.244].” Id. In addressing the significance of the limitations
set forth in MCL 15.234, this Court, in Tallman, supra at 130-131, stated:
The FOIA clearly provides a method for determining the charge for records. It is
incumbent on a public body, if it chooses to exercise its legislatively granted right
to charge a fee for providing a copy of a public record, to comply with the
legislative directive on how to charge. The statute contemplates only a
reimbursement to the public body for the cost incurred in honoring a given
request – nothing more, nothing less. If the statutorily computed charge is $1 per
page for the request, then $1 per page may be charged. However, if the computed
charge is $0.09 per page, no more can be charged, regardless of the ease of
application of a “policy” or the difficulty in determining the legislatively
mandated computation.
Here, defendants presented no evidence regarding the basis for the quoted fees and, in
fact, failed to even address plaintiff’s challenge in this regard in seeking summary disposition.
As a result, the record is devoid of any evidence from which to conclude that defendants
complied with the requirements of MCL 15.234 in charging the fees at issue. Although the fees
quoted by Kramer may seem reasonable on their face, reasonableness is not the test for
compliance with the express statutory requirements concerning the fees that may be charged by a
public body in compiling and producing public records requested under the FOIA. Tallman,
supra.
Because there is no evidence from which to reach such conclusion, the trial court clearly
erred in finding the fees not to be excessive. Id. at 126. Consequently, we reverse the trial
court’s finding in this regard and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reverse in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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