PEOPLE OF MI V MARK T CRAIGHEAD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 22, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243856
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-007900-01
MARK T. CRAIGHEAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Saad and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for manslaughter, MCL 750.321,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
sentenced to 40 months to 15 years in prison for the manslaughter conviction and two years in
prison for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
This case arises out of the shooting death of Chole Pruett on or about June 27, 1997. Mr.
Pruett was found shot four times in his own apartment, and the evidence suggested that at least
one of the bullets was shot while the shooter stood over him. There was no sign of forced entry,
and the killer did not disturb much of the apartment. The killer went through a few of the
victim’s dresser drawers, but did not take the victim’s jewelry. Mr. Pruett had recently received
a sizeable cash settlement about which only a select few of his friends knew. Mr. Pruett spent
much of his time with defendant, who was his best friend and one of only a few male friends. A
police interview suggested that defendant and Pruett had discussed selling drugs together, and in
the bedroom near the victim’s body, police found several shoe boxes left open on the bed and
two boxes of live ammunition. The ammunition was of two different calibers, .38 and .30,
neither of which matched the caliber of spent .44 cartridges and bullets retrieved from the
apartment.
Early in the morning on June 27, 1997, police and firefighters had responded to a report
of a burning truck in Redford, roughly 4 ½ miles from defendant’s house. The truck belonged to
Pruett. It had been doused with an accelerant and set ablaze. Inside the truck, investigators
found a .38 caliber handgun.
Witnesses placed Pruett with defendant on June 25, 1997, and defendant himself admitted
that he had drinks with Pruett at a restaurant, although he said he could not remember whether it
was on the 25th or 26th of June. Pruett’s girlfriend also reported to police that she saw Pruett in
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the mall with a friend on June 26, 1997. Nevertheless, police questioned defendant in late
August of 1997, and in March of 1999, and did not make an arrest.
On June 20, 2000, two police officers, a detective and his superior officer, arrived at
defendant’s home. The detective was newly assigned to lead the investigation. They waited on
defendant’s front porch for him to return, and then asked him to accompany them to
headquarters. Defendant initially requested that they postpone the interview until the next day,
but he complied after the new detective insisted that he needed to do the interview that day.
Defendant was not handcuffed, and the officers told his brother that they could follow them to
headquarters. The trial court found that during an initial, casual interrogation of defendant at
headquarters, the detective discovered inconsistencies between defendant’s responses at
headquarters and other statements provided to police. The trial court found that the detective
read defendant his Miranda1 rights, and told him he could not leave. The detective then turned
the case over to an interrogation specialist within the squad, who accompanied defendant to a
polygraph examination held between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on June 21, 2000, roughly eight
hours after the officers brought defendant to headquarters. Following the examination, defendant
was taken to a cell where he spent the night.
In a written statement at 11:00 a.m. on June 21, 2000, defendant admitted shooting and
killing Pruett after wrestling a gun away from him. Defendant also admitted driving Pruett’s
truck home and then driving it somewhere and setting it on fire. Defendant signed the statement
and repeatedly initialed a list of rights, acknowledging that he understood each of them and
voluntarily waived them all. He also signed beside each response in a list of acknowledgements
that he offered his statement without being threatened, promised anything, or deprived of
anything. Finally, he signed beside his acknowledgement that the statement was true.
On appeal, defendant argues that his federal and state constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when he was arrested without a warrant or a
showing of probable cause, and that his June 21, 2000, statement to the police obtained as a
result of the illegal arrest should have been suppressed. We disagree. When considering a trial
court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the trial court’s factual findings for
clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 209; 600 NW2d 634 (1999).
Defendant contends that he was arrested when police accompanied him from his house to
headquarters. He also argues that police did not have probable cause to arrest him until after he
made his statement, and that they were only acting on speculation and their subjective belief that
he was the perpetrator. We disagree. Defendant’s arguments essentially challenge two separate
factual findings made by the trial court following defendant’s Walker2 hearing. First, the trial
court found that the lead detective did not arrest defendant until after defendant generally
discussed the case with him and provided him with conflicting, evasive, and deceptive responses,
which provided the lead detective with probable cause. Second, the trial court found that the
incriminating statement did not flow directly from an illegal arrest, but was provided voluntarily.
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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Regarding the timing of defendant’s arrest, defendant willingly accompanied the officers
to headquarters without handcuffs or physical restraint. Defendant had voluntarily provided two
other statements to police before. At headquarters, defendant told the detective that he was not
involved in anything with Pruett, but vaguely alluded to the fact that they went to the apartment
for some purpose. Defendant also stated that he was not concerned when he heard about Pruett’s
death even though he and Pruett were best friends. The detective also noted inconsistencies with
defendant’s statement and the time other witnesses placed defendant with Pruett, but the
detective did not articulate these inconsistencies at the Walker hearing. Nevertheless, the trial
court found that defendant was not under arrest when he willingly accompanied the detective to
headquarters and was not put under arrest until after he made inconsistent statements that,
together with the other evidence, reasonably indicated his probable role as the shooter. Although
defendant contradicted the detectives’ testimony, the trial court found that defendant’s testimony
at the Walker hearing was not credible and that the detective’s testimony was. We defer to the
trial court’s credibility assessment, and the trial court’s findings are not otherwise clearly
erroneous. Farrow, supra.
Regarding the validity of defendant’s confession, the trial court found that defendant’s
confession was not tainted by illegal arrest, so the test was whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 633; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). The trial court found that defendant was not deprived of anything or promised anything
and that he knowingly waived his right to remain silent and have an attorney present.
Defendant’s signature on his confession and his waiver of rights supports the trial court’s
findings. Also, the lead detective and the interrogation detective testified that defendant
answered their questions without any coercive action on their part. Defendant was an articulate
adult who willingly responded to police questions and took a polygraph examination on the night
of his arrest. He provided his self-serving confession the following morning after one night in
jail. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 629.
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to call an expert witness
to testify regarding the phenomenon of false confessions. We disagree. Because no Ginther3
hearing was held, we limit our review to the facts contained in the record. People v Thomas, 260
Mich App 450, 456; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the
defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640
NW2d 246 (2002). “Defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was sound trial strategy.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396; 688 NW2d 308
(2004). Defense counsel’s decision not to call an expert witness is presumed to be trial strategy,
and we will not reverse on the basis that counsel failed to call a witness unless the failure
deprived defendant of a substantial defense. Id. at 398. Here, defendant assumes that expert
testimony, under the circumstances of this case, would have bolstered his defense, but defendant
did not present any favorable expert testimony to the trial court so we could review its efficacy.
Moreover, defense counsel did not need expert testimony to advance, rather persuasively, the
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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theory that defendant’s confession was coerced, so the lack of expert testimony did not deprive
defendant of a defense in this case. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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