IN RE DUNKLIN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ANGELICA DENISHIA
DUNKLIN and CLEVLAND DUNKLIN IV,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2005
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 260873
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 83-236110
v
SHEILA DENISE TREADWELL,
Respondent,
and
CLEVELAND DUNKLIN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Cleveland Dunklin appeals as of right from the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). We
affirm.
I. Parental Fitness
Dunklin’s parental fitness is measured by statutory standards.1 “Once the petitioner has
presented clear and convincing evidence that persuades the court that at least one ground for
1
In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 115; 92
NW2d 604 (1998), overruled on other grounds in In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426; 505 NW2d 834
(1993).
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termination is established under section 19b(3), the liberty interest of the parent no longer
includes the right to custody and control of the children.”2
Here, termination under § 19b(3)(g) was permitted at the initial dispositional hearing.3 It
was not necessary that Dunklin be provided a treatment plan because the goal for the children
was permanent placement.4 Although the reasonableness of any services provided to Dunklin
are nonetheless a relevant consideration, the ultimate question for the trial court was whether
§ 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence.5
Giving due deference to the trial court’s assessment of credibility, we conclude that the
trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing
evidence.6 The trial court reasonably concluded from the evidence that Dunklin was afforded an
opportunity to plan for the children, separate from the mother, and seek drug treatment.
Dunklin’s own testimony indicated that he did not take advantage of these opportunities. He
denied using cocaine and testified that it was his intent to raise the children with their mother. In
light of the clear and convincing evidence of Dunklin’s admitted use of crack cocaine, failure to
provide proper supervision for the children, and failure to protect the children from their mother,
who herself had an unresolved substance abuse problem and a history of leaving the children
without adequate supervision, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
respondent-appellant’s parental rights was warranted under § 19b(3)(g).
II. Termination Of Parental Rights
Termination of Dunklin’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(j) was also permitted at the
initial dispositional hearing7 and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that this statutory
ground was established by clear and convincing evidence.8 The children’s placement with their
paternal aunt did not constitute a return home under § 19b(3)(j). Regardless of where Dunklin
lived, the trial court could find that the children faced at least a reasonable likelihood of harm to
their mental well being, based on Dunklin’s conduct, if they were returned to his home.
Finally, we agree that the trial court could not properly apply § 19b(3)(i) to Dunklin,
because only the mother’s parental rights to other children were previously terminated. To the
extent that the record indicates that § 19b(3)(i) may have been applied to Dunklin, however, the
2
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
3
MCL 712A.19b(4); MCR 3.977(E)(3)(b).
4
See MCL 712A.18f(3)(d).
5
In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
6
MCR 3.977(J); In re JK, supra at 209-210; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161
(1989).
7
MCL 712A.19b(4); MCR 3.977(E)(3)(b).
8
MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, supra at 337.
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error was harmless because a statutory ground for termination was independently established
under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j).9
Because a statutory ground for termination was properly established, termination was
mandatory absent “clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best
interests.”10 Based on our review of the record, we are not persuaded that the trial court clearly
erred in assessing either child’s best interests.11
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
9
In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
10
In re Trejo, supra at 354; MCL 712A.19b(5).
11
Id. at 356-357.
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