PEOPLE OF MI V TYROSH TRENCELL BROWN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 257547
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 03-008877-FH
TYROSH TRENCELL BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Bandstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of resisting and obstructing
a police officer, MCL 750.81d. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to
eighteen months to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.
Two police officers arrived at defendant’s home in search of a suspect in an earlier
domestic violence complaint. Officers saw defendant at the residence but immediately
concluded that defendant was not the person for whom they were looking. When the officers
began to question defendant’s mother, defendant became belligerent and started screaming at his
mother and at the officers. The officers’ attempts to calm defendant proved futile, and because
defendant continued to scream and swear, the officers attempted to arrest defendant for his
disorderly behavior. In an attempt to avoid arrest, defendant fled into the home where a struggle
ensued with a third officer. The struggle continued into the basement where defendant fought
with four officers, but he was eventually handcuffed and taken into custody.
Defendant first contends that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to quash
the charge of resisting and obstructing a police officer. Defendant does not deny that he resisted
arrest. Rather, he argues that he had the right to resist because the arrest was unlawful.
Specifically, defendant argues that because he was arrested for a misdemeanor in his home, and
because the officers did not have a warrant for his arrest, the arrest was unlawful. Thus, he urges
this Court to find that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to quash because he had the
right to resist the unlawful arrest. We disagree.
We review de novo this question of law involving statutory interpretation. People v
Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 427; 703 NW2d 774 (2005).
-1-
Before its amendment by 2002 PA 270, the Penal Code prohibition against resisting
arrest, MCL 750.479, provided that the officer must have been performing “lawful acts.” People
v Ventura, 262 Mich App 370, 374; 686 NW2d 748 (2004). Thus, under the prior version of the
statute, a person could use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest. People v MacLeod, 254
Mich App 222, 226-227; 656 NW2d 844 (2002).
However, we have explicitly held that MCL 750.81d, enacted by 2002 PA 266,1 does not
require a showing that the arrest was lawful. Ventura, supra at 378. Therefore, a person may
not use force to resist an arrest made by one he knows or has reason to know is performing his
duties regardless of whether the arrest is illegal under the circumstances. Id. at 377 (emphasis
added). In Ventura, we recognized that mechanisms exist to correct any injustices that may
result from an illegal arrest and that assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer must be
avoided to protect the safety of those arrested and others. Id.
Defendant alleges that his arrest was unlawful because he was arrested for a
misdemeanor, in his home, without a warrant. In Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 576 (1980),
the United States Supreme Court held that absent exigent circumstances, the police may not
enter a defendant’s home without a warrant to make a routine felony arrest. Further, this Court
has held that the police may not enter a defendant’s home to effectuate a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest. People v Reinhardt, 141 Mich App 173, 178; 366 NW2d 245 (1985)
(finding that the Legislature did not authorize police officers to enter homes without permission
to effect warrantless misdemeanor arrests). However, in this case, the initial attempt to arrest
defendant was made outside the home and the police officers only entered the home because
defendant went there to elude them.
We find that the prosecution presented evidence that defendant resisted or obstructed a
person who defendant knew or had reason to know was performing his or her duties. Therefore,
the requirements of MCL 750.81d have been satisfied. Defendant’s argument that he had a right
to resist the arrest is without merit. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to quash.
In the alternative, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to
quash because he was entrapped into committing the crime of resisting and obstructing a police
officer by the police officers’ conduct. We disagree.
Entrapment is analyzed under a two-prong test. People v Connolly, 232 Mich App 425,
429; 591 NW2d 340 (1998). Entrapment is established where (1) the police engaged in
impermissible conduct that would induce an otherwise law-abiding person to commit a crime in
similar circumstances, or (2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that such conduct
cannot be tolerated. Id. We note that defendant raised the entrapment defense for the first time
on appeal. Therefore, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
1
2002 PA 266 took effect July 15, 2002, and was tied to the enactment of 2002 PA 270.
-2-
Defendant argues that the police entrapped him into committing the crime of resisting
and obstructing a police officer when they refused to leave the premises and threatened to arrest
him. Defendant argues that because the police had no basis for arresting him at that time, the
threat of arrest was merely used to induce him into committing the crime of resisting and
obstructing a police officer.
However, the police specifically told defendant that if he did not calm down, he would be
arrested for “disorderly creating,” not for resisting and obstructing a police officer. By
“disorderly creating” the officer apparently meant “disorderly conduct/creating a disturbance,”
which is punishable under a city ordinance. Grand Rapids Ordinance § 9.137 provides in
pertinent part:
No person shall:
(1) Create or engage in any disturbance, fight or quarrel in a public place.
(2) Create or engage in any disturbance, fight or quarrel that causes or
tends to cause a breach of the peace.
(3) Disturb the peace and quiet by loud or boisterous conduct.
In light of defendant’s actions, we find that there was a clear basis for the police to conclude that
defendant violated the city ordinance.
Moreover, the officers gave defendant two chances to calm down and warned him that he
would be arrested if he did not stop his yelling and belligerence. The officers’ conduct was
neither impermissible nor reprehensible. Therefore, we find that defendant was not entrapped
into committing the crime of resisting and obstructing a police officer.
Accordingly, we find that defendant failed to show the existence of any plain error, and
so, has forfeited his claim of entrapment.
Last, defendant argues that he was denied due process when he was physically removed
from the courtroom during voir dire. No person indicted for a felony shall be tried unless
personally present during the trial. MCL 768.3. A defendant must be physically present in the
courtroom to be “personally present” as required by MCL 768.3. People v Krueger, 466 Mich
50, 53-54; 643 NW2d 223 (2002). Thus, a defendant’s statutory right to be personally present
may be violated even when if a defendant is allowed to watch testimony on closed circuit
television, to take notes, and to confer with his attorney during breaks. Id. at 55.
Further, the defendant’s right to be present at trial is guaranteed not only by statute but
also by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. People v Gross, 118 Mich App
161, 164; 324 NW2d 557 (1982). Accordingly, a defendant has a right to be present during any
stage of trial where the defendant’s substantial rights might be adversely affected. People v
Parker, 230 Mich App 677, 689; 584 NW2d 753 (1998). Thus, a defendant has the right to be
present during voir dire. People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 247; 365 NW2d 673 (1984).
-3-
Even though a defendant has the right to be present at trial, he may waive both his
statutory and constitutional right to be present through improper and disruptive behavior in the
courtroom. Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 343; 90 S Ct 1057; 25 L Ed 2d 353 (1970). A trial
court’s decision to remove a defendant from the courtroom during the defendant’s trial is
reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. See People v Reginald Harris, 80 Mich App
228, 230; 263 NW2d 40 (1977).
In this case, we find that defendant waived his statutory and constitutional rights to be
present at trial. First, defendant had specific knowledge of the right because the judge explicitly
told him he had the right to be present in the courtroom. Second, he made an intentional
decision to waive that right when he disrupted the proceedings in an attempt to obtain new
counsel after the court clearly stated he was not entitled to such. He further waived his right
when, after being told he could return to the courtroom if he acted appropriately, he told the
judge that he refused to cooperate and indicated to the judge that he did not wish to return to the
courtroom.
Further, we will not presume that defendant was prejudiced merely because he was
absent from a portion of the trial. People v Morgan, 400 Mich 527, 535; 255 NW2d 603 (1977).
Rather, the burden is on the defendant to prove that he was prejudiced by his removal from the
courtroom. See Carines, supra at 763-764. In this case, defendant has not met that burden.
After defendant was placed in the holding cell, the judge made sure that the proceedings were
broadcast in the holding cell and explained to the jury that defendant could hear everything that
was said in the courtroom. Also, defendant’s attorney received permission from the court to
confer with defendant during voir dire, which she did before exercising one of defendant’s
peremptory challenges. Last, the court twice instructed the jury that they were not to consider
defendant’s absence as evidence in the case against him. Indeed, the court instructed the jurors
to decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial.
Thus, defendant failed to establish that his removal from the courtroom affected the
outcome of the trial. Therefore, we find that defendant failed to establish any error or prejudice
stemming from his removal from the courtroom during voir dire. Further, we note that defendant
voluntarily removed himself from the courtroom during the later stages of the trial. During the
presentation of defendant’s case, he explicitly requested he be returned to the holding cell. The
defendant remained in the holding cell, at his request, through the reading of the verdict.
Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not deprive
defendant of due process when it removed defendant from the courtroom during voir dire.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.