PEOPLE OF MI V RODNEY T MCLAURIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 255744
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-012281-FH
RODNEY T. McLAURIN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murray and Schuette, JJ.
SCHUETTE, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would deny defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea for failure to register a change of address as a convicted sex offender
pursuant to MCL 28.729(1)(a).
Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) in July of 1985,
receiving a prison sentence of two to five years, with credit for 117 days served. In 1987, while
still in prison, defendant committed an assault on a prison guard in violation of MCL 768.7a(1).
As a result, defendant was sentenced to a consecutive prison term of two to four years. In 1990,
while on parole for the CSC offense, defendant was convicted yet again for possession of
cocaine, in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v) and received another prison term of two and a
half to five years, to be served consecutively to the existing CSC offense. Defendant was
paroled for the CSC offense in 1994, but violated the terms of his parole and remained in prison
until September 1996.
MCL 28.725(1)(a) requires that registered sex offenders must provide a change of
address within ten days of a change in residence. It is unchallenged that defendant failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of providing a new address given his new place of
residence.
The precise issue presented to this Court is the application of MCL 28.723(3) which
establishes October 1, 1995 as the time frame for requiring a convicted sex offender to provide a
new address if residency is changed. MCL 28.723(3) states that the following individuals must
register under the act:
(a) An individual who is convicted of a listed offense after October 1, 1995.
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(b) An individual convicted of a listed offense on or before October 1, 1995 [1]
who on October 1, 1995 is on probation or parole, committed to jail, committed to
the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, or under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile division of the probate court or the department of social services for that
offense or who [2] is placed on probation or parole, committed to jail, committed
to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, or placed under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court or the department of
social services after October 1, 1995 for that offense. [numeration added.]
Without question, MCL 28.723.(3)(a) does not apply because here defendant was not
convicted for a CSC offense after October 1, 1995. However, in my opinion, MCL 28.723(3)(b)
does indeed apply to the facts and circumstances surrounding the incarceration of defendant who
was indeed convicted of a listed offense before October 1, 1995 and was committed to the
jurisdiction of the department of corrections consistent with the above mentioned statute.
In my opinion, MCL 28.723(3)(b) is comprised of two sections or clauses. MCL
28.723(3)(b) commences with the phrase, “An individual convicted of a listed offense on or
before October 1, 1995.” Then the first clause begins, “who on October 1, 1995 is on probation
or parole, committed to jail, committed to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, or
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court or the department of social
services for that offense.”
Subsequently, the second section or clause contains language referring to jail time, parole
or otherwise being committed to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections for offenses
committed after October 1, 1995. It is this second clause that the trial court incorrectly applied
and that is the focus of the majority’s ruling. However, the trial court’s analysis and the majority
opinion did not apply the first clause of MCL 28.723(3)(b) which plainly fits the circumstances
of this case.
The trial court agreed with defendant that while he was incarcerated on October 1, 1995,
the plain language of the MCL 28.723(b) requires that he was incarcerated for a sexual offence at
that time to be placed on the sex offender registry. “An individual convicted of a listed offense
on or before October 1, 1995 who on October 1, 1995 is on probation or parole, committed to
jail, committed to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections . . . for that offense.” MCL
28.723(3)(b) (emphasis added.)
The prosecutor argued that MCL 28.723(3)(b) should be read with MCL 791.234(3),
which states:
“If a prisoner is subject to disciplinary time is sentenced to consecutive terms . . .
at any time during the life of the original sentence, the parole board has
jurisdiction over the prisoner for purposes of parole when the prisoner has served
the total time of the added minimum terms, . . . . The maximum term of the
sentences shall be added to compute a new maximum term under this subsection
and discharge shall be issued only after the total of the maximum sentences has
been served . . . .” [emphasis added.]
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Reading the two statutes together, it appears that while the maximum term of the CSC offense
had passed, defendant had not been discharged from the jurisdiction of the DOC because of
subsequent offenses. Due to the fact that defendant had not been discharged, he remained under
the jurisdiction of the DOC for the CSC offense, and was properly registered as a sex offender.
For this reason, I would deny defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea for failure to
register a change of address as a convicted sex offender.
/s/ Bill Schuette
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