LISA MORELLI V YVONNE TUDOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LISA MORELLI, LAURA A. MORELLI, and
ANTHONY P. MORELLI,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2005
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 263814
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 03-054870-CH
YVONNE TUDOR,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
WALTER HAGEN and HARRY H. KEMNITZ,
Defendants.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Cooper and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from an opinion and order granting partial summary
disposition in favor of plaintiffs in this action to quiet title and for trespass damages. Because of
the operation of the doctrine of repose, we uphold the boundary line claimed by plaintiffs, and
affirm.
This property dispute stems from conflicting surveys and concerns the proper border
between residential parcels. In 1979, the Leaches owned all of the property at issue and
commissioned a parcel split of their land. A registered land surveyor, David C. Finney, surveyed
the land at issue and marked the parcel corners with iron rods and caps. Finney’s survey defined
the properties at issue and three other parcels to the north. The property now owned by
defendants was shown on Finney’s survey as an “exception” in the southeast corner of the larger
parcel. The Finney survey was recorded on August 7, 1979. Some nine years later, the Leaches
conveyed the “exception” parcel to the Stanleys by warranty deed. The deed was recorded on
August 31, 1988. After changing hands three more times by warranty deed, the “exception”
parcel was ultimately transferred to defendants by warranty deed recorded on September 15,
2000. All of the warranty deeds used Finney’s description of the property.
On November 7, 1988, the lot that is currently owned by plaintiffs was transferred by
warranty deed from the Leaches to the Paulls. This parcel of land was the lot from which the
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“exception” lot had originally represented the southeast corner. In anticipation of a lot split, the
Paulls commissioned a survey of their property in 1990. A registered land surveyor, Raymond
Kostecke, divided the parcel into two parcels, also using the Finney survey to define the property
boundaries. In 1999, apparently in accordance with the State Survey and Remonumentation
Act,1 MCL 54.264 et seq., Oakland County hired another surveyor, Grant J. Ward, to survey the
property. Ward established a new corner on the property and set a new corner monument
without referencing the Finney survey. Ward placed his new monument approximately thirty
feet north of the location marked by the pre-existing Finney corner irons. When plaintiff
purchased the property in 2002 there was a fence established on the line between plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ property as indicated by the Finney description.
Defendants approached plaintiffs about purchasing a thirty foot strip of plaintiffs’
property the length of defendants’ north property line. After plaintiffs declined to sell the
property, defendants hired a registered land surveyor, Harry H. Kemnitz, to perform a survey of
their land and establish their property dimensions. Kemnitz used Ward’s new section
monument, which placed defendants’ north property line thirty feet further north than Finney’s
northerly demarcation. Defendants removed the wire fence along the northern boundary of their
property and erected a new fence thirty feet to the north and marked new corners.
Plaintiffs consulted a surveyor, Boss Engineering, who reviewed the Kemnitz survey.
Boss Engineering realized that the Finney corner irons and the newly placed section corner
monument created a thirty foot discrepancy. Boss Engineering considered the Finney corner
irons as the description of the property. Plaintiffs thereafter commenced this action to quiet title
to the thirty foot strip of land at issue and also brought a damages claim for intentional trespass
against defendants. After applying the doctrine of repose, the trial court granted plaintiffs’
motion for partial summary disposition. The trial court then held a bench trial where it found
defendants liable to plaintiffs for damages in the amount of $500 for intentional trespass.2
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it granted partial summary
disposition in favor of plaintiffs because a question of fact clearly remains since two competing
surveys exist, and because the trial court erred when it applied the doctrine of repose.3 This
Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of
the complaint. Maiden, supra at 120. When deciding a motion brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10), we consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence
1
The parties have not argued, and we have not found that the statute in any way creates an
inference that the county sponsored survey supersedes previously established boundaries.
2
Neither party raises issues relating to the trespass claim on appeal.
3
Defendant also raises an argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief based on the doctrine
of acquiescence. Because the trial court did not grant relief to plaintiffs based on the doctrine of
acquiescence and in fact never considered it, and in light of our disposition on appeal, we decline
to address the argument.
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submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; MCR
2.116(G)(5). Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any
material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden, supra at 120.
The doctrine of repose provides that long established occupational lines and settled
boundaries are not to be disturbed by recent surveys. Adams v Hoover, 196 Mich App 646, 650;
493 NW2d 280 (1992). Further, public policy clearly favors consistency in ascertaining
boundary lines, especially where a multitude of boundaries have been established in reliance on
prior surveys and monuments. Id. at 651. This Court has previously affirmed a trial court’s
grant of title in favor of the plaintiff to a strip of land based on the doctrine of repose under a
similar factual scenario. Id. at 647-648, 655. Here, the boundary between the parties’ parcels
was established through a survey conducted in 1979 by David C. Finney. The survey was duly
recorded and subsequently relied on by later surveyors and property owners. Because the
boundary was based on a properly recorded survey, we conclude that the doctrine of repose
prevents defendant from using a subsequent survey to alter previously established boundary
lines. Thus by operation of law, no question of fact remains, and we hold that the trial court did
not err in granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs based on the doctrine of repose.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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