PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT LEE DYSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 256300
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 03-001012-FC
ROBERT LEE DYSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Zahra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; assault with
intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a;
four counts of possessing a firearm during a felony, MCL 750.227b; felonious assault, MCL
750.82; receiving and concealing stolen property, MCL 750.535(3)(a); fleeing a police officer—
4th degree, MCL 750.479a(2); assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1);
operating a motor vehicle without a license, MCL 257.904(3)(a); and felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f; for the robbery of a tobacco store in Kalamazoo. We vacate in part,
affirm in part, and remand for correction of the judgment of sentence.
Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of felonious assault, the four felonyfirearm counts and the felon in possession of a firearm count, and convicted of all other counts
charged. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to
concurrent terms of 375 months’ to 60 years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery, assault with
intent to rob while armed, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery convictions, two to five
years’ imprisonment for the receiving stolen property conviction, one to two years’
imprisonment for the fleeing and eluding and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer
conviction, and 93 days’ imprisonment for the operating without a valid license conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
Two men entered the store, forced the store clerk, Terry Dowdy, to lie on his stomach on
the floor, bound his hands, and robbed the store of cash and merchandise. Dowdy testified that
one of the men placed what he thought was a gun into the middle of his back and patted his back
pockets, looking for money, but his money was not taken because he keeps it in his front pocket.
Two women entered the store at different times during the robbery, and were taken to a back
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room and forced to lie down. One of the women was robbed of her money. The two men left
the store in a stolen GMC Jimmy, which was seen by a police officer shortly thereafter and
identified based upon a partial license plate number given to police by a man who had been in
the store’s parking lot, waiting for one of the women. Following a high-speed chase, the Jimmy
jumped the curb, and hit a telephone pole. Defendant got out and fled on foot, but police
apprehended him in the lobby of an apartment building shortly thereafter. Defendant was
transported to a hospital for treatment of a cut hand and a heroin overdose. Police collected his
clothing at the hospital, including “reddish-brownish” Timberland boots, and $472 was found in
his possession. Dowdy testified that one of the robbers wore “maroonish” Timberland boots, and
the storeowner testified that $470 was missing from the cash register, and Newport cigarettes and
Winchester cigars were also stolen. A “Newport” cardboard box was found inside the Jimmy,
and police later recovered other stolen merchandise at an old paper mill near where the police
officer first saw the Jimmy following the robbery and report of a stolen vehicle.
Defendant testified and admitted that he was the man driving the Jimmy and apprehended
by police that day. Defendant claimed that he was selling drugs that day, in part so that he could
buy heroin for his mother, who he characterized as a heroin addict. Defendant stated that he
“rented” the Jimmy from a guy named “Scanless,” and his cousin “Dude,” as part of a drug sale,
and that he obtained the boots from Scanless as well. Defendant explained that after he realized
that “they just played me for my dope,” he was driving to the drug house where Scanless
indicated he would be, when he encountered the police. He explained that he fled from police
because he had drugs in his possession, and a prior felony conviction, and further stated that he
swallowed the heroin because he had to get rid of it. Defendant denied any participation in the
robbery at Smokes.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant claims the prosecutor cross-examined him without a good faith belief that
evidence supporting the questions would be admitted, specifically in regard to questions whether
defendant’s mother was a block watch captain and whether his mother gave his name to the
police.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct. People v
Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001).
B. Analysis
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).
“Prosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to admit evidence.” People
v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999), citing People v Missouri, 100 Mich
App 310, 328; 299 NW2d 346 (1980). Thus, if the prosecutor had a good faith belief that her
questions would lead to the introduction of admissible evidence, there is no prosecutorial
misconduct.
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At trial, defendant testified that he sold drugs to support his mother’s heroin habit, so that
she did not have to prostitute herself to support it. He also testified that his mother is sometimes
delusional, although not necessarily crazy, and that he had to hide his drug money or his mother
would steal it so that she could buy drugs. That testimony was offered by defendant in support
of his testimony that he was selling drugs that day, accepted the “rental” of the GMC Jimmy as
payment for some drugs from “Scanless” and “Dude,” switched shoes with Scanless, and was on
his way to find Scanless and Dude at a drug house on Bryant Street when he was first seen by
Hemingway and subsequently chased. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant
whether his mother was a block watch captain and whether his mother gave his name to the
police.
The prosecutor’s cross-examination questions were not improper. A witness may be
cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. MRE
611(b); People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 764; 631 NW2d 281 (2001). Outside of the jury’s
presence, the prosecutor indicated that she believed defendant’s testimony was inappropriate
based on her knowledge of defendant’s mother. The prosecutor further noted that defendant had
seen the police report, and knew what evidence there was against his co-offender, and that it
involved his mother’s cooperation. Defendant’s testimony on direct examination “opened the
door” to the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination because his alibi defense was based on
his testimony that mother was a delusional heroin addict. The record indicates that prosecutor
had a good faith belief that allowed the prosecutor to ask defendant questions, if answered
honestly, would establish that defendant’s mother was not a delusional heroin addict, and that
defendant was not worthy of belief. Accordingly, defendant has not shown that the prosecutor
acted in bad faith.
Moreover, even if any of the prosecutor’s questions were improper, any error was cured
by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the evidence is supplied by the witnesses’ answers,
and not the questions posed by the parties’ counsel. “It is well established that jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229
(1998). Thus, defendant has not demonstrated error requiring reversal.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant next argues that his convictions for armed robbery and for the assault with
intent to rob while armed violate double jeopardy. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a constitutional double jeopardy challenge. People v Lett,
466 Mich 206, 212; 644 NW2d 743 (2002).
B. Analysis
The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant in jeopardy
twice for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Herron, 464 Mich
593, 609; 628 NW2d 528 (2001). These guarantees are substantially identical and protect a
defendant against both successive prosecutions for the same offense and multiple punishments
for the same offense. People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574-575; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). The Double
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Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense in order to protect
the defendant from being sentenced to more punishment than the Legislature intended. People v
Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 447-448; 687 NW2d 119 (2004).
At the outset, we note that the prosecution acknowledges that assault with intent to rob
while armed is a lesser-included offense of armed robbery, see People v Yarbrough, 107 Mich
App 332, 336; 309 NW2d 602 (1981), and thus, does not argue that the Legislature intended
multiple punishments for armed robbery and assault with intent to rob while armed for a single
armed robbery offense. Indeed, this Court has stated that, “”an assault should be punished as an
offense separate from armed robbery only where it can clearly be established that the offenses
occurred at separate times.” Id.
Rather, the prosecution argues that the armed robbery was completed before defendant
committed a separate assault with intent to rob while armed. “There is no violation of double
jeopardy protections if one crime is complete before the other takes place, even if the offenses
share common elements or one constitutes a lesser offense of the other.” People v Swinford, 150
Mich App 507, 515; 389 NW2d 462 (1986).
However, the evidence did not show that the armed robbery was completed at the time
defendant attempted to rob Dowdy. Contrary to the prosecution’s claim, the record does not
show that defendant and his accomplice had finished taking the cash and cigarettes and then
proceeded to attempt to rob Dowdy. Rather, Dowdy testified that while he was on the ground,
one of the robbers, at some point, placed a gun to his back and tapped his back pocket,
presumably to locate money. In other words, besides that Dowdy was on the ground with his
hands tied behind his back, there is no evidence showing when one of the robbers attempted to
take his money. Thus, there is no evidence to demarcate the assault of the armed robbery from
the purported separate assault that occurred when defendant attempted to take Dowdy’s money.
The remedy for conviction of multiple offenses in violation of double jeopardy is to
affirm the conviction on the greater charge and to vacate the conviction on the lesser charge.
Meshell, supra at 633-634, citing Herron, supra at 609. We vacate defendant’s conviction of
assault with intent to rob while armed, and remand for correction of the judgment of sentence.
IV. Sentencing Issues
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring offense variable (OV) 8 and
OV 17.
A. Standard of Review
The scoring of a particular sentencing factor is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear
error. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A sentencing court has
discretion in determining the number of points to be scored under an offense variable. People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). A scoring decision that lacks
supporting evidence will not be upheld. People v Elliott, 215 Mich App 259, 260; 544 NW2d
748 (1996).
B. Analysis
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Defendant argues that the trial court erred in scoring OV 8 at fifteen points. MCL
777.38(1)(a) provides that a trial court can score OV 8 at fifteen points if a “victim was asported
to another place of greater danger or to a situation of greater danger or was held captive beyond
the time necessary to commit the offense.” Defendant contends that the two female victims were
moved away from a situation of greater danger, and that the trial court erred in concluding that
isolation increased the danger to the victim.1 We conclude that the environment in the back
room constituted a situation of greater danger. The victims in the back room were threatened
with a gun, one was robbed of her money, and they were isolated from the other victims of the
crime, and further secluded from any possible intervention. Because the record contains
evidence to support the trial court’s decision to score OV 8 at fifteen points, we find no clear
error.
Defendant next argues, and plaintiff concedes, that the trial court erred in scoring OV 17
at ten points because the sentencing guidelines in effect on June 6, 2003 required that the use of a
vehicle be an element of the offense for OV 17 to be scored.2 We agree. However, an error in
scoring the sentencing guidelines that does not affect the total OV score enough to change the
applicable sentencing guidelines’ range is harmless. People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 290;
508 NW2d 509 (1994). Because a ten-point reduction of defendant’s OV score would not
change the applicable sentencing guidelines’ range, the trial court’s error is harmless, and
resentencing is not required.3
We vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed
and remand for correction of the judgment of sentence. We affirm in all other respects. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
1
We note that the movement of victim Payton is not presently at issue, as defendant was
acquitted of the charge of felonious assault against her. However, defendant was convicted of
the armed robbery of victim Comstock.
2
We address defendant’s argument only for his armed robbery convictions because of our
decision to vacate defendant’s assault with intent to rob while armed conviction, and because OV
17 was not scored for defendant’s conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction.
3
Vacating defendant’s conviction and sentence for assault with intent to rob while armed does
not change the scoring of any offense variables to the applicable sentencing guidelines’ range.
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