ROBERT BURTON V DAN DURAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT BURTON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2005
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 263463
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 03-006923-NZ
DAN DURAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiff appeals as of right an order of the trial court granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant and dismissing plaintiff’s claim. We affirm.
I
In April 2002, defendant hired plaintiff to perform repair of a leaky nine-foot-by-twelvefoot roof on a rental home owned by defendant. At the end of the second day of work, plaintiff
was attempting to cover the partially repaired roof with a tarp when the roof board gave way and
plaintiff fell approximately twenty feet to the ground. Plaintiff alleged that the roof gave way
when he stepped from the ladder onto a rotted piece of scrap wood that defendant insisted
plaintiff use to patch the roof. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, was hospitalized, and underwent
surgery. Plaintiff spent approximately nine-months at a center recuperating after his surgery,
during which time his mobility was restricted. He alleged that he thereafter was unable to fully
resume his work as a drywaller because of the residual effects of his injuries from the fall.
II
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant of summary disposition. Spiek v Dep't of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597
NW2d 28 (1999). The court considers the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and
other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
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III
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against
defendant as an employer.1 We disagree.
Plaintiff has failed to set forth any basis for reversal of the grant of summary disposition
on the ground that defendant violated his duties as an employer. Plaintiff asserts that defendant
owed plaintiff a duty to provide a safe environment in which to work. In general, “[a]n employer
must provide and maintain a reasonably safe place to work and reasonably safe tools and
appliances.” 15 Michigan Law & Practice, Employment (2d ed), § 71, p 484; see also Judis v
Borg-Warner Corp, 339 Mich 313, 323; 63 NW2d 647 (1954). As defendant points out,
however, plaintiff’s argument presupposes an employer-employee relationship. Defendant
argues that plaintiff does not qualify as an “employee” and that plaintiff was instead an
independent contractor.
We agree that plaintiff has failed to show that he was an “employee” of defendant as a
threshold matter. Plaintiff merely asserts that “[t]here can be no doubt that an employeremployee relationship was created when [defendant] hired [plaintiff] to work directly for him.”
However, plaintiff’s status as an employee is not evident from the record. An appellant may not
give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority and leave it to this
Court to search for authority to sustain or reject his position. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of
Comm'rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002); Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich
App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346 (2001).2
IV
The reasoning above likewise applies to plaintiff’s premises liability claim. Plaintiff has
not clearly set forth a legal basis for attributing liability for his injury to defendant under the facts
of this case. Plaintiff’s argument concerning his premises liability theory conflates distinct
theories of liability. Absent a clearer basis of the alleged liability, we cannot conclude that
summary disposition was improvidently granted.
In general, a premises possessor must exercise reasonable care to protect
invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on
the land. Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
However, this duty does not generally require the removal of open and obvious
1
Plaintiff has waived the filing of the lower court transcript, and, therefore, absent any record of
the hearing below or the trial court’s basis for its decision, we address plaintiff’s argument on
appeal only to the extent the record permits.
2
Moreover, the duty to provide a safe place to work is limited in application. “An employer is
not negligent for failing to furnish a safe place against apparent and obvious dangers . . .” and the
duty “does not apply to work that is inherently dangerous in its nature . . . .” 15 Michigan Law
& Practice, Employment (2d ed), § 72, p 489.
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dangers. In Lugo[ v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512,] 516-517[; 629 NW2d
384 (2001)], we rearticulated the open and obvious doctrine:
“[W]here the dangers are known to the invitee or are so obvious that the
invitee might reasonably be expected to discover them, an invitor owes no duty to
protect or warn the invitee unless he should anticipate the harm despite
knowledge of it on behalf of the invitee.” [Ghaffari v Turner Const Co, 473 Mich
16, 21-22; 699 NW2d 687 (2005).]
Plaintiff correctly notes that, in Ghaffari, the Supreme Court found the open and obvious
doctrine inapplicable in the general contractor liability context. However, contrary to plaintiff’s
argument, the decision in Ghaffari is not an appropriate basis for disregarding the open and
obvious doctrine in a premises liability claim such as this.
Unlike this case, Ghaffari involved liability of a general contractor for injury to the
employee of a subcontractor in a common work area. Id. at 18-20. The Court held that the open
and obvious doctrine and the common work area doctrine were incompatible because the former
imposes no duty if hazards are open and obvious,3 while the latter imposes an affirmative duty
“‘to guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers . . . .,’” i.e., hazards that are open
and obvious. Id. at 22-23, quoting Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 54; 684 NW2d
320 (2004). Different duties are owed under the two doctrines and the legal analysis employed
in the general contractor context is distinct from that of a premises owner. Ghaffari, supra at 2426.
As our analysis today attempts to make clear, the two doctrines at issue are
independent of and distinct from one another. The open and obvious doctrine
serves as an "integral part of the definition" of the duty a premises possessor owes
invitees, Lugo, supra at 516, while the common work area doctrine "is an
exception to the general rule of nonliability for the negligent acts of independent
subcontractors and their employees," under which "an injured employee of an
independent subcontractor [may] sue the general contractor...." Ormsby, supra at
49. The two doctrines involve completely distinct sets of plaintiffs and
defendants, and therefore, as noted in Perkoviq[ v Delcor Homes—Lake Shore
Pointe, Ltd, 466 Mich 11; 643 NW2d 212 (2002)], different sets of duties.
[Ghaffari, supra at 29.]
Plaintiff has failed to clearly distinguish these doctrines and contexts in his argument and
has not articulated the specific theories and doctrines under which defendant is allegedly liable.
An appellant may not simply “‘announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.’” Yee, supra at
406, quoting Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
3
Absent “special aspects.” Ghaffari, supra at 23 n 2.
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In any event, viewing defendant’s liability as merely a premises owner, we find no basis
for reversal. The nature of the duties owed by virtue of the ownership of property is not altered
by the fact that a defendant may have additional duties in its role as a general contractor or
employer. Perkoviq supra at 19. As the premises owner, defendant had no reason to foresee that
the condition of the premises would be unreasonably dangerous. Id. Plaintiff was aware that
scab or scrap wood was used to patch the roof, and he complained to defendant about it. The
roof lacked any other special aspects that made it unreasonably dangerous such that defendant
could not expect that plaintiff would take special precautions to guard against the obvious danger
of the allegedly substandard wood. Id. Accordingly, we find no basis for reversal of the grant of
summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s premises liability theory.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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